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ABSTRACT
A PARROT PERCHED ON A RIFLE:
MILITARY INTERPRETERS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT 1945-1953
SEPTEMBER 2020
HYONGRAE KIM, B.A., HANKUK UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES
M.A., HANKUK UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Moira Inghilleri
This dissertation presents an overview of interpreting during the Korean War by
examining shifts in the positionality of interpreters during the preparatory, engagement,
and conclusionary stages of the conflict. Here, the preparatory stage refers to the U.S.
military occupation of south Korea (1945-1948), the engagement stage refers to period of
active military engagement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its
allies against the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command (1950-1953),
while the conclusionary stage refers to the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-1953).
Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and Moira Inghilleri’s (2005a) influential
argument that interpreting takes place in a “zone of uncertainty,” this dissertation
explores how new interpreting habitus emerged as the communicational purposes and
power dynamics within the military field were oriented, disoriented, and reoriented with
the progression of the conflict. The variation in who was allowed to act as an interpreter,
the tasks interpreters were assigned, and the norms that dictated how interpreters should
act and react during interpreted events indicates a need to reconsider traditional notions
of interpreting.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview of Chapters
The Korean War (1950-53) is remembered as an important event in international
history because it was the first “United Nations War” (Edwards 2013, 1) and was dubbed
as such because when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North
Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) on June 25, 1950, and in
response the recently formed United Nations deployed the United Nations Command
(UNC), a coalition of troops assembled from sixteen UN member states, to counter the
North Korean attack. North Korea, in turn, would later be aided by troops dispatched by
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The multilingual makeup of the UNC required
that the organization rely on the services of numerous interpreters who helped bridge the
language gaps between coalition partners, facilitate communications with the local
populace, and aid in the gathering of intelligence about the enemy. It is due to the
presence of troops from various linguistic, cultural, and national backgrounds, and the
significant role interpreters and translators played throughout the war that this internecine
war has been recognized as “a particularly fertile ground for research on language”
(Müller 1984, 83).
The body of research on interlingual communication during the Korean War,
however, remains relatively small, though some insightful research on interpreting and
interpreters during the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-53) has been conducted and
presented by scholars of Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS). María Manuela
Fernández Sánchez has published two papers, “Understanding the Role of Interpreting in
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the Peacemaking Process at the Korean Armistice Negotiations (Panmunjom 1953)”
(2010) and “A Bilingual Officer Remembers Korea: A Closer Look at Untrained
Interpreters in the Korean War” (2012). On this topic both examine the technical and
emotional difficulties interpreters faced while working at the armistice talks. Her findings
indicate that interpreters at the armistice negotiations experienced role conflict,
perceptions that their work was underappreciated, high performance expectations and
perceived skill inadequacies, all of which have been identified as causes for “burnout”
(Schwenke et al. 2014; Shlesinger 2007).
In “Interpreting Conflicts and Conflicts in Interpreting: A Micro-historical
Account of the Interpreting Activity in the Korean Armistice Negotiations,” Binhua
Wang and Minhui Xu (2016) engage in a nuanced study of “post-hoc accounts” of
interpreters who served at the Korean Armistice Negotiations. Wang and Xu examine the
complex networks of relations that took form during the wartime negotiations and
analyze the various conflicts that took place during interpreted events. These conflicts
included disagreements over language use between the two sides, disputes between the
interpreters and their military superiors arising from misconceptions about interpreting
activity, and differences of opinion between different interpreters. The study reveals that
the ethical code these interpreters adopted dictated that rather than acting as neutral
mediators, which is often expected from professional interpreters in a civil setting, they
act as loyal members of the military.
Though these publications have provided much needed insight into the role
interpreters played during the Korean Armistice Negotiations, a conspicuous shortcoming
in the existing research on the Korean War is that it does not account for the activities of
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interpreters at different stages and locales of the war. Previous research by Hillary Footitt
and Michael Kelly (2018) and Jesus Baigorri-Jalon (2011) has demonstrated that
interpreters play different roles during the preparatory process, the war operations, and
the post-conflict period. During the preparatory process, interpreters are recruited to work
in diplomacy and intelligence, but once direct warfare breaks out, interpreters are
required to mediate communications among military personnel who speak different
languages, facilitate interactions with local civilians, aid in the control of occupied
territories, partake in to production of propaganda material, participate in the
interrogation of prisoners of war and support the evacuation of non-combatants. At the
end of hostilities, interpreters are required to work in peace negotiations, demobilization,
and the management of resistance or liberation movements. While previous studies that
examine interpreting during the Korean Armistice Talks have furthered our
understanding of diplomatic interpreting within the military as a conflict neared its end,
much remains to be said about the role of linguistic mediation while preparations for war
are underway and contributions interpreters make “on the ground” while hostilities are
unfolding.
In an effort to address these gaps in research about interpreting during the
Korean War, the current study engages in a comparative study of all three stages of the
conflict, namely,
(1) the preparatory phase – the U.S./U.S.S.R. military occupation of Korea
(1945-48),
(2) the engagement phase – the violent confrontation between the militaries of
North and South Korea and their respective allies (1950-53), and,
(3) the conclusionary phase – the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-53).
By expanding the scope of research to include the events that led to the war, the period of
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direct military engagement, and the circumstances that prompted its discontinuation, this
study will provide a more comprehensive picture of wartime interpreting during the
Korean conflict. The objective of this investigation is to reveal how the identity of
interpreters and what it meant to interpret was oriented, disoriented, and reoriented by the
shifting structures of hierarchy and power within the military field during the three stages
of the Korean conflict. The basis of this approach is grounded in the assumption that
interpreting is a socially-situated activity and, as such, who is allowed to function as an
interpreter in any given context and what is perceived as legitimate interlingual mediation
is liable to shift as the communicative objectives of social agents and organization, as
well as the conditions under which interpreting takes place change.
The empirical data presented in this dissertation draws from a diverse corpus that
includes military documents, archival material, personal memoirs, biographies,
interviews, historical studies and short stories. The documents collected from the online
Korean History Database and the United States National Archives at College Park, which
includes meeting notes, letters, and newspaper articles, are a crucial source of
information on the positionality of interpreter within the various power structures that
arose during different periods of the Korean conflict. The inclusion of these documents in
my research is significant as they are previously unpublished and are therefore under
scholarly examination for the first time.
In addition to the archival documents, I also draw on a variety of biographical
material (memoirs, autobiographies, and interviews). The use of these sources is often
marginalized in social scientific research (Watson 1976, 95) as questions have been
raised about the reliability of autobiographical accounts and the vulnerability of such
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material to manipulation by other parties such as ethnographers, interpreters, and
interviewers. Despite these potential shortcomings, many studies conducted within the
social sciences make use of biographical materials, albeit with careful consideration of
their application, because, as Perk (1998, 69) points out, the life stories told by
individuals provide “a much closer view of personal involvement in the history, which
may compensate for the chronological distance” in most history publications.
Furthermore, what information individuals choose to include and omit, as well as the
subjective manner in which this data is narrativized is a strong indicator of the narrator’s
ethical beliefs, which can be as valuable as objective facts. Thus, I have opted to include
excerpts from the writings of military interpreters who worked with the U.S. military
during the Korean War and the Korean Armistice Negotiations.
Lastly, I consult fictional representations of interpreters and translators, or
transfiction, written during this period by Korean writers and U.S. military personnel who
lived in Korea during the U.S. military occupation and/or the Korean War. As stated
earlier, historical records which mention interpreters or interpreting during the Korean
War are limited. Due to the absence of relevant transcripts or recordings, it is difficult to
engage in traditional discourse analysis and reveal how individual interpreters worked
within the social structures in which they were positioned. The fictional works seen in
this study provide vivid portrayals of communicative exchanges mediated by interpreters
caught in the midst of the Korean conflict. Such depictions of translators and interpreters
in literary works are valuable sources of knowledge about the interpreting profession in
history. An added benefit of engaging with transfictional works is the fact that fiction can
speak to the emotional aspects of translation in a way that nonfiction often does not, and,
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as such, is a particularly useful resource for “exploring the impact of feelings like desire,
empathy, shame, anger and fear” on interlingual communication (Spitzl 2014, 363-368).
Such details are particularly relevant to the present study insofar as it examines how
interlingual mediation takes place under the pressures of conflict, during which tensions
are high and violence is likely to erupt at any moment. While this study is grounded in a
macro-sociological approach, it recognizes the fact that excerpts taken from fiction offer
details about interpreting in the context of violent warfare which would otherwise be
inaccessible, and thus views them as useful resources for providing description and
analysis of interpreting practices during the Korean conflict.
The contents of this dissertation are organized as follows: chapter one reviews
the existing literature within TIS that engages with translators and interpreters during
violent conflict situations. It introduces the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of
field, capital, habitus, and zones of uncertainty as the theoretical basis of this study.
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is particularly effective when applied to the study of
interpreters because interpreting often takes place in social contexts in which differing
communicational objectives and unequal social status among agents and institutions
engaged in interpreted events is the norm. The Bourdieusian framework introduced in
this chapter serves as the foundation for the central argument of this study: that the
identity of the interpreter and the norms of interpreting are prone to change as the
communicational purposes and the power dynamics between social agents engaged is
oriented, disoriented, and reoriented by changes that emerge within a social field.
Chapter two examines how interlingual communicative encounters were
mediated during the U.S. military occupation of southern Korea. I first elaborate on the
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circumstances that led to the division and occupation of Korea by the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S. and reveal how faulty planning by the United States military, Korea’s history of
subjugation under Japanese colonial rule, the frustration felt by the Korean public
towards foreign intervention by the two superpowers, and the ideological hostilities
brought on by the onset of the Cold War created tensions between American officials
within the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), the Korean
public, and Korean civilian interpreters working for the Military Government. Memoirs,
military records, fictional works, and newspaper articles are consulted to reveal why the
Military Government earned the moniker “the interpreter’s government” and what caused
widespread negativity to be felt towards the so-called “malicious interpreters” working
for the U.S. military.
Chapter three begins with a brief historical review of the Korean War. It explains
why the military brass of the United States opted to rely on interpreters provided by the
South Korean military rather than train its own linguists. The tensions that arose between
UN Liaison Group officers (interpreters), U.S. Korean Military Assistant Group (KMAG)
officers, and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) unit commanders during interpreted
events are the main focus of this portion of the dissertation. I argue that although both
KMAG officers and ROKA commanders sought to gain control over the interpreting
habitus, the balance of power between the two sides and the mutual animosity felt
between UN Liaison Group officers and their military superiors prevented either of these
interlocutors from fully asserting their dominance during interpreted events held during
the war.
Chapter four focuses on the form and function interpreting took during the
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Korean Armistice Negotiations. I consider a range of factors, such as the affiliation of
United Nations Command (UNC) interpreters, their military rank, the diplomatic
conference setting, and the presence of enemy interpreters who monitored the
interpreter’s work. These factors collectively served to uncompromisingly constrain the
interpreter during the armistice talks, forcing them to function as “faithful echoes” of
their military superiors when interpreting. I argue that while institutions of power, such as
the U.S. military at the Korean Armistice Negotiations, may possess the power to compel
interpreters to function as so-called linguistic conduits, illusionary assumptions of what
constitutes objective approaches to interpreting can hamper rather than encourage
coherent interlingual/cultural communication and discourage the interpreter’s moral and
professional unaccountability.
Chapter five ties the study together by comparing how the communicational
goals and power dynamics between interlocutors engaged in interpreted events during
each stage of the Korean conflict led to the formation of unique interpreting habitus
specific to the context in which interpreting was taking place. It considers how changes to
the interpreter’s position within the military field influenced their ability to ensure that
the communication objectives of social agents engaged in interpreted events are met. I
argue that while interpreters can take on different roles based on the contexts in which
they engage, interventionist tactics are often the result of pragmatic necessity rather than
ulterior personal or political motives. On the other hand, mechanisms instituted to
guarantee the neutrality of the interpreter and the fidelity of their words to the original
statement are often imposed to ensure the maintenance of structures of power, encourage
moral unaccountability, and ultimately obfuscate communication in order to satisfy the
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strategic aims of the institutions of power.

1.2. Literature Review: Interpreters in Violent Conflict
While early scholars of translation of interpreting in the 1960s were interested in
issues of so-called “equivalence,” the interests of the field shifted in the mid-1980s
towards the exploration of issues of power, ideology, resistance, ethics, and activism
which revealed translators and interpreters to be active participants in the transfer of
written texts and oral exchanges rather than unbiased conduits (Even-Zohar 1978,
Hermans 1985, Lefevere 1992, Niranjana 1992, Spivak 1993, Toury 1995, Venuti 1995,
Mikkelson 1998; Wadensjö 1998; Angelelli 2004a, 2004b; Shlesinger and Pöchhacker
2010). These studies challenged previous notions that interlingual/cultural
communication should or even can take place in a neutral vacuum and argued that in fact
that translation and interpreting actually occurs within confrontational social spaces in
which different parties vie for power by controlling the form and flow of linguistic
exchange.
Due to the confrontational nature of translation and interpreting, metaphors of
violence were often used as part of the language employed during discussions among
scholars in the field, yet studies conducted in the field rarely engaged with the topic of
interlingual communication within the context of violent conflict. Myriam Salma-Carr
was one of the first to point out the longstanding paradox in TIS to view translation in
terms of violent metaphors yet represent the individual language mediator as situated in a
position of “in-between” where risks to their wellbeing are “manageable” (Salama-Carr
2007, 1). She urged researchers to engage with actual situations of political, cultural, and
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ideological confrontation in which the translator/interpreter is firmly embedded in rather
than merely serving as a metaphor for the tensions and conflicts that inevitably arise
during intercultural communication. A large body of studies have since examined how
language mediators function under conditions of fierce hostility.
Given that wars are typically fought between countries and peoples who spak and
write in different languages, there is an inherent requirement for interlingual
communication within the context of warfare. While the ability to communicate with
one’s allies and adversaries is crucial to the waging of war, the role of translators and
interpreters is often overlooked by the media, policymakers, and scholars outside of
Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS). As Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly note,
Until the turn of the twenty-first century, foreign languages, translation and
interpreting were almost totally absent from discussions about war and conflict,
receiving little attention from academics (such as military historians, translation
scholars, and international relations specialists), from the military themselves, or
from the general public. The tacit assumption seemed to be that most wars are
fought with allies, and against enemies, who obligingly speak our own language.
(Footitt and Kelly 2018, 166)
Rosendo and Persaud (2016, 2) surmised that possible reasons for the lack of
historical records and studies pertaining to interpreters may be due to the primacy of the
written word over the spoken word, which implies that the work of translators is more
likely to have been examined than that of interpreters due to the often perceived lower
social status of these spoken language brokers, and the fact that when historians leave
records of historical events, they must choose what details to include and which to leave
out, meaning that the participation of individuals of secondary roles, such as interpreters,
tend to go unrecorded. Afterall, the annals of war do not provide details about every
human activity but tend to chronicle the “great deeds of great men, statesmen, generals”
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(Burke 1992, 3-4). Even on those rare occasions when the presence of the interpreter is
acknowledged, records often lack detailed descriptions or commentary on the most-often
unnamed interpreter’s work. The marginalization of interpreting and interpreters is also
evident in visual portrayals of wartime interpreters, as Fernández Sánchez notes that
interpreters are very rarely the focus of the wartime photographs in which they are
featured, and “this position reflects both the function of interpreters as mediators and the
marginality of their role” (Fernández Sánchez 2014, 173).
More scholarly interest in interpreting in the history of conflict has begun to
emerge over the past several decades within TIS, as evinced by the works of authors such
as Gaiba (1998), Roland (1999), Delisle and Woodsworth (2012), Baigorri (2014). This
rise in research on interpreting in violent conflict is the result of trends that have emerged
since the “cultural turn” in TIS. Particularly relevant to the present study is research
conducted on the involvement of interpreters in modern conflicts, such as the role of
interpreters working with French, British, and U.S. troops during World War I
(Heimburger 2012) and in the campaigns in Europe and the Pacific during World War II
(McNaughton 2007, Takeda 2009, Tryuk 2012, Footitt and Kelly 2012, 2018; Footitt and
Tobia 2013). Other publications report on recent African conflicts in the Darfuri (Hari
2008), the Former Yugoslav Republics (Stahuljak 2000, 2009; Dragovic-Drouet 2007;
Baker C. 2010a, 2010b; Kelly and Baker 2012), and Iraq and Afghanistan (Baker, M.
2006, 2010; Inghilleri 2008, 2009, 2010; Tipton 2011; Rafael 2007, 2012). There are also
revealing first-hand accounts of military linguists’ experiences in the U.S. detention
facility in Guantánamo Bay (Saar and Novak 2005).
There have also been a number of collected works published on the topic of
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translation and violent conflict. The studies collected in Translating and Interpreting
Conflict, edited by Salama-Carr (2007) engage with topics including the role of “fixers”
working for Western Media during the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Palmer 2007), translation
and interpreting practices during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Dragovic-Drouet
2007), translators and interpreters during the Opium War (Wong 2007), and several
more. A special issue of the academic journal The Translator (Inghilleri and Harding
2010) entitled “Translation and Violent Conflict” discusses a range of relevant topics,
such as the decision to and consequences of interpreting during the war in Iraq (Inghilleri
2010), narratives of translators and interpreters in war zones and the construction of
narratives of conflict by translators and interpreters (Baker 2010), the translation of
Bosnian and Serbian poetry during the violent breakup of Yugoslavia (Jones 2007), the
management of interpreters recruited to work in British war crimes trials following World
War II (Tobia 2007), and the depiction of translators as traitors in historical records, film,
fiction, and news reports (Beebee 2007). The special issue of Linguistica Antverpiensia
(Rosendo and Persaud 2016) on “Interpreting in Conflict Situations and in Conflict Zones
throughout History” is also a valuable source for research on the history of interpreting. It
contains a collection of studies on the history of interpreters in various historical contexts
such as interpreters working for the Dutch East India Company during the Sino-Dutch
War (1661-1662) (Chang 2016), French interpreters during World War I (Cowley 2016),
interpreting in Nazi concentration camps during World War II (Tryuk 2016), as well as
the role of mediators in more recent conflicts in Afghanistan (Tălpaș 2016) and Kosova
and Macedonia (Todorova 2016).
Taken as a whole, this growing body of literature on military interpreting
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provides a clear picture of the critical role that interpreters play in influencing both the
progression and representation of a war, irrespective of the historical period or geopolitical nature of the conflict. The study of interlingual communication and warfare will
likely continue to entice scholars of TIS because this context has proven to be a fruitful
ground for the testing of theories developed within the field. Though the extreme
conditions of war might appear to have little to do with the circumstances interpreters
typically encounter in a civilian setting, in fact, it is under the duress of violent warfare,
where implicit hierarchical structures of power are explicated, that the discursive
structures formed in interpreted interactions become clearly visible and the tensions over
legitimate forms of communication are most starkly revealed.

1.3. Sociological Approaches to Interpreting in Violent Conflict
A variety of methodological approaches have emerged from existing research on
military interpreting, though most studies are cross-disciplinary in character. “Historical
perspectives” draw on case studies, oral histories, and archive material to understand the
sociopolitical and historical context of particular conflicts that involved interpreting and
interpreters. One such work is Ruth Roland’s Interpreters as Diplomats: Diplomatic
History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics (1990), which is an historical
account of the numerous roles interpreters assume in diplomatic and political history that
relies on anecdotes, interpreters’ diaries, and governmental administrative records.
Roland notes that from ancient times to the Cold War era, interpreters have played a
crucial role in military conquests and political negotiations in which they may accrue
significant power due to their political or military affiliations, and where they are liable
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to “grossly abuse their power” rather than voluntarily abide by any professional codes
when faced with conflicting ideologies and risk to their own lives (Roland 1999, 171).
But while Roland’s work sheds light on the work of interpreters that had previously been
ignored, because it was written for the general reader by a political scientist, the book
does not pay much attention to topics often discussed in TIS, such as interpreter training
or modes of interpreting.
In The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial, Gaiba
(1998) investigates the interpreters and the interpreting arrangements at the Nuremberg
Trial. The strength of this study lies in the breadth and depth of information the author
collected on interpreting at this historic venue, which prior to the publication of this book
had not been extensively discussed. Based on an examination of a wide range of
materials including transcripts, archival documents, microfilm and interviews with
several interpreters, Gaiba describes the preparation stage, the interpreting system, the
impact of interpreting on the proceedings, and the personal backgrounds of some of the
interpreters.
“Textual approaches,” or narrative approaches, on the other hand, consider how
interpreters exercise their agency against the politically-inflected narratives that are
constructed by institutions of power to garner domestic and international support for a
war. In Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account, Mona Baker (2006) employs
narrative theory to examine the role played by translators and interpreters in mediating
conflict in various arenas of conflict, including Guantanamo, Iraq, and Kosova. Baker
argues that translation, and by extension interpreting, is not an innocent act but “part of
the institution of war” (Baker 2006, 1-2) as translators and interpreters participate in the
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active circulation, promotion and resistance against narratives that are circulated through
a society and between societies via translation and interpreting. Baker emphasizes that
though interpreted utterances may serve as weapons for waging war, they may also be
used as acts of subversion:
undermining existing patterns of domination cannot be achieved by concrete
forms of activism alone – demonstrations, sit-ins, civil disobedience – but must
involve a direct challenge to the stories that sustain them. As language mediators,
translators and interpreters are uniquely placed to initiate this type of discursive
intervention at a global level.
(Baker 2006, 6)
The insight that interpreting can be used as a tool to combat the narratives of powerful
institutions was further examined by Julie Boéri (2008) who applies narrative theory to
examine the emergence of interpreting communities that adopt an activist approach to
interpreting.
Finally, research adopting a more “sociological approach” examines the
networks of power and structures of hierarchy and power that dictate the actions of social
institutions and agents in the context of a particular conflict. The sociological perspective
is readily applicable to the studying of interpreting as interpreting is a socially regulated
activity that takes place between social agents, rather than being a purely linguistic
exchange. The earliest published research to draw attention to interpreting as a socially
situated activity was penned by sociologist R. Bruce W. Anderson (1976). Anderson
modelled interpreting as a three-party interaction, with the bilingual interpreter assuming
the pivotal mediating role between the monolingual producer and the monolingual
consumer. He argued that the power of the interpreter arises from their position in the
middle which has “the advantages of power inherent to all positions which control scarce
resources” (Anderson 1976, 218-219). This advantage, when combined with the relative
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ambiguity of the interpreter’s role, allows the interpreter considerable latitude in defining
their own behavior vis-à-vis the client(s). Unfortunately, his work was not taken up by
interpreting scholars until over a decade later.
The work of Miriam Shlesinger (1989), who applied of Gideon Toury’s theory of
translation norms to interpreting, paved the way for research that viewed interpreting as a
social act, and not merely a linguistic activity. The notion of norms, developed by Toury
(1995) mainly in the context of literary translation, is one of the most influential concepts
in TIS. Toury was amongst the first scholars to underscore the fact that translation takes
place amid complex cultural, political, and historical contexts, and, like all other social
behavior, is regulated by norms. With regards to translation activity, Toury viewed norms
as “the translation of general values or ideas shared by a community—as to what is right
and wrong, adequate and inadequate—into performance instructions appropriate for and
applicable to particular situations” (Toury 1995, 54-55). His view of translation as a
norm-governed activity inspired many TIS scholars to focus on the target text and culture
rather than on the correspondence between the source and target texts, to describe
translation activities rather than prescribing them, and to pay attention to the cultural and
sociological aspects of translational phenomena rather than limit analysis to the linguistic
features of a translated text.
Later, the work of Cecilia Wadensjö (1998), drawing from the work of Erving
Goffman (1981), highlighted the triadic nature of interpreter-mediated events, which
encouraged scholars in the field to apply discourse analytic and sociological models to
the empirical study of interpreting. Two currents of research have emerged from this
body of work: the micro-sociological approach, or social interactionist approach, which
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widely uses discourse analysis as its theoretical framework, and the macro-sociological
approach, which draws on social theories, most notably the French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu’s field theory, to account for interpreters’ agency in interpreted social
interactions.
The macro-social approach to the study of interpreting was pioneered by Moira
Inghilleri, who presented (2003) a theoretical model to examine translation norms in
interpreting by incorporating Toury’s notion of norms with Bourdieu’s concepts of
habitus and field, and Bernstein’s pedagogic discourse. She uses asylum hearings as
examples to argue that norms are realized in and through interactions between the
interpreter and various other participants of the interpreted event. Inghilleri’s work came
in response to an earlier attempt by Daniel Simeoni to apply Bourdieu’s theories to TIS in
his article “The Pivotal Status of the Translator’s Habitus” (1998) in which Simeoni
rather depressingly theorized that over the centuries the “translatorial habitus” had
contributed to the internalization of submissive behavior on the part of the translator
which has led to the low social prestige of the profession. Simeoni argued that the
translator’s “voluntary servitude” significantly contributed to the secondariness of their
activity (Simeoni 1998, 6). The question of the translator’s alleged subservience is
directly addressed by Inghilleri (2005b) who offered an alternative reading of Bourdieu’s
theorization of the habitus of translators and interpreters, suggesting that they can be
“both implicated in and able to transform the forms of practice in which they engage.”
She examines acts of interpreting in relation to the social practices and relevant fields in
which they are embedded, rather than seeing interpreting as taking place in its own static
professtional field. Bourdieu’s field theory has proven to be a useful framework for the
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study of interpreting as a social act and interpreters as social agents, serving as an
alternative to theories developed within Descriptive Translation Studies, which often fail
to considered the agency of individual linguistic mediators by focusing excessively on the
systems in which they function.

1.4. Habitus, Field, Capital, and the Zone of Uncertainty
Over the past two decades, a significant number of scholars have applied
Bourdieu’s sociological approaches to TIS (Simeoni 1998; Gouanvic 2005; Inghilleri
2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Wolf 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2015; Torikai 2009, 2014; Grbić
2014; Guo 2017), and his concepts of “habitus,” “field,” and “capital” are widely
discussed in various contexts, from asylum interpreting to the professionalization of
translation and interpreting. Inghilleri (2005a, 126) notes that Bourdieu’s sociological
approach “provides a set of powerful tools” for conceptualizing interpreters’ practices,
especially their “reproductive or transformative” roles in particular historical and sociocultural contexts. Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts are interrelated and can be employed to
analyze the practices of social agents and the dialectical relationship that emerges
between agents within social institution. According to Bourdieu, social space is a
“multidimensional space” comprised of multiple fields in which agents’ positions are
defined according to the types of capital they possess or accrue (Bourdieu 1991, 229).
Bourdieu understands “fields” to be confrontational spaces in which individuals and
institutions struggle for the production, attainment, and dissemination of capital. Here,
“capital” refers to any assets (cultural, economic, social, etc.) which social agents
collectively or individually view as valuable and are associated with both material and
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symbolic wealth. It is important to note that Bourdieu posits a social world (what he
sometimes refers to as the field of power) comprised of multiple fields, each capable of
being further divided into subfields. Each subfield, though it follows the overall logic of
the larger field with which it is associated, has its own internal logic, rules and
regularities. Though fields are hierarchized, with the most dominant agents and
institutions holding considerable power, there is nonetheless space for agency and change
within and between them. An agent’s “habitus” is formed based on an agent’s position
within a field and can be understood as an acquired schemata, dispositions, or, “a sense of
the game, ordinarily described as a ‘spirit’ or ‘sense’ (philosophical, literary, artistic,
etc.)” (Bourdieu 2000, 11).
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, this study first reconstructs the
social space in which the Korean conflict was fought in order to contextualize and
analyze interpreters’ practices throughout its duration. Bourdieu offers three steps which
can be used to investigate a given field and the social agents who occupy it:
1. analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power;
2. map out the objective structures of relations between the positions occupied by
the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate forms of specific
authority of which this field is a site;
3. analyze the habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have
acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition,
and which find in a definite trajectory within the field…a more or less
favorable opportunity to become actualized.
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992a, 104-5)
Inghilleri outlines this conceptual approach in relation to interpreted events in the
asylum system as follows,
In interpreted events, where multiple fields and habitus intersect, social agents
representing well-established professions (e.g., judges, solicitors, civil servants)
will reproduce with some certainty what they feel to be the ‘objective’ structures
of their respective fields. Such agents will possess culturally significant forms of
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capital linked to their respective fields, in this case the legal and political fields,
which confer prestige, status and authority upon them. These fields are part of the
larger universe of symbolic institutions that reproduce existing power relations
through the production and distribution of a dominant culture that tacitly
confirms what counts as legitimate linguistic and cultural knowledge in the
context of the legal system. But what of interpreters if, as suggested above, the
interpreting profession occupies a far less certain social position? Their
relationship to any or all of the inter-locking fields that converge on the
interpreting context may reflect this positioning, making it more likely that others
will define and control the social/interactive space through the imposition of their
respective habitus.
(Inghilleri 2005a, 5)
Nevertheless, she indicates the potential for what she refers to as an “interpreting
habitus” to emerge in which interpreters can and do exert equal or greater control over
interpreting activity, including in situations where this involves the disruption of preestablished power relations.
I would argue that a specific interpreting habitus can emerge from interpreting
activity that simultaneously disrupts power relations and structures interpreted
events in such a way as to allow all participants to operate with a shared
understanding regarding interpreting activity. However, the specific ways that a
particular interpreting context is structured by and structures the interpreting
habitus – which or whose normative practices prevail – will depend on the
interplay in social/interactional space between social agents, field(s) and their
accompanying habitus. The interpreting habitus is thus, like habitus more
generally, by its very nature, contingent upon macro and micro orderings of
experience.
(ibid.)
In this dissertation, the emergence of an interpreting habitus within the military
field and across three different phases in which interpreting took place during the Korean
conflict is identified and analyzed: the U.S. military occupation, the Korean War, and the
Korean Armistice Negotiations. The three stages are distinctive due to the particular
identities of the interpreters, the specify communicative purposes of each event, and the
specific social and geopolitical conditions under which the interpreting occurred. The
distinction between the events is primarily temporal, though there is an overlap between
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the Korean War and the Armistice Talks, as the negotiations took place while the war
was still being waged. To some extent, therefore, the categorization is also geographical,
as the armistice negotiations were restricted to two sites, Kaesong and Panmunjom, while
the entirety of the Korean peninsula was made a battlefield.1
The idea of a “fictive kinship” as regards to the interpreters’ relationships to
members of the military will also be examined and will include local civilian interpreters
working for the U.S. occupational government, South Korean military interpreters
working with U.S. military officers, and the relationship between U.S. military
interpreters and their military superiors at the Korean Armistice negotiations. In doing so,
it will reveal how the physical, political, cultural, and ideological proximity of these
interpreters to the institutions they served determined how closely they aligned
themselves with the role morality and ordinary morality of the U.S. military institution.

1

In Surviving in Violent Conflicts: Chinese Interpreters in the Second Sino-Japanese
War 1931-1945, Ting Guo (2017) also looks at interpreters working across three different
contexts: the Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Japanese
military during the Second Sino-Japanese War, focusing on the asymmetry in the role
they played in each group. The KMT, she notes, only required the services of JapaneseChinese interpreters or translators for diplomatic negotiations and intelligence gathering
during the war, for which it had an adequate supply as a significant number of Chinese
had studied in Japan. The Chinese Communist forces had the least need for interpreters.
Their main partner was the Soviet Union and their interpreting needs could be met by
Chinese cadres who had studied in Russia. The Communist Party used only party
members as interpreters and felt confident of their loyalty. In contrast with the Chinese,
the Japanese invading forces needed an extraordinarily large number of competent
interpreters. There were, of course, a number of Japanese who had studied Chinese; there
were also the members of the colonized Taiwanese population, who generally had to use
Japanese language in school and thus became bilingual. In addition, an estimated 50,000
Chinese, many of them in the occupied areas, held college degrees from Japanese
universities. Despite this large pool, the number was insufficient, and the Japanese had to
recruit locally. Those who cooperated with the Japanese were often deemed traitors and
collaborators. Some were targeted during the conflict and many labeled traitors
afterward, showing how interpreters so often find themselves on the frontlines of combat
and in the crosshairs after defeat.
21

The concepts of “role morality” as defined by professional codes of conduct, and
“ordinary morality” as driven by personal feelings of responsibility for one’s actions
within a specific cultural context are amongst the issues discussed in Interpreting Justice:
Ethics, Politics, and Language (Inghilleri 2012) in which the expectations and realities of
interpreting in different types of conflict situations are discussed at length. Whether in the
mass arrest of undocumented workers in a meat-packing plant in Postville, Iowa, asylum
adjudication procedures in the U.K., or within the U.S. forces during the Iraq invasion
and subsequent occupation, in each setting the impossibility of interpreters achieving a
neutral stance prescribed by codes of conduct is in evidence. The book concludes that
professional codes of interpreter conduct which focus purely on “role morality” do not
sufficiently take into account the varied contexts in which interpreted communication
takes place and tend to disregard the matter of the interpreters’ responsibility to morally
respond to injustices they observe while performing their work. Inghilleri’s examination
of local and contract interpreters in Iraq is particularly relevant to this dissertation as it
reveals the ethical choices made by local interpreters both to serve and while serving with
the U.S. military and the interpreting habitus that emerged as a result of the social,
economic, and political conditions under which they worked. She argues that interpreters
in violent conflict zones cease to be mere linguistic conduits and instead often adopt a
“fictive kinship” with the military that further shields them from the ethical demands of
their role. As such, interpreters, like combatants, can become “embodied conduits” of
the political and military institutions they agree to serve, and adopt the same “role
morality” as the soldiers with whom they serve (Inghilleri 2012, 112).
The current study adopts the view that interpreting takes place in “zones of
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uncertainty”, a term Bourdieu uses to refer to weak positions located in the gaps between
fields, where different fields converge, and interlocutors, each with a different “feel for
the game,” interact with other agents and assert with varying levels of certainty the
validity of their social practices, or habitus (Inghilleri 2005a, 4).
Bourdieu views zones of uncertainty as contradictory and potentially liberatory
spaces within a social structure in which contradictions emerge from a
convergence of conflicting world views that momentarily upset the relevant
habitus. He suggests that zones of uncertainty are located in the gaps or spaces
between fields – hence their lack of clear social definition.
Following Bourdieu, I argue for a view of interpreting as a potentially social and
disruptive space where contradictions may emerge due to the convergence of distinct
fields, and the social/institutional/discursive practices associated with them. The
possibility of gaps or spaces emerging between fields will always be contingent upon the
particular context in which an interpreting event takes place and the wider network of
power that exists outside of or emerges within it. The level of uncertainty can become
higher when the value of the symbolic capital of a dominant institution of power goes
unrecognized, enabling others to challenge the normative view of what constitutes a
legitimate practice. In some cases, a more empowered interpreter may be able to use their
own linguistic or cultural capital to challenge existing normative practices and demand
that new ones be employed. On the other hand, when the level of uncertainty is low, the
dominant institution is more likely to assert its control over the interpreting habitus.
This dissertation will examine how, within competing military fields, the
interpreting habitus transformed across three stages of the Korean conflict due to a
number of factors including, the different status of the military and civilian interpreters,
the value of the symbolic capital they and other relevant social agents possessed, and the
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social hierarchies that emerged as the local and geopolitical conditions evolved. It will
show how, when the authority of different institutions of power was challenged or when
the value of some interpreters’ linguistic capital became highly valued, the interpreting
habitus underwent additional significant transformations. Under these circumstances, the
prior assumption of the institutions and the social agents involved were brought into a
new relationship during which, in certain stages of the war, the habitus of some or all
participants was disrupted, challenging their previously taken for granted specialized
knowledge and networks of power.
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CHAPTER 2
THE U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION OF KOREA (1945-48):
A GOVERNMENT OF, FOR, AND BY THE INTERPRETER
The current chapter will reveal how the power dynamics between social agents
engaged in interpreted events shaped the form that interlingual communication would
take within the field of military occupation in southern Korea (1945-48). Employing
Bourdieu’s theoretical approach as a framework for examination, this chapter will first
examine the position of the military field of occupation vis-à-vis larger fields of power,
namely the diplomatic field in Northeast Asia leading up to and during the occupation. In
his works, Bourdieu defines fields as “historically constituted areas of activity with their
specific institutions and own laws of functioning” (Bourdieu 1990, 87). As such, a study
of the military field in Korea during the U.S. occupation must expand beyond the period
under direct examination and include the circumstances that preceded it, most notably the
Japanese colonization of Korea (1910-45) and the U.S.-Japanese conflict during World
War II (1941-45). The chapter will then introduce the United States Army Military
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and the communicational challenges it faced during
the occupation. Various factors forced the Military Government to rely heavily on the
services of locally recruited Korean civilian interpreters, as a result of which it was
mocked as a “government of, for, and by the interpreter” and an “interpreter’s
government.”

2.1. WWII and its Aftermath in Northeast Asia
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The Korean peninsula, divided along the 38th parallel into communist North and
capitalist South, stands as one of the final vestiges of the Cold War. The roots of the
division can be traced back to 1910, when Korea, which existed as a unified state for
more than a millennium, was colonized by Imperial Japan. World War II broke out in the
Asia-Pacific Theater when the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service attacked various U.S.
Navy bases, most notably Pearl Harbor, to prevent the U.S. Pacific Fleet from intervening
in its military actions in Southeast Asia, where it sought to seize control over the
European colonies in the region. The surprise attack, which was condemned for being
carried out without a declaration of war, provided the Japanese army with an advantage
during the early stages of the war; it left the U.S. military in the Pacific severely depleted,
allowing the Japanese to expand into much of Southeast Asia (Willmott 1983: 14). The
United States Navy, however, was able to quickly rebuild its forces and after two decisive
victories in 1942, at the Battle of Guadalcanal and the Battle of Midway Island, the tides
of war turned in favor of the United States. Following these two defeats, Japan was
unable to further extend its sphere of power, which might have provided it access to more
resources with which to mount an offensive. The resurgent United States implemented a
strategy of “island hopping” or “leapfrogging” and steadily captured Japanese territory in
the Pacific (Roehrs and Renzi 2004, 122). A series of bases were built on these captured
islands, allowing for direct and massive bombing raids over the Japanese mainland, at
which point Japan’s defeat was inevitable.
In late 1943, with victory seemingly a matter of time, U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek met in Cairo to discuss the shape Asia’s political landscape would take
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following Japan’s surrender. The results of these talks were issued on November 27,
1943 in the Cairo Declaration, which states that the Allies would continue deploying
military force until Japan’s unconditional surrender and that they had agreed that after the
war, Japan would be stripped of all the overseas territories it had gained after 1895
(Latourette 1957, 627). The United States, the United Kingdoms, and China also
proclaimed:
The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and
independent.2
The vague phrasing regarding the time frame envisioned by the leaders of the Allies
before Korea would be granted full independence left much up to speculation and would
later be the source of widespread discontent amongst the Korean people. It was later
revealed that, in fact, Roosevelt believed Korea would require a period of tutelage of up
to forty years before it could be granted sovereignty while Stalin, on the other hand,
advocated that such intervention be limited to a period of five years (Barry 2012, 38).
With Japanese forces on the defensive, the Allies once more called for the
unconditional surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces on July 26, 1945, in the Potsdam
Declaration, proclaiming that the only alternative would be “prompt and utter
destruction.”3 The Declaration, signed by U.S. President Harry Truman, British Prime
Minister Clement Attlee, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, affirmed that once
the Japanese were defeated the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be carried out and

For the text of the Cairo Declaration, see McNelly, Sources in Modern East Asian
History and Politics, 154.
3
For the text of the Potsdam Declaration, see McNelly, Sources in Modern East Asian
History and Politics, 166-168.
2
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Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and
Shikoku, which constitute the Japanese mainland. The Japanese leadership responded to
the Declaration with their own pronouncements to fight to the bitter end. On August 6,
1945, the United States detonated an atomic bomb over the city of Hiroshima and on
August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union, which had thus far avoided conflict with the Japanese
in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, declared war on Japan and
invaded the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, in northeastern China. Later that day,
the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki. While there
was considerable pushback from the military, on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito
gave a recorded radio address to the Japanese Empire announcing the surrender to the
Allies, thus ending the war.
On August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur issued General Order Number One for the
surrender of Japan.4 The order instructed the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to
direct its military and naval commanders in the field to surrender their forces and
weapons to specifically designated representatives of the Allied Powers (the United
States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and Republic of China) who had divided Japanese
territory into four zones. The U.S. would occupy Japan, as it had conducted the attacks on
Japan’s main islands, as well as Korea south of the 38th Parallel. The Soviets would take
the surrender of Japanese forces in Manchuria, Korea north of the 38th Parallel, and
Karafuto (southern Sakhalin). The British military would conduct operations in Southeast

For a detailed discussion of the drafting of General Order No.1 see Gallichio, The Cold
War Begins in Asia, 75-92
4
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Asia south of the 16th Parallel and troops in China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa, and
Indochina north of the 16th Parallel would surrender to the representatives of the Republic
of China.
The Soviet Union entered northern Korea on August 14, 1945 and arrived in
Pyongyang, the largest city north of the 38th, on August 24, 1945. It established the
Soviet Civil Administration (SCA) as the occupying government on October 3, 1945, and
the United States military, preoccupied with circumstances in Japan, only arrived at
Incheon harbor on September 8, 1945, and established the United States Army Military
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in Seoul, the capital of the country.

2.2. The Dismantling of the People’s Republic of Korea
Historians agree that the decision to occupy and divide Korea stemmed from the
inability of American bureaucrats to comprehend the possibility that a potent sense of
nationalism or will for unification and independence could exist in Korea (Cumings
1981, Lee 1982, Gallicchio 1988), despite the fact that Korea had stood as a single
unified state since the 10th century, sharing a common ethnicity, language, and culture,
with well-recognized national boundaries. It was therefore unsurprising that the people
resisted the idea of trusteeship and felt humiliated by the prospect of yet another period of
great-power “tutelage,” having just endured thirty-five years under Japanese colonial
control. If any country should have been divided following World War II it was Japan,
which like Germany, was an aggressor. Instead, as a result of the ideological rivalry
brewing between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it was countries like Korea, China, and
Vietnam that suffered this fate. As a former German ambassador to Korea would
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comment, “While we Germans were divided after the war because of our sin, the Koreans
were divided because of their innocence” (Breen 2004, 117).
The U.S. occupation felt further unjustified owing to the fact that in August 1945,
when it became clear Japan would lose the war, an indigenous governing body, the
People’s Republic of Korea (PRK), had been established in consultation with Japanese
colonial authorities before the U.S. or U.S.S.R. arrived in Korea. According to William
Stueck and Boram Yi (2010, 180-181), “fearing that Koreans would respond by attacking
the more than 378,000 Japanese civilians and 163,000 Japanese military […] Abe
approached Yo Un-hyung” who organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean
Independence (CPKI) with the assent of General Abe Nobuyuki, the last Japanese
Governor-General of Korea, in preparation for Korean independence.56 Immediately after

For all references to and mention of paces and people in Korean, I have kept the spelling
of Korean names according to the Romanized versions appearing in the archived
documents for ease of possible later reference to the archives. Most historical documents
produced during the Korean War did not consistently follow any format at the time, so
spelling can be highly idiosyncratic and variety. For my own writing, I have used the Revise
Romanization of Korean developed by the Republic of Korea National Academy of the
Korean Language, with the noted exceptions of well-known figures like Syngman Rhee,
who are often associated and referenced with particular rendering of their names.
6
Under Yo’s leadership, People’s Committees sprouted up throughout the country to
coordinate Korea’s translation to independence. The CPKI called for the cooperation of
all political groups and factions in its efforts in enacting a land program which would
enable tenants to purchase their farms on easy terms, guarantee the ousting of Korean
collaborators and Japanese from positions of authority, extend the suffrage, enable the
formation of cooperatives, increase wages, stabilize the economy, and minimize
governmental intervention in the private domain. Though there were over forty parties
representing all shades of opinion included in the original coalition, all parties were
united in their views on key topics such as the expulsion of the Japanese, seizure of their
property, immediate independence, and self-government. To implement these programs, it
was agreed by the leaders in Seoul that each province would establish its own
government in accordance with the basic principles of the program. Such a procedure, it
was believed, would allow all regions to solve local problems without the need to refer
back to Seoul and effect a governmental stability impossible to achieve through
immediate centralization. Provincial leaders were informed of the plan before the
5
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the announcement of Japan’s surrender, resistance leaders of the CPKI called upon the
Japanese Governor-General and proposed that in order to preserve law and order, prevent
political and economic chaos, and construct a Korean government in harmony with the
wishes of the people, all authority be turned over to their coalition, which would prepare
for complete Korean independence by establishing the People’s Republic of Korea
(PRK). Abe willingly assented, with the understanding that the existing Japanese colonial
governmental structure would not be dissolved, and that Japanese soldiers and civilians
would not be molested in the aftermath of the war. The governor’s conditions were
supported by the CPKI and the organization assumed de facto control over the Korean
peninsula (Millett 2005, 43). Soon after, the Committee held a representative national
assembly in Seoul and on September 6, 1945, the delegates formed a national
government with jurisdiction over all of Korea.
It was in the name of this government that Yo Un-hyung sent a delegation that
included his brother Yo Un-hong, his secretary Cho Han-yong, and their interpreter Baek
Sang-gyu, to greet the commander of the U.S. military occupational forces, Lieutenant
General John R. Hodge, upon his arrival at Incheon on September 7, 1945. Hodge, who
had orders from Washington to deal directly with the Japanese Governor-General in
effecting the transfer of authority, was completely unprepared for such a move. He
denied the Korean delegates an audience, opting to discuss these matters with the
Japanese colonial authorities in the absence of Korean representation (Henderson 1968,
205-206).

surrender and were, therefore, able to act instantly upon news of the Allied victory.
31

The U.S. military claimed to have come to Korea to help its people form a
democratic government that represented the aspirations of all. Yet at the same time,
Washington took the view that Koreans lacked the training necessary for administrative
duties, making it necessary for Military Government to assume governmental
responsibility in southern Korea. The fact that there was already a functioning
governmental body, recognized by the Japanese Governor-General, with People’s
Committees successfully operating throughout the country, complicated the issue as it
contradicted the very premise of occupation.
The U.S. military’s approach to the matter was to act as if it were forming a
military government in enemy territory, as was the case in Japan, in which case standard
procedures would dictate that it adopted the following attitude towards local political
bodies:
Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however,
sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of military
government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or
negotiating with, any local political elements except by direction from higher
authority.7
This was not the case in Korea, however, as the Americans themselves had claimed that
Korea was an independent and friendly state, and thus the standards mentioned above
should not have been readily applied to the circumstances in southern Korea.
Truman attempted to clarify the U.S.’s stance in the following public statement
made on September 18, 1950, in which he intimated that the efforts of the PRK to
establish immediate independence were to be disregarded:
The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibilities and functions of
a free and independent nation […] will of necessity require time and patience. The
7

FM 27-5, p 0, 1.7.
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goal is in view, but its speedy attainment will require the joint efforts of the
Korean people and the Allies.8
The U.S. military used Truman’s words as the basis for ignoring the authority of the
PRK, declaring that “United States policy prohibits official recognition or utilization for
political purposes of any so-called Korean provisional government or other political
organization by United States Forces.”9 By refusing to recognize the sovereignty of the
PRK and choosing rather to treat it as just another political party—one that it actually
viewed as a latent challenge to its occupational authority—the U.S. blatantly refused to
respect or acknowledge the will of the Korean people and their right of selfdetermination.10
Enraged by the Military Government’s treatment, Koreans flocked to the streets
in protests against the Military Government while the Republic’s leaders argued that the
PRK represented a unified government of all Koreans, regardless of the dividing line, and
that it was likewise recognized north of the artificial border as well.11 The U.S. military
ignored the Republic’s demands for recognition and on October 10, 1945, Major General
A. V. Arnold, the newly instated U.S. Military Governor of Korea stated in a press
conference that the Military Government was the only government in southern Korea,
and demanded that the Korean people put an end to the pronouncements of what he

Department of State Bulletin, XIV, p 108.
SCAP, Summation, No. 1, p 177
10
The U.S. military government also refused to recognize the members of the
Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, led by Kim Gu, who was obliged to
enter the country as a private citizen.
11
Yo Un-hyung stated that it was “only after the lapse of more than a month since
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termed “irresponsible political groups.” This statement crystallized a large part of Korean
thinking into an anti-American mold: the liberators had become the oppressors.
If the sole reason U.S. troops were sent to the Korean peninsula was to “aid the
Korean people to achieve their independence” and to establish a democratic government
by their “free choice,” and if the authorities in Washington did “believe in the right of the
Korean people to determine for themselves the kind of economy and political
organization they require,” why did the PRK receive such treatment?12 Why did
Washington insist on administering an election when a popular government already
existed?
The decision to occupy Korea, disregarding the pre-existing indigenous governing
body, and establish the Military Government is intricately linked to the onset of the Cold
War and the emergence of a new power dynamic in Northeast Asia following World War
II. The United States wished Korea to operate according to the American framework of
beliefs, not the Soviet’s communist model. The PRK, as it existed upon the arrival of the
24th Corps, was not dominated by American ideology, though it was not strictly speaking
communist in nature either. Instead, the Republic was the embodiment of Korean
aspirations for a democratic socialist government, a form of government that over eighty
percent of Koreans favored according to a study conducted by the USAMGIK during its
first year of occupation. Any recognition of the PRK’s sovereignty and independence,
which appeared to be more closely aligned to Russian ideals that American ideology,
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however, would have signified a diplomatic defeat and weakening of the United States’
influence in the region.

2.3. The Establishment of the United States Army Military Government in Korea
The United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was
established on September 8, 1945 and maintained administrative authority over southern
Korea until August 15, 1948. The Military Government was terribly unprepared for the
challenges it would face, as it lacked knowledge of the language, history, culture, and
political situation in Korea. Most importantly, Hodge, the commander of the 24th Corps
of the U.S. Tenth Army, and his subordinates, failed to distinguish between Koreans and
Japanese as four days before arriving in Seoul, Hodge told his officers that Korea “was an
enemy of the United States” (Cumings 1981, 126). The general was also widely quoted as
calling Koreans, “the same breed of cat” as the Japanese. This meant that from a
command point of view “no separation had been made between the Japanese and Korean
occupations [and] there was a tendency to place both Japan and Korea in the same
category” (Meade 1951, 76). The historian Michael Breen supports this argument as he
claims, “There was a tendency to see [Koreans] as low-class Japanese” (Breen 1998,
118).
Hodge’s disregard for the sociopolitical circumstances in Korea led to a number
of faulty policy decisions. In addition to dismantling the PRK, on September 9, 1945, at a
surrender ceremony, Hodge announced that the Japanese colonial government, including
its Governor-General and its technical and administrative staff, would remain intact. This
move was, naturally, met with a major public outcry, in response to which Hodge
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reluctantly replaced the Japanese Governor-General with Major General Arnold and
remove all the Japanese bureau chiefs, though he in turn, enlisted the former Japanese
bureaucrats as his advisors. Hodge later defended his use of Japanese personnel with
claims that the U.S. would have experienced “great difficulty operating with any
sweeping removal of Japanese unless we are willing to accept chaos” because “all
utilities, communications, etc., are Japanese-operated and government controlled” and the
U.S. Military Government was “entirely inadequate to cope with this situation” (Dobbs
1981, 37-38).
The decision to retain members of the Japanese colonial government as advisors
caused a second outpouring of discontent from the Korean people, forcing Hodge to
establish the Korean Advisory Council within the Military Government in October 1945.
Nine out of the eleven Council seats were given to members of the Korean Democratic
Party, a right-wing political group that was formed at the encouragement of the U.S.
which was primarily made up of large landowners, wealthy businesspeople, and former
officials in the Japanese colonial government. The chairman, Kim Seong-su, was a large
landowner who had been a member of Japan’s Central Council. Clearly unrepresentative
of the Korean public, the Advisory Council was, according to one observer, “universally
hated and distrusted throughout Korea” (Cumings 1981, 148). This was another source of
bitterness among the Korean people as much of the Korean elite had previously worked
directly or indirectly with the Japanese for material reward and defense of their own
interests. By employing such personnel, the U.S. Military Government justified the
actions of the Japanese colonial government and the Korean elite who had colluded with
them. Ordinary Koreans wishing to see their country independent, unified, and tackling
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its social and economic problems felt betrayed at the deep conservatism that
distinguished the occupation. As USAMGIK official E. Grant Meade later wrote, “the
establishment of the Council ended the period of general Korean unity and opened an era
of extreme confusion” (Meade 1951, 159).
In effect, the dominant operating philosophy of the American Military
Government mirrored the oppressive approach of Japanese colonialism as it blatantly
disregarded the aspirations of the Korean people for self-government, ignored its
historical past, and enforced an occupation to enlarge its sphere of influence. The U.S.
Military Government, by choosing to bolster the status quo in Korea by resisting
thorough reform of colonial legacies, generated monumental opposition against its
presence, thereby inheriting an enmity amongst the majority of the Korean people that
had previously been directed at the Japanese colonialists (Cumings 2005, 192). This
dissatisfaction was manifested in the form of mass demonstrations and uprisings that
persisted throughout the occupation. Judging that it was the People’s Committees
operating throughout the country that were the cause of such resistance, the U.S. military
dedicated the first year of its occupation towards forcefully dismantling these
organizations. This push by the U.S. was met with a massive rebellion that spread over
four provinces in the fall of 1946. Although the U.S. military was able to quickly
suppress these revolts, radical activists nonetheless developed a significant guerrilla
movement in 1948 and 1949.

2.4. The Establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the
Republic of Korea
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In addition to the dissatisfaction felt by Koreans due to the policy decisions made
by the U.S. Military Government, the Korean people were also enraged by the arbitrary
division of their country, one that grew increasingly rigid as U.S.-Soviet relations
deteriorated. The end of World War II terminated the alliance between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., which eliminated the buffers that existed between the two ideological camps
and led to the rise of an ideologically fueled rivalry that would last throughout the Cold
War. The Korean peninsula, thus, became a microcosm of the emerging Cold War order
as it morphed into a battle ground between two contending powers. Hugh Borton,
Division Chief, Japanese Affairs, Department of State, summed up the situation
succinctly:
Originally that was a military division […] It was made to assist us and our Allies,
the Russians, in fighting the Japanese in Korea. But they surrendered before we
got there and the military division stuck and became a political one.13
In other words, as world relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
deteriorated, each government became more insistent on a solution of the Korean
problem which would prevent the other from bringing the whole territory within its
sphere of dominant influence. Thus, during the three-year occupation, the division
between the two zones deepened and the difference in policy between the occupying
powers led to a polarization of politics (Robinson 2007, 108-109).
The Soviet-U.S. Joint Commission, which was established to aid in the
construction of a unified Korean government, met twice, once in 1946 and 1947, so that
the two sides could work towards a unified administration, but they failed to make
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progress due to increasing Cold War antagonism (Buzo 2002, 59-60). After the failure of
the Joint Commission meetings in 1947, it became apparent that the formation of a
unified Korean government would be impossible under the current conditions. The
United States handed over the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations
which on November 14, 1947. The General Assembly passed Resolution 112 (II), which
created the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), whose
mandate was to supervise free and open elections, assist in the withdrawal of the
occupying forces, and guide the new political entity to full independence. The UN
decided elections were to take place no later than March 31, 1948, and that UNTCOK
would have the right to verify any aspect of the election process that it wished. American
and Russian armed forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea as soon as possible
and within three months of the formation of the Korean government (Luard 1982, 232).
The Soviets argued that the Resolution 112 (II) would break the 1945 Moscow
Accords and violate Articles 32 and 107 of the UN Charter. Article 32 requires that both
sides of the dispute be consulted, but Korean representatives from northern and southern
Korea were never invited to address the UN and Article 107 denied jurisdiction to the UN
over post-war settlement issues (Hart-Landsberg 1998: 85). The U.S.S.R. was unable to
stop the passing of the resolution because their veto rights were limited to issues brought
up in the Security Council and did not extend to decisions made by the General
Assembly. Instead, northern Korea and the Soviet Union publicly opposed the creation of
UNTCOK and refused to participate in any election administrated by the Commission or
support any of its activities. When the members of the Commission arrived in Korea in
January 1948 to begin an assessment of the situation, it became clear that UNTCOK
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would not be able to fulfill the conditions set by the UN resolution as they were denied
entrance into northern territory. A report was made to the Interim Committee of the UN
General Assembly, which operated when the General Assembly was not sitting, and a
decision was made on February 26, 1948, that UNTCOK should adhere to the original
intention in so far as this could be accomplished: elections would be supervised in the
south but nothing could be done about the north (Luard 1982, 234).
During the following month, elections were held for Korea’s National Assembly,
in which the northern Koreans refused to participate. Soon after, Syngman Rhee was
chosen by the National Assembly to be the first President of the Republic of Korea. The
United States then transferred authority to this new government, and on January 1, 1949
accorded it full recognition. The Soviet Union responded to the establishment of the ROK
by holding elections in the north for a Supreme People’s Assembly. With Kim Il-sung at
its helm as the Prime Minister, this Assembly drew up the North Korean constitution and
founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which proclaimed
authority over all of Korea. In early 1949, the Russians withdrew their troops from North
Korea and in June 29, 1949 the United States withdrew its own forces from South Korea.
To the Korean people, who had hoped for independence, the occupational forces,
who arrived as benefactors who had liberated them from Japanese colonization, ended up
opposing the nation’s independence and unification despite popular protest. The two
foreign powers left behind two diametrically opposed governments, each claiming
sovereignty over the whole of Korea, setting the stage for the largest international conflict
following World War II—the Korean War.
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2.5. Nisei Interpreters in Korea
The U.S. military was exceedingly underprepared for the administrative duties of
an occupational force when it seized control over the southern half of the Korean
peninsula. Traditionally, the United States had shown limited interest in the country. As
historian James Matray (1985, 5) explains, “Korean affairs had been the exclusive
concern of closer and more powerful neighbors—Russia, China, and Japan” while “the
United States had seen no national interests worth defending on the Korean peninsula.”
America’s attitude towards peninsular affairs remained largely unaffected during World
War II and Korea was scarcely considered in postwar planning, even after the Cairo
Declaration in November 1943 and the verbal agreement on international trusteeship at
Yalta in February 1945. It hardly comes as a surprise that “the Korean policy of the
United States in 1945 was very poorly coordinated” (Kim 1975, 53) and “a view widely
held among historians is that the United States forces coming into the Korean peninsula
had practically no preparations to deal with the problems awaiting them” (Lee 1982, 32).
Amongst the various difficulties the U.S. Military Government faced during the
occupation, the most salient were the
difficulties imposed by barriers of language – the mechanical linguistic problem,
the difficulty of achieving a meeting of minds, and the frequent impossibility of
being certain whether there has been a meeting of minds or not. On all levels the
occupation forces were constantly confronted with problems of language.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
Despite the important role interlingual communication would play throughout the
occupation, the U.S. military failed to make the appropriate preparations needed to meet
the various challenges interpreting and translation would pose before arriving in Korea.
In fact, when Hodge and the 24th Corps first landed in Incheon Harbor on September 8,
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1945, they were without so-much as a single Korean language specialist. The Armed
Forces Pacific (AFPAC), the command group above the 24th Corps, made a belated
search for Korean interpreters in August 1945 but “it was able to find only six paroled
Korean prisoners of war, who were accordingly attached to the 24th Corps” (HUSAFIK
1948).
It was only in October of 1945, several months after Hodge landed in Korea, that
the U.S. military sought to train Korean linguists at the U.S. Military Intelligence Service
Language School, where the Japanese translators and interpreters were trained during
World War II. This was a classic instance of too-little-too-late, as the Korean-language
class was made up of only “eight students under a Korean American officer, Lt. Calvin
Kim” (McNaughton 2007, 417). Needless to say, this number could hardly meet the
immense demand for Korean-English mediators under the Military Government.
On the other hand, the U.S. occupational forces were accompanied by a total of
approximately thirty Nisei (second generation Japanese immigrants to the U.S.)
interpreters and translators who were assigned to the headquarters, the Military
Government, and military divisions in local provinces. These Japanese interpreters and
translators were critical to the success of Hodge’s initial mission, which was to “take the
Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed forces, enforce the terms of the surrender,
and remove Japanese imperialism from Korea” (Hodge 1948). The Nisei mediated
between U.S. and Japanese military units as the Americans disarmed and relocated the
approximately six-hundred-thousand Japanese troops stationed in Korea, who were
gradually removed to Jeju island off the southern coast of the Korean peninsula before
being repatriated to Japan (McNaughton 2007, 411).
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After taking Japan’s surrender, Hodge’s second mission in Korea was to
“maintain order, establish an effective government along democratic lines to replace the
Japanese government in Korea, and rebuild a sound economy as a basis for Korean
independence” and “train Koreans in handling their own affairs and prepare Korea to
govern itself as a free and independent nation” (Hodge 1948). This mission required that
Korean-English interpreters mediate communication to facilitate cooperation between the
U.S. occupational forces and the Korean populace. As the U.S. had landed in Korea
“without trained Korean language personnel in their ranks” (Fishel and Hausrath, 1958,
8) the Military Government decided to continue using Nisei interpreters as their
substitutes. While Nisei interpreters initially stood-in for Korean interpreters, their ability
to function as efficient mediators in Korea was severely limited, for the following
reasons.
First, while the success of this approach hinged on the premise that a large portion
of the general Korean public could converse in Japanese, the actual number of Japanese
speakers in Korea was not as high as the U.S. military assumed. The number of Koreans
who reliably understood Japanese did not reach 20 percent of the population until 1943,
when 22.15 percent or 5.7 million Koreans were able to understand Japanese (22.15
percent) (Kim-Rivera 2002, 266-267). It should also be noted that it is unclear what
categories were used to define “understanding” Japanese, which is distinguishable from
having a “command” of the language, which is the requisite for effective communication
via interpreter. Regardless, this number could hardly justify the usage of Japanese
interpreters as the primary channel of interlingual communication between the U.S.
military and the Korean people.
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Second, the Korean people displayed resistance towards communicating with U.S.
military personnel through Japanese interpreters. The future president of the ROK, Rhee
Syngman stated “We shall not teach the Japanese language in our schools. We are
Koreans. If the Japanese wish to speak with us in the future let them learn Korean!”
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 173). The presence of the Nisei suggested to the Korean
people, who had endured thirty-five years under Japanese colonial control, that the
United States acknowledged Imperial Japan as a legitimate counterpart whose language it
was willing to learn in order to communicate on equal terms. The absence of Korean
interpreters indicated to the Korean people that the U.S. military did not see the need to
communicate with or feel the necessity to cooperate with them. As U.S. Colonel William
P. Jones Jr. (1959, 1-2) writes:
expecting others to make the effort to learn his language, an arrogance that
suggests we are no different from the former colonial rulers. For foreigners to
make the effort to learn the local working language is to demonstrate – often
dramatically – a sense of respect for the people who speak that language. To
avoid the effort can sometimes be interpreted as a show of disrespect.14
Under such conditions, Koreans felt themselves once again at the mercy of a foreign
power while they themselves were barred from participating in the recontextualization or
the reconstitution of social order. Of course, these Nisei interpreters were not of Japanese
nationality, and were therefore not directly related with Korea’s colonial past, but the
Korean people remained distrustful towards Nisei, “because of the Korean conviction that
a Japanese remained a Japanese even if born in the United States and wearing an
American uniform” (Meade 1951, 82-83). Such racial antipathy, however, was not one-
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sided as “many Nisei exhibited the traditional Japanese disdain for Koreans and the
Korean language” (McNaughton 2007, 143). This mutual distaste created hostility in an
environment in which tensions were already palpable, thus serving as a hindrance to
communication and cooperation.
An additional problem that arose when employing Nisei interpreters in Korea is
depicted in the following remarks made about a Nisei interpreter at the surrender of Jeju
Do.
Green’s [the senior American officer] remarks were translated into Japanese by an
interpreter, a Nisei who looked very embarrassed and stumbled badly over the job
[…] He got most of the information we wanted, most of it correctly in all
probability, but it was hard and slow going. Everything had to be translated, often
through two intermediaries. Questions and answers were frequently
misunderstood: at times a matter had to be dropped out of sheer fatigue. And the
Japanese, who were permitted to ask questions towards the last, appear to have
been equally obscure on certain of the answers that painfully sifted through them.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
Based on this statement, some Nisei interpreters stationed in Korea appear to have lacked
the linguistic and communicational skills needed to function as competent mediators. It is
possible that the more competent Nisei interpreters were stationed in Japan, which was
also under U.S. military occupation at the time, while the less adept linguists were
deployed to Korea. The questionable linguistic capabilities of the Nisei interpreters
dispatched to Korea, coupled with the low number of Koreans capable of or willing to
conversing in Japanese, undermined the practicality of employing the Nisei interpreters in
Korea.

2.6. Local Korean Civilian Interpreters
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As a result, the USAMGIK was forced to “depend almost exclusively upon
natives for the vital work of interpreting” (HUSAFIK 1948). The need for KoreanEnglish interpreters grew more pressing as the occupation dragged on and an increasing
number of Koreans were employed by the Military Government. By December 1945,
almost seventy-five thousand Koreans were working for the USAMGIK, and in
December of 1946, the governance structure of the USAMGIK was reorganized so that
each bureau would be co-headed by an American and a Korean. This meant that any
policy decisions would require consultation between the two sides and the consent of
both. Despite having to work side-by-side with their American counterparts,
less than ten percent of the higher officials in Military Government have any
understanding whatever of English. Less than one-half of the number who do
understand English are able to speak it effectively. It is absolutely necessary for
Americans to be able to talk and to get over ideas to Korean officials. This can be
done only through interpreters […] I think we might add that practically no
American can speak Korean.
(National Archives and Records Administration, November 15, 1946, 11)
In the absence of Korean civilian interpreters, communication and coordination between
U.S. and Korean personnel would have been virtually impossible, making interpreters
vital to the operations of the occupational government.
Interpreters were recruited by the USAMGIK throughout the occupation. The task
of selecting local civilian interpreters was at first managed by Yasuma Oda, a former
official of the Japanese Government General, because no American military personnel
possessed the linguistic skills necessary to properly administer the selection process. The
first round of recruiting Korean interpreters, carried out shortly following the arrival of
the 24th Corps, was judged as being “fairly successful” as “a considerable number turned
up” to work (HUSAFIK 1948). The military assessed that “[a]lthough not fluent in
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English, they were for the most part satisfactory” (ibid.) and a large portion of this
original group eventually ended up working for the Military Government. Soon
afterwards, due to a rising need for Korean interpreters among the U.S. military units
stationed in Korea, a secondary call for interpreters was sent out but this second search
“yielded only a loan harvest, but some Koreans were hired as interpreters, translators, and
civil censors” (ibid.). The fact that the second group was judged to be inferior to the first
demonstrates there was a limited number of Koreans able to speak and understand
English in the country at the time.
The low number of capable English speakers in Korea was due to the fact that
“the forty years of Japanese rule, especially that last decade when Japan was at war, was
a major interruption in English education in Korea” (Kim-Rivera 2002, 279). In 1939, the
Japanese imperial government declared English an enemy language, banned the import of
Western books, fired all British and Americans in official positions, forced missionaries
to leave its territories, drastically reduced the instructional hours of English, and removed
the subject from the higher-education entrance exams. Under the highly discouraging
atmosphere the Japanese government created against the English language, “both the
quality and the quantity of English language education suffered a great deal” (KimRivera 2002, 272). The bulk of the interpreters who worked for the Military Government
were individuals from wealthy families who had studied in the United States and “only
one in five had learned English in Korea” (Dong 2005, 112).
The limited number of Koreans capable of communicating in English meant that
the supply of interpreters within the linguistic market the Military Government had
constructed upon its arrival could not meet the demands for this resource. In the
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following excerpt, Jeon Suk-hui, who worked as an interpreter during the occupation,
comments on the difficulty the U.S. Military Government faced when recruiting
interpreters, and the lengths to which its staff was willing to go to find capable personnel
(Jeon 2005, 107):
When the U.S. soldiers arrived they discovered that all the Americans and
Koreans could do was stare at each other’s faces and say “hello” and “okay”
because no one spoke good enough English to communicate […]
They thought someone who had been to university would speak at least a little
bit of English. That is when the name “Jeon Suk-hui,” a graduated from Ewha
Womans University, caught their eye.
Three or four American officers from the Military Government came to our
hospital and asked me to become an interpreter. They were not soldiers, they were
officers. I showed them my baby and told them that it would be difficult for me to
work for them. Of course, I spoke in English. They visited several times
afterwards to persuade me to change my mind.
Peter Hyun, who worked as an interpreter for the Military Government, wrote the
following about the interview process he underwent when he applied for a interpreting
position at the USAMGIK in the early winter of 1945, when he was seventeen years old:
The only job I could come up with in Seoul right after liberation was working as
an interpreter for the U.S. occupational forces. The best and favorite subject
during middle school in Hamheung was English. To be frank, I never studied
conversational English. Of course, my English skills were not very good […] but
so what? I decided to give it a try! I was as courageous as I was young and
foolish. I visited the Human Resources office of the 8th Army. I must have looked
very young because the bulky Army Major sitting behind the desk asked me how
old I was. I added three years to my actual age […] I couldn’t believe it. I got the
job so quickly and easily! There weren’t even any detailed questions about by
work experience or qualification.
(Hyun 1996, 29-30; my translation)
Hyun’s experience reveals that the supply of interpreters within the linguistic market
which the Military Government had constructed upon its arrival could not meet the
demands for this resource. In a market in which the already high demand for interpreters
continued to rise whilst the supply remained stagnant, the Military Government had to
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resort to recruiting interpreters without properly assessing whether or not they possessed
the requisite linguistic abilities to fulfill their function as linguistic mediators. Thus, Jeon
also indicates that English language abilities amongst the interpreters varied considerably
as “at the time there were many interpreters who were complete hokey” (Jeon 2005, 108).

2.7. Interpreters as Intercultural Agents
During the U.S. occupation of southern Korea, however, the presence of
USAMGIK interpreters was readily felt by all interlocutors participating in an interpreted
event, as evinced in the following statement made by a former Military Government
official:
It can readily be understood how an interpreter could in time come to know his
principal’s job almost as well as the principal and, if granted enterprise, act on his
own in answering questions and reaching decisions while interpreting, or even
independently while his principal was absent. It was a common enough
experience to hear one’s interpreter and a Korean conversing at a greater length
than demanded by the translation at hand. This led in some cases to suspicion of
interpreters, but always there remained the answer that the rendition of an
American thought into Korean terms was more than a mere exchange of words.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
This excerpt indicates that interpreters were not restricted to functioning as “conduits”
but actively intervened in interlingual communicative exchanges, at times overstepping
the limits of what is often considered the normative role of the linguistic mediator, as
they were entrusted with extralinguistic functions to supplement for the lack of
knowledge USAMGIK personnel possessed regarding Korean language, politics and
culture.
Though this historical record does not provide detailed accounts of how
interpreters intervened in interpreted events, the short story “Rice” by Henry Steiner
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(1951) provides a detailed depiction of a Korean interpreter working with an American
military officer during the Korean occupation. Though this is a fictional work, given the
fact that Steiner lived in southern Korea from 1946 to 1947 while working as an
engineering field supervisor for the Military Government, much of what is described in
this story would have been inspired by observations made while the author was stationed
in Korea.
The story follows Song, a Korean interpreter, who accompanies Captain Frazer
and Sergeant Biancoli as they pay a visit to Han, an elderly rice farmer. Their goal is to
persuade Han to sell his rice harvest to the USAMGIK at a reduced price, as part of the
Rice Collection Program, but if necessary, the American military men are willing to
forcefully confiscate his stores.
“Tell him if he doesn’t sell, we’ll confiscate the rice.”
Mr. Song said placatingly in Korean, “The people in the cities are starving.
They cannot pay the high price on the open market. That is why the government
sets this low price and makes out a quota.”
“The government of thieves! Let those in the cities come back to the land if
they wish to eat.” Mr. Han’s eyes, the color of yellow river-water, became bright
and wet with emotion. “Let them depend on the rain as I do and starve when it
does not come. Let the river sweep away all they have. For years, I have worked
the land for the Japanese and saw them take my rice away. Now I have the land
and the rice. The government wants to take it away again. It is the same as the
Japanese.”
“What does he say?” Frazer asked.
“One moment please, Captain Frazer.” And then in Korean to the old man,
“But this is not for the Japanese. This is for your own people. The Americans are
helping us.”
“Yes, I know. They will sell the rice to the robbers for five times what they
give me. Then the robbers will sell it to the people for ten times. What do these
foreigners know!” The speech came shooting out of the old man’s mouth.
“You are right,” Mr. Song said, “some of the rice may go to thieves, there to
be sold again, but is it no comfort to know that you are behaving justly, that you
are helping others who would starve without you? At least you will gain merit in
the eyes of God no matter what sins others may commit.”
The old man ignored him again.
Mr. Song turned to Frazer and said, “He says no.”

50

“You mean you talked that much and all he said was no? You interpreters are
all alike.”
(Steiner 1951, 7-8)
In this excerpt, rather than mimicking the American captain’s menacing tone, or relaying
his threatening message, the interpreter instead attempts to first pacify the elderly man by
explaining the circumstances that have necessitated the Rice Collection Program. Even
when Captain Frazer asks that the farmer’s response be communicated to him, rather than
informing him of the farmer’s thoughts on the matter, the interpreter opts to continue
persuading Han. He negotiates on behalf of the Americans, imploring the elderly farmer
to recognize the fact that the U.S. Military Government is requiring that he sell his rice
for reasons different from those of the Japanese colonists who stole Han’s previous
harvests. Only when Song determines that he can do no more to convince Han to
reconsider his stance does the interpreter relent and offer the American officer the short
interpretation, “He says no.” Here the interpreter decides to omit much of what was said,
choosing rather to relay the central message without voicing the criticism expressed by
Han, in an attempt to diffuse the rising tension within the interpreting event. While Frazer
does voice his displeasure with Song’s approach, his comment that “You interpreters are
all alike” reveals that it was considered normative behavior for the interpreter to speak on
behalf of both interlocutors, to select what should be embellished or omitted from a
dialogue, and to facilitate discussion so that the communicative goals of the exchange
might be achieved.
The interventionist role USAMGIK interpreters assumed during interpreted
events was met by criticism and condemnation by both the Military Government and the
Korean public, who were preconditioned to believe that interpreters ought to transfer
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rather than construct meaning. The active role interpreters adopted during interpreted
events led some Korean politicians to fall under the impression that it was the interpreters
who were actually in charge of overseeing the administrative duties of the Military
Government rather than its American officials, and thus they were the ones to blame for
its many policy failures. This idea became so widespread that one Korean political
organization went so far as to claim that the idea of trusteeship itself originated not from
U.S. policymakers but came,
[f]rom the interpreters of the U.S. Army and Military Government who are of the
opinion that in Korea we have no leader who is capable of leading us and
therefore our independence should be delayed…It is not unreasonable, therefore,
that U.S. authorities should think of a trust system for Korea.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
This is, of course, far from the truth as the idea of trusteeship over Korea was first
discussed between Roosevelt and Stalin while World War II was still underway, and
detailed plans for the length and form of the trusteeship were decided on during the
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December of 1945. Regardless of the truth,
however, this incident demonstrates how influential interpreters were seen to be in the
eyes of the public.

2.8. Public Perceptions of the Malicious Interpreter in Fiction and the Media
Two translation-related events during the early months of the U.S. occupation had
a notable influence on the recasting of Korean views of the U.S. presence into a negative
mold. The first widespread controversy had to do with the translation of the Cairo
Declaration. In November 1943, the leaders of the U.S., the U.K., and the Republic of
China committed themselves to the liberation of Korea following Japan’s defeat by
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specifying in the declaration that Korea would be granted independence “in due course.”
The translation of the Cairo Declaration that circulated in Korea, which had been
prepared by official Japanese sources, translated the ambiguous phrase “in due course”
into the equivalent of “in a few days” (Stueck and Yi 2010, 186). According to Hodge, in
his report to MacArthur,
One of greatest difficulties here in maintenance of order is the idea planted firmly
in the minds of all Koreans that Korea is now…a free and independent nation…In
talking to educated Koreans I discovered that translations of the Cairo Statement
to Koreans have been “in a few days” or “very soon” rather than “in due course”
in reference to the time of Korean independence. That is said to apply specifically
to Proclamation Number One. Request that any future translations be carefully
checked.15
Hodge later made a public announcement that Korea in fact would not be granted
immediate independence and instead, that Koreans would have to earn their liberation by
“demonstrate[ing] to the democratic nations of the world and to me as their representative
your capacities and abilities as a people and your readiness to accept an honored place in
the family of nations” (HUSAFIK 1948).
The situation was further exacerbated in December 1945 when the decision to
establish a trusteeship over Korea was announced. To the Koreans, who had anticipated
immediate independence, the decision to implement a five-year trusteeship was
humiliating, and cooled their initially warm welcome to United States troops as
liberators. Anti-trusteeship demonstrations were staged across the country. It was later
assessed that to some extent the reaction was due to the fact that the word “trusteeship,”
when translated into Korean, was the same word that had been used by the Japanese

15

Radio CG USAFIK to CINAFPAC Adv, 131031/I Sept 45.
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authorities to refer to their colonial control over the country. General Hodge made the
following statement in an attempt to pacify the public:
I fully understand what the word “Trusteeship” means to Koreans. In the meaning
that you apply to that word, it is even more abhorrent to me as a responsible
representative of my nation than it can be to you. The diplomats of the great
Powers do not use the word in the same meaning as do Koreans, because they did
not exercise forty years of Japanese domination. If they did understand your
thoughts of the term “Trusteeship” they would use another term to express the
assistance and advice they are willing to give Korea. I can assure you that I need
no demonstration of any kind to make me do all in my power to remove all
references to “Trusteeship” from future discussions of Korea.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
The general’s belated response did little to mend the damage already done to public
relations with the Korean people; instead it appeared that the Americans were replacing
rather than removing the former colonial overlords.
A natural extension of the view that equated the U.S. Military Government with
the Japanese Colonial Government was the idea that the groups aiding the Americans,
especially the local interpreters, were the successors to the chinilpa (pro-Japanese
collaborators). As stated earlier, the Japanese government radically reduced the study of
English in schools once the war in the Pacific began. The majority of interpreters that
worked with the Military Government had thus studied overseas and only wealthy
families could afford to send their children abroad. Following liberation, the majority of
these wealthy landowners began to support the far right party, the Korean Democratic
Party, which had deep vested interest in the status quo and felt the threat of communism
most keenly. A significant number of “collaborationists” from the Japanese occupational
period were also drawn into this group. A staunch anti-communist, Hodge lent his
support to the far right. The majority of the approximately 400 interpreters who worked
for the Military Government, including Hodge’s personal interpreter Lee Myo-muk, were
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members of or closely associated with the Korean Democratic Party. In the eyes of the
Korean people, the Japanese collaborators, the wealthy landowners, and the Military
Government interpreters were cooperating to maintain the social hierarchy established
during the colonial era.
The perceived relationship between the U.S. Military Government, former
Japanese collaborators, and interpreters, which was the subject of widespread
condemnation, is aptly represented in the following description of a poster seen by U.S.
Colonel Glenn Newman of the U.S. Military Government:
An American soldier, blindfolded, is shaking hands with a Korean who holds a
Japanese flag and a bundle of 100 yen notes. Between the two is an interpreter
labeled as “Bribed by Traitors and Pro-Japs.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
The American soldier in this poster is drawn wearing a blindfold to suggest that the
United States was oblivious to the circumstances in Korea. The Korean holding a
Japanese flag and a bundle of Japanese money is a representation of former Japanese
collaborators who were now seeking to forge ties with the United States and the
interpreter, positioned at the center, is bridging the two parties, thus ensuring that the
existing social hierarchy will prevail under the new regime.
The perception that interpreters were running the Military Government led to that
institution earning the moniker the “interpreter’s government,” which was a “government
of, for, and by interpreters” (Taylor 1948, 372). These interpreters were referred to as
“malicious interpreters” by the Korean media. This idea was examined in many
transfictional works produced in Korea during the occupational period. Among these
works, Chae Man-sik’s “Mister Pang” stands out as an exploration of the social role

55

played by interpreters following the end of the war and the arrival of the United States.16
The story presents two characters, Paek Chisa and Pang Sambok, and demonstrates how
the ability to speak English reversed the fortunes of two Koreans in 1945. The allegiance
of the two characters is underlined by the English and Japanese honorifics the two use
when referring to each other: Paek Chisa is referred to as Paek-san while Pang Sambok is
called Mister Pang. The lower-class Pang Sambok, a cobbler, managed to put his limited
English skills to use as an interpreter for an American officer, resulting in a dramatic rise
in wealth and status. The following excerpt describes the house Pang purchases just three
days after becoming an interpreter.
Mister Pang […] moved to his present house—said to be the company house of a
bank director before Liberation—from the Hyonjo-dong rented room three days
after becoming an interpreter for the lieutenant. Upstairs and down, it was
decorated half in the Western style, half in the Japanese—altogether a palatial
mansion.
(Chae 2017, 177)
The fact that the U.S. military interpreter, Pang, moved into the house of a former
Japanese collaborator, the bank director, indicates that the interpreter has replaced the
colluder as the face of the Korean upper-class. Rather than redecorating the house in the
“Western style,” which would indicate a clear break from the past, however, the mansion
is decorated half in the Western and half in the Japanese style. This passage hints at the

Chae Man-sik, a Korean novelist, playwright, literary critic, essayist, reporter, and
editor who produced 290 novels, short stories, plays, critiques, and essays during his
career. In his work, Chae uses satire to discuss social issues such as class conflict,
colonialism, national identity, and the intellectuals living under Japanese colonial and
U.S. military occupation. During the U.S. occupation, Chae shifted his attention from
colonialism to the difficulties of nation-building in Korea under U.S. occupation, amid
the turbulence and confusion of ideological struggle and national division.
16
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fact that though the Japanese colonial era might have ended, Japanese collaborators
continued to maintain a strong hold on the wealth and power in Korea.
Soon after Pang moves into his new home, he is visited by the upper-class
patriarch Paek Chisa, who prospered under the Japanese because his son held a position
within the colonial police force. With liberation, however, his family was stripped of its
wealth and targeted for retribution. Paek paid Pang a visit in hopes of persuading Pang to
help him regain his fortune by using his connections within the Military Government to
track down and capture the people who stole his riches. As payment, Paek promises to
award Pang half of his estate, to which the interpreter quickly agrees. Although the
interpreter has replaced the colluder as the beneficiary of foreign occupation, the fact that
Pang agrees to help Paek regain his fortune indicates that ultimately the interpreter is
working to maintain the social status quo that was established under Japanese rule.
Malicious interpreters also sparked the interest of the public when the topic of
interpreting was reported on by major newspapers in southern Korea during the years
between 1945 and 1950.17 The large number of articles devoted to this topic is a clear
indicator of the level of interest the public felt towards the empowered interpreters
working for the Military Government. These articles provide a rough overview of how
interpreters were framed by the media during the occupation.
(1) Malicious Military Police interpreter sentenced to 10 years in prison
(2) Emphasize principle of judiciary independence – eliminate machinations of
interpreter and impure party members, lawyer’s association proposes to MilitaryGovernor
(3) Unjust outside interference and malicious interpreter domination renounced,
determined to protect the judiciary, group of prosecutors submit petition

Taken from the Korean History Database of the National Institute of Korean History.
http://db.history.go.kr/
17
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(4) U.S. Korea Joint Conference close examination crimes and consider
punishment for malicious interpreters and corrupt officials
(5) Criticism for misbehavior of U.S. official, Korean interpreters are a necessary
evil
(6) Fake interpreter steals 130 thousand won
(7) Fake interpreter delinquent to be locked up for undermining Bar-Dance Hall
(8) Interpreter steals military uniform to be sent behind bars
(9) Abuse of U.S. military interpreter, several hundred thousand Won swindled,
approximately ten malicious interpreters arrested
(10) Delinquent interpreter prosecuted
(11) Misdeeds of malicious interpreter, steals 140 thousand Won
(12) Malicious interpreter exposed while trying to pocket supplies – candidate for
Mayor’s secretary”
(13) Thorough purge of malicious interpreter, seeking information on police
torture”
(14) Malicious interpreter uses handgun in robbery
A cursory examination of the titles shows that the majority of these articles report on the
crimes committed by “malicious interpreters.” This would suggest that U.S. Military
Government interpreters were subjected to public scrutiny. Considering that these
interpreters were viewed as the new generation of foreign colluders, it is hardly surprising
that media outlets focused on the malicious activities of this social group. A closer look at
the contents of articles (1) through (3) provides a clearer picture of how interpreters and
the act of interpreting in an occupational space were viewed by the Korean public.
Article (1), “Malicious Military Police interpreter sentenced to 10 years in
prison,” is one of two articles which reports on the arrest of a Korean-Japanese interpreter
who worked for the Japanese colonial government. This interpreter was charged with
“participating in the electrical and water torture of 60 anti-Japanese activists while
working for the Japanese Military Police.” The tone of the article grows particularly stern
when it mentions that this interpreter aided the Military Police set their office on fire
before fleeing Hoeryeong, most likely to dispose of any records of their inhumane
interrogation methods, after Japan had announced its surrender to the Allies, which
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proved that the interpreter was not working for the Japanese out of necessity but rather
that he was “a national traitor” who was in fact loyal to the Japanese.
Article (2), “Unjust outside interference and malicious interpreter domination
renounced, determined to protect the judiciary, group of prosecutors submit petition,”
likewise discusses the misconduct of interpreters under the colonial government, though
in more general terms:
When Japanese tyranny began the people suffered bitterly for the numerous cases
of innocent civilians being imprisoned for unfounded accusations made by
malicious interpreters while criminals were acquitted because they had bribed the
interpreter.
This article indicates that interpreters under the Japanese authorities wielded considerable
influence as it claims they could use their position to convince the police and court
whether a person was guilty or innocence of a crime. It also suggests that these
interpreters were prone to receiving bribes and that they were feared and hated by the
public. This article, most importantly, shows that the criticism directed towards
interpreters during the U.S. military occupation extends back to the Japanese colonial era.
The contents of Article (3), “Unjust outside interference and malicious interpreter
domination renounced, determined to protect the judiciary, group of prosecutors submit
petition,” show that interpreters were charged with interfering in court hearings during
the military occupation. In an interview, former prosecutor, Seonu Jeong-won, states that
“many people suffered because interpreters distorted what was being said” at the Military
Government Court. Seonu claims he saw a court interpreter “send an innocent man to
prison by making him guilty by saying ‘no’ when he should have said ‘yes’” (2005, 117).
Seonu claims he later had the interpreter arrested, but while incarcerated the interpreter
informed the authorities that the prosecutor who had had him arrested was actually a
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communist. After hearing this, the prosecutor scolded the interpreters, saying “Hey you,
it was terrible living under Japanese oppression, now that there are new masters have you
decided to sponge off the Americans and harass Korean people?” Here again, the actions
of interpreters working for the U.S. military government are seen as mirroring Japanese
collaborators.
The contents of articles (1), (2), (3) show that interpreters working for the United
States Army Military Government in Korea were viewed by the public as colluders
working with a foreign institution who were willing to use their linguistic resources for
their own personal gain. It was due to these factors that historians such as Jin Duk-gyu
(1980, 46) tend to be extremely critical of Military Government interpreters:
These interpreters were individuals that lacked clear historical awareness or a
sense of national identity. Most of them were obsessed with their own individual
comfort and personal advancement. They began to play the role of a new social
stratum within the hierarchy of power by using the backing of unchallenged
power of the U.S. military they ruled over the Korean people. They were involved
in all matters relating to rights and interests, committed countless corrupt crimes,
increasing the level of socio-political confusion.
The reason interpreters engaged in corrupt activity appears to be linked to the dynamics
of the linguistic market in southern Korea under U.S. occupation, which was
characterized by an excess in demand. Excessive demand is created in a market when the
price of a product or service is set below the equilibrium price. In this case, the
consumers compete to purchase this product or service, and the high demand pushes up
the price, making more suppliers willing to produce the product or provide the service as
the price begins to rise to its equilibrium. The conditions under which the linguistic
market operated during the occupation, however, were not typical market circumstances
because the U.S. military maintained a monopsony—i.e., a situation in which there is
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only one consumer of a good or service—over the demand for interpreters and
translators. The following excerpt, taken from historical records of the U.S. military,
suggests that the Military Government, which possessed wage-setting power as the
largest employer of interpreters, set the price for linguistic services at an artificially low
price, a fact that the institution was cognizant of:
[interpreters] were paid twenty yen a day; in spite of the low pay many educated
English-speaking Koreans volunteered their services in order to improve their
knowledge of English.
(HUSAFIK 1948)
The Military Government, however, was disinclined towards increasing the wages of
interpreters and translators under its employment, based on the fact that they were already
being paid more than Japanese interpreters during the Japanese colonial government.
Q. Are interpreters well paid?
A. Comparatively speaking, interpreters are paid higher than chief clerks and
considerably higher than their position called for under the former government of
Korea – under the Japanese. Their exact pay at present ranges from Civil Service
grade 7 at the top to 10 at the bottom. The total monthly pay for the top grade at
present, including the cost of living differential, is 1870 W. The total monthly pay
for the lowest paid interpreter at present is 1670 W.
(National Archives and Records Administration, November 15, 1946, 12)
By undercutting interpreters, the Military Government opened the door to potential
corruption. The political leader Won Se-hoon asserted that underpaying interpreters led to
corruption and that there was a need to increase interpreter wages, as they have “been
paid salaries which give them little more than tobacco money.”18

Research by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) shows that countries with higher civil
service wages have lower levels of corruption because higher salaries raise the stakes of
engaging in corruption. Similarly, the “fair wage model” contends that officials engage in
corruption only when they see themselves as not receiving a “fair” income, a perception
that could be eliminated through higher salaries. This view corresponds with experts on
corruption, such as Peter N.S. Lee, who notes that “it is not a question of paying
sufficient salary to a man incorruptible but rather of not paying salary on which a man is
18
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The artificially low pay offered interpreters meant that the countervailing force
against engaging in corrupt activity, in other words the threat of loss of employment, was
weakened while the incentive to seek alternative channels of income was strengthened.
Under such circumstances, interpreters, who joined the Military Government for
pragmatic rather than ideological reasons, did not feel the need to meet the expectations
of the Military Government.

2.9. Interpreter Agency within a Zone of Uncertainty
According to Bourdieu, the power that a social agent holds is derived from their
position within a social field and the capital they possess. How then were interpreters
able to gain access to capital and power that allowed them to challenge the authority of
the Military Government during interpreted exchanges when the USAMGIK dominated
the military and political field in occupational Korea? The empowerment of USAMGIK
interpreters was made possible by the fact that interpreted events take place within a
“zone of uncertainty” (Inghilleri 2005, 72). A “zone of uncertainty” is a social space in
which agents from different fields converge, and the convergence of conflicting world
views momentarily upsets the habitus of everyone involved. Social agents, seeking to
reestablish social order amid the confusion, compete to assert with varying levels of
certainty the legitimacy of their own social practices. Thus, interpreting activity becomes
the locus of competition between social agents whose hierarchical relations and
accompanying habitus are recontextualized. Typically, social agents and institutions in
possession of larger amounts of capital, and therefore power, will dictate the terms under

encouraged to be corrupt in order to meet his reasonable commitments.”
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which the norms of interpreting are established. It is due to this fact that the interpreting
habitus often remains oriented towards the maintenance of control possessed by dominant
institutions and social agents over interlingual communication and interaction.
Nonetheless, it is always possible for a more dominant networks of power to be
rendered unable to forcefully assert its authority during interpreted events if its position
of power is challenged by the presence of an interpreter or other interlocutors who may
diminish the value of the symbolic capital they possess. Such developments allow the
interpreter to accrue symbolic and cultural capital that enables them to compete with
social agents from more established professions and fields in the struggle over power and
control of the social/interactional space in which interpreting activity takes place. When
the authority of the dominant institution is challenged, an interpreting habitus that rejects
the dominant institution’s views regarding normative behavior may emerge. In this case,
the role of the interpreter and what constitutes legitimate interpretive practice can be
brought into question or redefined.
In the case of the USAMGIK, although the Military Government was the
dominant administrative and military institution in the field of occupation, interpreters
were able to challenge the organization’s view of what constitutes legitimate behavior,
able to produce new forms of interpreting practices, and able even to dominate
interpreted interactions because of the significance of the linguistic and cultural capital
they possessed. The value of the interpreter’s capital was exponentially increased due to
two factors. First, the demand for the linguistic capital these interpreters possessed was
driven upwards as the USAMGIK transitioned to a bilingual organization. While the
viability of daily administrative operations hinged on the assumption that the American
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and Korean staff could cooperate and coordinate, none of the American staff and only a
very limited number of the Korean staff could communicate with their counterparts.
Second, the supply of interpreters in the linguistic market created by the USAMGIK
could not rise to meet expanding demand because the study of English had been
discouraged by the Japanese colonial government during the decade preceding the U.S’s
arrival.
According to the historians Fishel and Hausrath, the “interpreter’s government”
had the following effects:
1) It put civil affairs at the mercy of their Korean interpreters;
2) it made the Korean interpreter, unprepared by training and experience, the key
man in civil affairs field operations;
3) it posed a serious security problem because of the difficulty of adequately
screening interpreters under Korean conditions; and,
4) it exalted the influence of Koreans who spoke English and therefore were able
to obtain direct access to civil affairs personnel.
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 8-9)
Countermeasures against the empowerment of interpreters were discussed during the
Joint America-Korea Conference, during which the head of the Korean delegation, Kim
Kiu-sic suggested that Military Government interpreters might be kept in check if the
U.S. military could carry out the three following measures:
1) Language qualifications to be tested by both Koreans and Americans before
employment
2) Duties and activities should be outlined and he should be told how far his
responsibilities go. The trouble is that these interpreters are used sometimes
as informers, advisors, liaison officers, etc.
3) Classification:
a. Interpreters or translators attached to the higher officials of M.B.
b. Those attached to bureau chiefs and governors of provinces
c. Those attached to sub-officials such as section chiefs.
(National Archives and Records Administration, November 4, 1946)
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Indeed, had the Military Government been able to enact these three measures, namely
improving the recruitment process, clearly defining the interpreter’s duties, and
establishing a system for personnel management, it would have been better able to dictate
the terms under which interpreters operated. However, Kim overlooked the fact that it
was precisely the organization’s inability to select, train, and manage its linguistic staff
rather than a disinclination to do so that created the conditions for USAMGIK
interpreters to monopolize the channels of interlingual/intercultural communication in the
first place.
After discussions were completed, the members of the Joint Conference sent a
letter to General Hodge which contained the following suggestions for tackling the
problems associated with interpreting:
Interpreters are essential in any governmental organization such as Military
Government where the language barrier is so great. However, dishonest and venal
interpreters have unique opportunities not only for personal gain but for the
furtherance of the political power of the particular group with which they may
happen to be associated. The utilization of interpreters should be carefully limited
to tasks where the officials concerned cannot perform their missions satisfactorily
because of language difficulties. Such officials should carefully check the work of
interpreters in important matters.
(National Archives and Records Administration, February 4, 1947)
This statement does little in the way of providing the Military Government with practical
guidance for managing its interpreters. The recommendation that officials limit the use of
interpreters to tasks for which their services are indispensable was hardly a viable option
as there were no American military personnel able to speak Korean, and less than five
percent of Korean officials in the USAMGIK were capable of conversing in English.
Such a move would have required that American staff restrict dialogue to the handful of
Koreans who could conversate in their language, and the Military Government was
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already under fire by the Korean public for its preferential treatment of English speakers.
Under such circumstances, the suggestion that U.S. staff somehow monitor the work of
the organization’s interpreters rings hollow as well. Thus, rather than providing effective
countermeasures, the contents of this letter reveal that the Military Government’s
inability to access the linguistic capital required for interlingual communication barred it
from asserting dominance over the interpreting habitus.
The circumstances seen above should not, however, simply be understood as a
case in which interpreters forcefully wrestled control away from the Military
Government. An interpreting habitus emerges through interactions between social agents
rather than being constructed by one group. In other words, the interpreting habitus that
arose within the USAMGIK was a natural result of the lack of linguistic and cultural
capital USAMGIK officials possessed during interactions that required fluency in the
language and culture of their counterparts. It was due to this fact that “Many Military
Government officials came to rely heavily on interpreters for the conduct of business far
beyond that of mere translation” (Historical Office of the U.S. Command in Korea,
1948). In sum, the interpreting habitus was reoriented towards the interpreter because
their specialized position with respect to linguistic and cultural knowledge was
acknowledged by interlocutors in the field, which provided them with the symbolic
capital necessary to assert their dominance over interlingual communication.
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CHAPTER 3
THE KOREAN WAR (1950-19 53): A PARROT PERCHED ON A RIFLE
Given that the United Nations Command was comprised of troops from sixteen
United Nations member states, the success of its military operations was highly reliant on
the work of interpreters and translators. Despite the critical role they played during the
Korean War, however, little is known about these linguistic mediators. This chapter first
reveals how Korean-English interpreters, known as UN Liaison Group officers, were
recruited, trained, and utilized during the Korean War (1950-53). Particular attention is
paid to the triadic relationship between UN Liaison Group officers, U.S. Korean Military
Assistance Group officers, and ROK Army officers.

3.1. Diplomatic and Military Fields in Northeast Asia
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the international arena was
dominated by multinational wars which cut across national borders and spanned multiple
continents. The aftermath of the disastrous Second World War saw the beginning of an
era defined by the decline of former colonial powers, the simultaneous rise of the Soviet
Union and the United States, and the creation of supranational organizations such as the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace. On the Korean peninsula, the
end of the Second World War signaled the collapse of the Japanese Empire and the end
of colonial rule. The power void left by the Japanese was promptly filled by the militaries
of the Soviet Union and the United States, who divided the country along the 38th
Parallel and established military governments in the two zones. Though the United
Nations attempted to unify the two Koreas by administering joint elections, this effort
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failed because UN agents were prevented from setting foot in the communist zone north
of the border. Separate elections were held in 1948, and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South
Korea) were launched that same year. The Soviet and American militaries soon after
departed, leaving behind two diametrically opposed governments, each claiming
sovereignty over the whole of Korea, setting the stage for the Korean War.
As soon as the two governments were founded, they began preparations for
military confrontation. In the South, this mandate was spearheaded by Syngman Rhee,
the first president of the Republic of Korea, who maintained that a peaceful coexistence
between the two Koreas was impossible and reunification needed to be secured by any
means possible. What prevented Rhee from launching an all-out war with the North
Koreans was the fact that the United States refused to support his plan for the
reunification of the Korean peninsula by force. At the time, the U.S. was preoccupied
with countering Soviet geopolitical expansion in Europe. As part of this effort, Truman
announced the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to contain the communist threat in Greece and
Turkey, which became the foundation of America’s policy of Soviet containment
throughout the Cold War. This move was followed by the Marshall Plan in 1948, an
initiative to aid Western European economies rebuild after the end of World War II, and
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, a military
alliance established to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.
The premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Il-sung, was
equally adamant about the need to unify the country by force and constantly sought Stalin
and Mao’s support for a war against the Republic of Korea. In the years following the
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establishment of the two Korean governments, however, neither of North Korea’s two
major allies had sufficient motive to unleash a war on the Korean peninsula. Unifying the
Korean peninsula was not a high priority for Stalin, who faced a greater challenge in
Europe as Western European states began to rebuild themselves, with the aforementioned
support of the United States. When Kim Il-sung first breached the matter, asking for
“permission to begin military operations against the south” (Shtykov 1949), the Soviet
Politburo responded with, “It is impossible to view this operation other than the
beginning of a war between North and South Korea, for which North Korea is not
prepared either militarily or politically” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo
1949). While refusing his proposal, Stalin nonetheless “found Kim’s reunification ideas
interesting enough to discuss them with Mao” (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue 1993, 139).
At the moment, the Chinese likewise had little to gain from a war on the Korean
peninsula. The Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and
the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Zedong, had been raging on since 1927,
although the two had briefly combined forces against the Japanese. It was only in 1949
that, after more than two decades of fighting, Mao’s communist forces finally defeated
Chiang’s army and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite the fact
that Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters had fled across the Taiwan Strait, the newly
established PRK was faced with a myriad of domestic issues, including eliminating the
last vestiges of opposition on the mainland, erecting a stable political system, and
revitalizing the economy. Preoccupied with matters closer to home, Mao had no reason to
incite a clash on the Korean peninsula.
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It was only in 1950 that shifts to the balance of power on the international stage
convinced Stalin to accept Kim’s calls for a war for the reunification of Korea. The most
important factor was without question the establishment of the PRC, which successfully
placed the whole of mainland China under communist control. In addition to the
enlargement of the communist sphere of influence, this development was interpreted by
party leaders in Moscow as a sign that Washington was reluctant to actively intervene in
East Asian affairs. Stalin therefore believed he could support a North Korean military
push for unification without risking all-out war with the United States. Nonetheless, as a
cautionary measure, Stalin insisted that Kim receive Mao’s approval for operations, and
warned that “if he ran into difficulty with the United States, he would have to depend on
China, not the Soviet Union, to bail him out” (Stueck 2002, 73). In May, Stalin also sent
a telegram to China’s leadership declaring, “The present situation has changed from the
situation in the past [so] that North Korea can move towards actions” (Vyshinsky 1950).
At this point, Stalin was still the unchallenged chief of the international communist
movement, and Mao could not openly dispute his authority on such matters. Furthermore,
Mao had himself very recently reunified China by force and could thus not justifiably
oppose Kim from pursuing a similar goal by identical means. For these reasons, when
Kim Il-sung called on him for support, Mao promised that the DPRK had the PRC’s
backing, should a need arise.
Preparations for war began as soon as Stalin gave the go-ahead. Hundreds of
Soviet military advisors had remained in North Korea after the establishment of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and more still arrived in May and June of 1950.
Large amounts of mobile artillery and tanks were also sent from the U.S.S.R., with
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technical staff to prepare and maintain the weapons. Though Stalin made it clear that this
would be a “Korean” war, which would be limited to the Korean peninsula, as he did not
want to risk the outbreak of a third world war, he promised that the Soviet Union would
assist the North as best it could within those parameters. Kim Il-sung pledged “the attack
will be swift and the war will be won in three days: the guerrilla movement in the South
has grown stronger and a major uprising is expected” (Lankov 2015, 10) once the
Northern army crossed the border. Fully in agreement on these matters, the three
communist leaders set the time for attack for late June.

3.2. The Outbreak and Progression of the Korean War
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean military crossed the 38th Parallel and began
its attack on the Republic of Korea. Their plan was to rapidly advance southward, capture
the capital city of Seoul and encircle the Republic of Korea Army in the central region of
the country. Seoul fell on the third day of the attack and Rhee and his administration, as
well as hundreds of thousands of refugees, fled to the southeast coast. In late July, Kim
Il-sung reported to Moscow that he was confident the war would last less than a month.
Although North Korea held the upper hand militarily, the international
community’s reaction to the war made the fulfillment of Kim’s prediction unlikely. In
Washington, Truman immediately decided that the war was a case of outright Communist
aggression, claiming in a statement made on June 27, 1950, that “The attack on Korea
made it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion
to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war” (Truman
1956, 339). In Truman’s eyes, this attack, which was orchestrated by the Soviet Union,
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was carried out to reduce American influence in the Asian continent and to test the mettle
of the United States and its allies on a global scale. It was widely held at the time that the
Soviet Union had masterminded the North Korean attack and that Kim Il-sung was
Stalin’s puppet (Kennan 1968, 395). According to Truman, this gave America a moral
imperative to act. “If we don't put up a fight now,” Truman proclaimed to his staff, there
is “no telling what they’ll do” (Neal 2002, 182).
A number of events surrounding the attack on South Korea made Truman
anxious. First, the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb in 1949, ending
the United States’ monopoly on the weapon. Second, in Europe, Soviet intervention in
Greece and Turkey had given rise to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which
funneled aid to war-torn Europe in the hopes of warding off communist political
victories. Most importantly, in Asia, China proper had been unified under Mao Zedong’s
communist party, whereas the U.S.-backed Chiang Kai-shek had been forced to retreat to
the island of Formosa (or Taiwan). After defeating Chiang, Mao had quickly moved to
ally himself with the Soviet Union, and the two sides signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. The Truman
administration faced fierce criticism for the unexpected communist takeover of China,
which was often referred to as the “loss of China” (Newman 1992, ix). This critique
played a large role in the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy, which placed Truman and his
advisors under pressure to not appear “soft” on communism. When North Korean troops
invaded the South, the Truman administration was eager to seize the opportunity to
defend a noncommunist government from invasion by communist troops in hopes of
gaining approval for its anticommunist campaign.
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In the days following the outbreak of the Korean War, a series of critical
decisions were made within the United Nations Security Council, propelled by the United
States, regarding its response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Word of the
North Korean attack first reached Washington via a radio message from Seoul to the
Department of State sent by United States Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, who
stated: “It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was
launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea” (FRUS
1950, 125-126).19 News of the North Korea attack was soon passed on to the Secretary
General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, who reportedly immediately exclaimed, “This
is war against the United Nations” (Chace and Carr 2006, 68).. Lie called a meeting of the
Security Council for the next day at 2 p.m. (New York time) to debate, amend, and revise
a resolution with respect to the situation in Korea. United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 82 was adopted on June 25, 1950, by a vote of nine to zero. The
Soviet delegation, which could have vetoed the decision, was not present at the Security
Council when the resolution was passed, because it had boycotted meetings since January
10, 1950 over the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations (Pak 2000, 109).
UNSC Resolution 82 stated that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by
forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “constitutes a breach of the
peace.” It called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of North
Korean armed forces to the 38th Parallel, and, finally, “all [United Nations] Members to

19
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render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to
refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”20
While the UNSC was debating how to respond to the North Korean attack,
MacArthur, who was stationed in Tokyo, was ordered to send ammunition and equipment
to South Korean forces so as to prevent a North Korean occupation of the capital area
through the usage of air and naval cover to assure their safe arrival, provide ships and
planes to evacuate American families from Korea and to protect the evacuation, and
dispatch a survey party to Korea to monitor the situation and determine how best the U.S.
might assist the ROK. On the evening of June 26, 1950, MacArthur reported to
Washington that South Korean forces could not hold Seoul and that the ROK military
was on the brink of “a complete collapse” (Korean Institute of Military History 1997,
252).
As the situation on the Korean peninsula further deteriorated, on June 27, 1950,
the UN Security Council passed the momentous UNSC Resolution 83.21 This statement
once again called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the North Korean
authorities to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th Parallel. It was also noted that
North Korea had failed to comply with UNSC Resolution 82, and thus “urgent military
measures are required to restore international peace and security.” The resolution
recommended “that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore

The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 82 may be viewed through the search
engine of the United Nations at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/82
21
The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 83 may be viewed through the search
engine of the United Nations at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/83
20
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international peace and security in the area.” The passing of this second resolution was an
exceptional event in the history of the United Nations as it was the first time the UN
requested military action from its member states to defend a country under military
attack. Also noteworthy is the fact that, at the time, the ROK was not a UN member state.
Despite calls for peace, the war waged on, and North Korean forces were able to
continue their rush southward. On July 7, 1950, the UNSC passed Resolution 84.22
Having previously recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the South Korean state as may be necessary to repel the attack and restore
peace and security to the area, the Security Council further recommended that all
members providing military forces and other assistance to the Republic of Korea make
these forces and assistance available to a unified command under the United States of
America. In addition, they requested that the U.S. appoint the Commander of this
organization, the United Nations Command, and task the Commander with reporting to
the UNSC on circumstantial developments. In other words, the U.S. was hereby granted
nearly unlimited authority over all UN-backed military operations on the peninsula.
National militaries participating in the war as part of the United Nations Command
(UNC) would be required to march under the UN flag. After the resolution was passed,
Truman appointed MacArthur as Commander of the UN forces on July 8, 1950. The
Republic of Korea, though not a member of the UN, likewise placed its military under
MacArthur’s command on July 15, 1950, and on July 25, 1950, the UNC was officially
established under the leadership of MacArthur.

The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 84 may be viewed through the search
engine of the United Nations at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/84
22
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In total, sixteen countries sent troops and forty-one sent some form of equipment
or aid to support the United Nations’ efforts against the forces of North Korea, which
would later be aided by China. The success of this first “United Nations War” was of
vital importance to the international organization if it hoped to maintain legitimacy.
Failure to counter the North Korean attack would have caused the young institution to
lose credibility just five years after its creation. Truman went so far as to state that the
goal of the war effort was “to bring the United Nations through its first great effort in
collective security and to produce a free world coalition of incalculable value” (Rovere
and Schlesinger 2009, 104).
While these critical decisions were being made at the UN Security Council, the
South Korean government, military, and people were continuously forced into retreat by
the Northern onslaught. The UN forces sent to aid the South Koreans were likewise
repeatedly defeated by the advancing North Korean Army until they were forced back to
the Pusan Perimeter, a 140-mile defensive line around the southeastern tip of the Korean
peninsula that includes the port of Pusan. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and
UNC mounted a last stand around the perimeter, warding off North Korean attacks for six
weeks, between August to mid-September. While the ROKA and UNC successfully
defended this border, the United States, which had firm footing in Japan, continuously
dispatched reinforcements and supplies to Pusan harbor. By early September,
MacArthur’s troops outnumbered the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) 180,000 to
100,000 soldiers, giving it the manpower needed to successfully mount a counterattack
against the North (Appleman 1961, 61).
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On September 15, 1950, MacArthur masterminded an amphibious landing at
Incheon, a harbor city west of Seoul, which was well over 100 miles north of the Pusan
Perimeter (Stokesbury 1988, 67). His objective was to liberate Seoul and threaten to cut
off North Korean troops in the south of the peninsula. This risky tactic was a tremendous
success. The UN forces that landed in Incheon defeated the North Korean units
surrounding Seoul after only a week’s fighting. The UNC in Pusan pushed northward as
the KPA retreated and Seoul was recaptured by ROK forces on September 25, 1950. By
October 1, 1950, the communist troops that had marched on South Korea were all fleeing
north of the 38th Parallel.
With the North Korean forces in full retreat, the vital issue under consideration in
the United Nations was the matter of whether the organization’s forces should cross the
38th Parallel into North Korean territory and attempt to reunify the country by force. This
topic had not been discussed at length earlier but there was a general understanding that
the aim of the UN’s military venture was to restore the status quo by driving the North
Korean Army north of the 38th Parallel. As UN forces rapidly approached the former
border, arguments erupted within the UN for and against advancing past the parallel.
Those in favor of a northward push argued that it was evident that there could be no
lasting peace in the region if Korea remained divided into two ideologically polar states.
During the U.S.S.R./U.S. occupation of northern and southern Korea, the policy of the
UN had been to accomplish a unified Korea through the arrangement of free elections
under UN auspice. The United Nations was still committed to this past decision and in
dispute with North Korea, which had refused to permit UN supervision of elections north
of the 38th Parallel. On the other hand, an attempt to unify Korea by force entailed
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potential danger as there was no sure way to know how China or the Soviet Union would
respond to the potential downfall of their ally. The Soviets could justify its entry into war
with claims to some residual interests in the country while China might intervene since
the disappearance of a communist state on the Korean peninsula would threaten its
national security as it would place a U.S. ally next to its borders. The consequences of
intervention by the Soviet Union or China could go so far as possibly sparking a third
world war. In the United States, the success of the Incheon Landing had led to the rise of
sufficient support for crossing the border. On September 30, 1950, U.S. Defense
Secretary George Marshall sent a secret message to MacArthur stating, “We want you to
feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel”
(Weintraub 2000, 157-158).. With his government’s support, MacArthur ordered UN
troops to cross the 38th Parallel into North Korean territory on October 7, 1950
(Stokesbury 1988, 79). The North Korean capital, Pyongyang, was captured on October
19, 1950 and UN troops continued to press northward, drawing closer to the North
Korean-Chinese border (ibid.: 90).
Stalin, who had been repeatedly promised a swift victory, was furious with the
North Korean defeat and accused the North Koreans and his own military advisors of
incompetence and negligence. On October 1, 1950, Stalin sent a message to Mao stating,
“the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate […] I think that if in the current
situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should
move at least five-six divisions towards the 38th parallel at once” (Roberts 2019, 323).
Upon receiving this message, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership met in
emergency sessions from October 2-5, 1950 in order to decide on whether or not China
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would intervene. Mao was very clear from the start that he wanted Chinese forces to
move into North Korea, as per Stalin’s request. Furthermore, the Chinese communists
owed the Koreans a debt of gratitude from the Chinese Civil War, in which many Korean
communists had participated, and Mao himself had promised Kim he would provide him
with assistance if needed. However, there was considerable opposition within the Chinese
Politburo, and Mao was forced to decline the request for an immediate intervention with
the statement that “such action may entail extremely serious consequences.” After
receiving yet another more urgent request from Stalin to intervene, on October 5, 1950,
Mao was able to convince members of the Politburo to overturn their previous decision
and agree to send up to nine divisions to fight in Korea. After additional negotiations, on
October 13, 1950, Mao finally made the decision that the PRK “should go ahead and
cross the Yalu” into North Korea (Yufan and Zhihai 1990, 111).
While Stalin and Mao prevaricated, the UN military advance northward
continued. The Chinese forces, constituted as the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA),
entered Korea the same day as the North Korean capital fell, with approximately two
hundred thousand men. China justified its entry into the war as a response to “American
aggression in the guise of the UN” (Fuchs, et al. 2018, 291). At the time, U.S.
intelligence knew of China’s intention to intervene in the war, but they did not know
where their troops would attack from nor how many troops they were willing to dedicate
to the cause. Thus, the UNC was taken by surprise on November 1, 1950 when the
Chinese forces attacked the U.S. First Cavalry Division near the city of Unsan. The
Americans were caught wholly unprepared and suffered terrible losses. Mao then ordered
the Chinese troops to wait for reinforcements before proceeding. This led MacArthur to
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his biggest miscalculation of the war, ordering an offensive against the Chinese troops
who he still believed were few in number. The result was a complete disaster for the UN
forces. The PVA counterattack not only destroyed the offensive, with heavy losses on
both sides, but forced the UNC into retreat. By December, the UNC was entirely pushed
out of North Korea and on January 4, 1951, Seoul fell to the Communist forces for the
second time. On April 11, 1951, Truman delivered his “Preventing a New World War”
speech and dismissed MacArthur, a move that was brought about after the general
publicly argued that the United States “take the war to China” (Ryan 1981, 576).
By intervening in the Korean War, the newly established People’s Republic of
China demonstrated to its domestic population the freshly instituted communist regime’s
dedication to defending the country’s national sovereignty and communist ideology while
flaunting to both its allies and rivals the country’s ability to hold its own against the
United States. The intervention of China created a pseudo “balance of power” on the
Korean peninsula. In mid-March 1951, UN forces retook Seoul for the second time, and
their forces were able to establish and hold a fragile front line very close to the 38th
parallel. The Chinese tried to dislodge them in April but failed due to the UN’s superior
air support. The communist forces attempted an offensive in the spring of 1951, but the
war had already taken the form of trench warfare. By the summer of 1951, Seoul had
changed hands four times, the conflict became a war of attrition, with the front line set up
close to the original border, the 38th parallel.
By June, Mao was ready for a cease-fire, but Stalin argued that the war “gives the
possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and
[…] shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the
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Anglo-American troops” (Combs 2012, 149). In the south, Syngman Rhee likewise urged
the UNC not to settle before the country was reunified. Meanwhile, international support
for the war continued to wain: in Europe, the war had never had much resonance and
most people simply wanted the conflict to end before it spread there, the developing
world expressed little support for the war, and two thirds of Americans believed that the
U.S. should pull out of Korea altogether.
For the remainder of the Korean War the ROKA/UNC and the KPA/PVA
continued to wage battle but exchanged little territory. As such, the two sides were
eventually forced to devise an alternative strategy to end the war because neither the
UNC nor the Chinese and North Korean commanders were willing to gamble on a largescale offensive. Although the Korean Armistice Talks finally started in the summer of
1951, the war continued on the battlefield and amassed thousands of casualties without
meaningful military gains from either side.

3.3. Interpreting during the Korean War
Interpreters played a particularly consequential role within the UNC because this
organization was comprised of troops dispatched from sixteen UN members states.23 The
ROK and the U.S. militaries made up the overwhelming majority of this military
coalition, and thus, ensuring smooth interlingual communication between these two
groups was of maximum importance for the success of the UNC’s military operations.

During the war, the demarcation between interpreter and translator was not clear, as a
single individual was often assigned to do both. Individuals tasked with both functions
were more often referred to as “interpreter” rather than “translator.” The current study
will adhere to this approach.
23
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The U.S.’s lack of capable Korean interpreters was both evident and problematic
even before the official outbreak of violent conflict. In early 1950, the United States
Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which controlled and operated all
communications intelligence and communications security activities within the
Department of Defense, had no technical expertise on the Korean peninsula. The single
self-trained Korean linguist possessed no Korean dictionaries, typewriters, or books
pertaining to Korea. The agency, like most other national and operational level
communications intelligence organizations at the time, focused on Soviet military
communications targets and, thus, “North Korean codes had of necessity been grossly
neglected” (Blair 1987, 171). The agency thus failed to conduct communications
intelligence collection or analysis against North Korean targets until April 1950, and, as a
result, the U.S. military misjudged the danger posed by North Korea and the imminence
of the attack on South Korea, as analysts had believed “there will be no civil war in
Korea this spring or summer” (Finley 1995, 382).24 The lack of Korean interpreters
continued to hinder the U.S. military’s wartime operations in Korea; military historians
Wesley R. Fishel and Alfred H. Hausrath acknowledge that during the war the inability of
United States military to access the Korean language and clearly communicate with its
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Naturally, the challenges of communicating with allied forces presented difficulties
not only for the UNC but the communist alliance as well, as the lack of a common
language between the Chinese-North Korean Joint Air Command and the Russian Air
Force was a tremendous hindrance to cooperation between the communist militaries. The
resulting lack of coordination between the Sino-Korean ground forces and the Russian air
units led to North Korean AAAs targeting Soviet fighters and a Russian pilot shooting
down a Chinese MiG after mistaking it for an American F-86 Sabre (Halliday 1993: 154).
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partners was “responsible for many operational situations and errors that proved costly in
lives, money, and time” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 1).
When the United States decided to deploy troops to the Korean peninsula, the
country’s military brass and policymakers believed U.S. military intervention would
bring about a swift end to the conflict. Although initially taken aback by the rapid
advance of the North Korean military, the atmosphere in Washington soon turned to one
of euphoria following the success of the Incheon Landing on September 15, 1950, and a
definitive victory against the communist enemy seemed only a matter of time. In early
November, the Associated Press reported that an emboldened MacArthur told his staff,
“You tell your boys that when they get to the Yalu (River) they are going home. I want to
make good on my statement that they are going to eat Christmas dinner at home.” Soon
after, the UNC commander launched the so-called “Home-by-Christmas” offensive on
November 24, 1950, with “unwarranted confidence...believing that they comfortably
outnumbered enemy forces” (Mossman 1990, 23-24). The northern push, carried out with
the objective of conquering all of North Korea and ending the war, was quickly
abandoned in light of the massive assault by the PVA, which had come to North Korea’s
aid in late October. MacArthur was relieved from his post in April 1951, and the war
stretched on until the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.

3.3.1. UN Liaison Group Officers
It was largely due to the U.S. military’s overconfidence and belief that the Korean
War would be a short-term commitment that “the Army Language School (ALS) did not
gear up for a major expansion, as had occurred to meet the needs for language skills in
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World War II” (Müller 1986: 104). As a result, throughout the period of “active combat
in Korea from 1950 to 1953—the period of prime need for the Army—US military
interpreters were not available” (Hausrath 1957, 121). In their stead, “the [U.S] Army
was forced to rely on non-Americans for linguist services in Korea” (Fishel and Hausrath
1958, 1).
It was the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) that assumed the duty of selecting,
training, and managing Korean-English interpreters by establishing the UN Liaison
Group on July 7, 1950. Though initially a relatively small group of first lieutenants, the
organization grew expeditiously following the UN Security Council’s pledge to come to
the aid of the ROK. According to KMAG and ROKA headquarters, “more than 1,800
Korean-English interpreter-officers were on duty in the ROKA at the close of the Korean
hostilities” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 32).
The position of UN Liaison Group officer was considered an attractive one
because these interpreters were not expected to actively participate in armed combat.
Unlike other commissioned officers who led enlisted soldiers on the battlefield, the
official duty of the UN Liaison Group officer was limited to mediating communication
between U.S. and ROK counterparts:
Interpreters are assigned or attached to units by Headquarters ROK Army as may
be required and they are to be used for interpretation and translation duties only.
They will not be assigned to other duties.
(Office of the Chief KMAG, 1953)
Furthermore, there was the added advantage that officers were paid a higher salary than
enlisted soldiers, and UN Liaison Group officers could improve their English language
skills during their military service. During the war, English was a vital tool for survival,
as even children learned a few English words in order to beg for food from the U.S.
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military, as well a ladder for success, as ROK President Rhee Syngman was noted for
giving preferential treatment to people proficient in English. The ROK Defense Minister,
Shin Sung-mo, was one individual who benefited greatly from his ability to speak
fluently in English, a fact that is highlighted and vilified in the poem “Shin Sung-mo” by
the Korean poet Ko Un.
he used to sail on an English boat
and was thought competent
because he knew the language
he was loved by the president who was also well versed in English
in no time he was named the Defense Minister
he was living the dream
before the war he said
we will lunch at Pyongyang
and supper at Sinuiju
this is our chance
our national army shall chase them to the Yalu River
so that our dream of national unification may come to pass
such utter nonsense
(Ko 2004, 180-181; my translation)
Due to the various privileges these military interpreters enjoyed, many hoped to
serve as UN Liaison Group officers and candidates were selected through a fiercely
competitive selection process. Anyone wishing to join the UN Liaison Group was first
required to submit documentation verifying that they were, “a man of the Republic of
Korea, civilian or army personnel [EM] who have completed the entire course of high
school or higher” (Hausrath 1957, 120). If their paperwork was accepted, the applicants
then appeared for a written examination administered by ROKA. A special
KMAG Selection Board (under the KMAG AG) then gave those who passed the
written test an oral examination. This board recommended to ROKA AG and G1
those candidates it found competent to enter the school.
(ibid., 122)
According to former UN Liaison Group officer Kim Il-pyong, during the examination,
candidates were
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tested on their ability not only to speak in English but also their knowledge of
Korean history and ability to translate. They were not only tested to see if they
could speak English but also to see if they could read various English books,
understand Anglophone culture, and translate into Korean. It was therefore a
comprehensive exam of the candidate’s linguistic skills.
(Kim 2012; my translation)
Due to the position’s appeal and the examination’s high-level of difficulty, most
candidates who were selected were “either university graduates, university students, or
career men […] who could be considered ‘intellectuals’” (Lee 1988, 213-14).
Those who passed the entrance exam were sent to the English Interpreter (UN
Liaison) Officer Training School, where they received military and language training for
three to four weeks. The mission of the school was,
to train the selected Republic of Korea personnel in the Republic of Korea Army
military in English; techniques of interpretation and translation, and the technical
military working knowledges and the basic military training as they require to the
service of the excellent interpreter [English] officer in every field of any
organization so that they can contribute to the sufficient operations of the
Republic of Korea Army which has been held by the most close cooperation and
coordination with the United Nations Army, and also to the development of the
Republic of Korea Army.
(Hausrath 1957, 120)
While the Training School’s goals were lofty enough, when compared to the 46 weeks of
language training provided at the U.S. Army Language School (ALS), the training UN
Liaison Group officers received was exceedingly short. UN Liaison Group officer
themselves considered the course they had taken at the interpreter school “to have been
too short and sketchy to meet their actual needs and recommended that it be increased in
length from 3 to at least 6 weeks; in three instances the suggestion was that it be at least 2
months long” (Hausrath 1957, 122). The following excerpts show that it was also not
uncommon for cadets to be posted after having spent only one or two weeks at the school
due to the urgent need for their services at military headquarters and field units.
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The head of the newly established “UN Liaison Officer Group” was Lieutenant
Colonel Kang Young-jun. The name and branch of service “UN Liaison Officer”
had not previously existed within the ROK Army. Due to the rapid expansion of
the Army during the early phases of the Korean War, the extension of the war,
and the increase in the demand for KMAG Advisors, it was rare for these cadets
to finish the required four-week training period before being dispatched. When I
joined, the third batch had been sent out, but considering that it had only been
forty days since the war broke out, it was obvious they had only received a
maximum of ten days of training before being sent out.
(Lee 1988: 211-12, my translation)
In June 1951, I received just two weeks of training and was commissioned as an
Army first lieutenant and sent to the 3rd Division.
(Ji 2006: 84, my translation)
The English Interpreter (UN Liaison) Officer Training School was only able to increase
its period of training from three to six weeks in June 1953, a month before the signing of
the armistice agreement. Thus, throughout the majority of the Korean War, UN Liaison
Group officers had to manage their duties despite being undertrained for the tasks set
before them.
The UN Liaison Group, despite rushing to churn out military interpreters, was
never able to fully meet the demand for these military linguists. As a result, there was a
tendency for combat units to recruit interpreters whenever the opportunity presented
itself:
Because the number of Liaison officers who received regular training could not
meet the exploding demand of the Army, a fair number were commissioned on
the spot. Due to the needs on the battlefield, anyone who could say a few words
on the frontlines was immediately ‘recruited’ and given a new insignia.
(Lee 1988, 213)
When we reached the northern outskirts of the city just after sunset, we ran into a
roadblock manned by a squad of American GIs. I was overjoyed.
“Hey, you guys, what’s your outfit?” I asked.
“2nd Infantry Division,” one of the GIs manning a 75-mm recoilless gun
replied, asking, “Would you like to work for us as interpreter?”
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“Hell, yes,” I accepted the offer on the spot.
(Kim 2008, 26)
In this case, interpreters were put to work without having received even the most basic
level of language training. However, as will be revealed later in this chapter, in some
cases, U.S. military personnel preferred working with untrained civilian interpreters over
UN Liaison Group officers due to issues related to loyalty.

3.3.2. U.S. Korean Military Assistance Group Officers
Once their training was completed, UN Liaison Group officers reported to ROKA
units to mediate communications between U.S. and ROK officers. Typically, these U.S.
officers were members of the United States Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), a
military unit originally deployed to South Korea to help train and provide logistic support
to the ROKA, following its establishment on August 15, 1948 under the title Provisional
Military Advisory Group (PMAG). PMAG was renamed KMAG on July 1, 1949 and
tasked with advising and assisting the ROK to develop its army, coast guard, and national
police. After the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, KMAG advisors faced the
demanding task of providing their ROKA advisees with counsel during major combat
operations against North Korean and Chinese forces while also performing the secondary
mission of maintaining a liaison between the ROKA and the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA),
the U.S. field army with command over all U.S. armed forces in Korea.
The main challenge KMAGers faced in their interactions with ROK unit
commanders and officers during the war was the language barrier. When first deployed to
the peninsula, KMAG had no Americans who knew or understood the Korean language.
Prewar attempts to induce KMAG advisors to learn Korean failed from a general lack of
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interest. Even in 1953, after the war had waged on for almost three years, it was found
that only one KMAG advisor could speak, read, and write Korean with any degree of
fluency. The inability of KMAG personnel to understand the local language negatively
affected their mission, as a study of KMAG advisors concluded:
From the circumstances there can be no question but that the utter dependence of
KMAG advisors on Koreans for vital military information, and as a corollary the
inability of KMAG advisors to obtain information directly through the use of the
Korean language, hampered them in the accomplishment of their mission and
resulted on numerous occasions in the unnecessary loss of territory and lives or
wastage of ammunition.
(Hausrath 1957, 117)
Consequentially, the KMAGers were unreservedly dependent on the linguistic services of
UN Liaison Group officers throughout the war, as is indicated by the following chart.
Table1: Methods of Communication with Counterparts
Method
Percent of 255 respondents
English (no interpreter)
59
Korean (no interpreter)
ROKA interpreter
79
Korean civilian interpreter
3
US Army interpreter
Pictures, writing, or gestures
26
Other
2
No answer
*Adds up to well over 100 percent because most advisors checked more than one method
(Hausrath 1957: 67)
One of the main complaints brought up by KMAG personnel about UN Liaison Group
officers was their lack of knowledge regarding military terminology.
Language is probably our biggest problem. The ROKs…make a genuine effort to
learn English. It’s been suggested that we learn Korean, but that is difficult.
Interpreters vary in quality. The one we use most of the time is excellent; he
understands slang…The language barrier slows down the operation all the time.
Interpreters are students who learned the English language. I recommend that they
be given a course in military instruction and terminology. Now, they don’t know
what you mean by MSR, and so forth.
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(Hausrath 1957, 69)
The interpreter should be given a basic course in the branch concerned. He
doesn’t have the vocabulary to put technical things over to his counterpart.
(ibid.)
The language barrier is most serious. Interpreters are not familiar with technical
terms…[They] are not trained in tactics, they need more training.
(ibid.)
Our ROKA interpreters simply don’t understand military terms until they’ve been
out on the job for a minimum of two months, and that is the minimum.” [ROKA
GGSC Advisor]
(Hausrath 1957, 120)
The interpreters we have secured from ROKA are not very good quality. Maybe
mediocre is a better word. They aren’t familiar with military terms either in
Korean or English. [Div Senior Advisor]
(ibid.)
The UN Liaison Group officer’ unfamiliarity with military and technical terminology was
in large part due to the inadequate training interpreters were provided with during their
short stay at the English Interpreter (UN Liaison) Officer Training School. Less than four
weeks of training was simply not long enough to properly arm interpreters with the
linguistic and technical tools necessary to perform their duties immediately after being
sent into the field. According to Lee (1998), however, the problem was not simply a
symptom of the short duration of training, as he explains that training was insufficient in
not only temporal terms but also sorely lacking in qualitative terms. While at the school,
UN Liaison Group officers-in-training were “handed out the Glossary of U.S. Military
Operation Terminology to memorize” but “it was impossible that we would be able to
converse in English after only a week or two when we had previously only been trained
to read” (Lee 1988, 212). It is important to note that the glossary, which was the main
reference tool provided during training, was written in English and did not include the
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Korean language equivalents for the military terms it listed. A major effort to translate
the Dictionary of United States Army Terms into Korean was made before the outbreak of
the war but the project was abandoned following the North Korean attack. The lack of a
bilingual dictionary or glossary was the cause of much confusion regarding what military
terms meant and how they should be rendered into Korean. In many cases, equivalents
for military terms and equipment did not exist in the Korean language and the interpreter
was forced to describe the item or concept as best they could. For example, “a machine
gun, for which no word existed in Korean, became a gun that shoots very fast or a gun of
many loud noises” (Hausrath 1957, 69) or any other way the interpreter chose to describe
it. Another strategy used by officer-interpreters was to transliterate rather than translate
military terms.
American terms, such as M1, OP, tank, etc., were adopted into the Korean
language and were used with complete understanding in oral communication.
(Hausrath 1957, 119)
Alternatively,
this shortcoming could frequently be overcome by the addition of Chinese
characters (which are understood by most literate Koreans, chiefly officers) to
express the desired thought.
(Hausrath 1957, 117-18)
While the employment of Chinese characters allowed interpreters to assign concise
signifiers to military terms, this did not guarantee that anyone else but the interpreter who
coined the neologism would understand or employ the same terminology. It is hardly
surprising, given the absence of officially prescribed equivalents for military
terminology, that complications arose. For instance, “it was found in the course of
manual preparation that different translators differed as to which terms were proper and
accurate translations of the original language” (Hausrath 1957, 118). It is on these
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grounds that both KMAGer and Korean interpreters pointed to the lack of translation
equivalents for military terminology as the primary challenge when rendering English
into Korean and vice versa.
I felt at the time that it was easier to translate Japanese into English than it was to
translated Korean into English. This was because the Japanese language has been
quite Westernized since the late 19th century, starting in the 1860s, and thus
changed, making it easy to express certain things in a Western way.
(Kim 2012, 1)
The Korea language is a nonmodern tongue in the sense that it often lacks terms
for technical and modern colloquial words and phrases found in other languages.
It was often impossible to find equivalents for American military terms.
(Hausrath 1957, 117)
The cumulative result of the cursory manner with which training was provided at the
Interpreting School and the lack of reference materials and established interpreting norms
meant that the UN Liaison Group officers were not provided with the tools to succeed as
linguistic mediators within a highly contentious military field. The following excerpts
show that KMAGers expressed mixed reactions when asked about their level of
satisfaction with the interpreting services of UN Liaison Group officers (Hausrath 1957,
69):
They go from excellent to poor. It varies by the individual…I had an excellent
interpreter who knew the job and helped me to do my job.
The battalion CO didn’t speak English, but he had two interpreters who had
been with the battalion for two years and knew their stuff. They could have been
artillery officers, and they knew English well. I had the interpreters run missions
like the S-3. They know all the artillery terms.
I had no trouble whatsoever…I had a good interpreter; he made polite but
accurate translations. I could check on this through an American sergeant who
spoke Korean.
I had three interpreters of whom two could not speak English. One of these
would “translate” written English to Korean. One could speak a little. He would
say he understood but experience showed that he didn’t.
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The mixed responses regarding interpreter quality suggests that even among official UN
Liaison Group officers, the ability to render what was said in either English or Korean
into the opposing language varied significantly. In their study of Korean War interpreters,
Fishel and Hausrath (1958, 13-14) divide military linguists active during the Korean War
into four general levels of competence:
Class A: international political (or negotiating) level25
Class B: advanced intelligence level26
Class C: routine language operations level27
Class D: minimum requirements level28
25

Personnel operating at this highest level must be completely fluent in an Asiatic
language and in English as well. They should be capable of simultaneous translations
(interpretation) to and from English. In addition to linguist fluency they must have a deep
understanding of the appropriate Asiatic culture, area, and psychology. This is a “super”
category, the personnel in which would be competent to handle interpretation, advising,
and even negotiating at high-level meetings such as those in which US military
representatives have been engaged in Kaesong and Panmunjom since 1951. At the time
of this writing the Army has no career personnel in this category in either Korean or any
Chinese dialect.
26
Personnel in this category must be fluent in an Asiatic language and competent in
English as well. They should have some understanding of the appropriate Asiatic culture,
area, and psychology. Primary areas of employment for men of such qualifications are
military intelligence (including counterintelligence), Army Security Agency, psywar,
CA/MG, military advisory groups, attaché system, MP (including CID), POW handling,
and CIE. Unlike the altogether fluent top-level linguists, men within this category might
be capable of fluent performance in only one of the primary fields of military linguist
endeavor: interpretation, interrogation, or translation. This is a small group from the
standpoint of available linguist manpower.
27
Its members possess a lower degree of fluency than either higher classification, and
might be “fairly competent” in only one of the three types of linguist work. This, it has
been found, is the largest group from the standpoint of available linguist manpower.
Because of the scarcity of the more highly qualified Class B linguists in Korea, many in
this category were working in military jobs that, in the opinion of their responsible
language supervisors, called for language specialists of Class B qualifications. Normally
these persons of Class C language competence would be expected to be used in those
activities of intelligence, CA/MG, advisory groups, MP, etc., where less time pressure or
less critical preciseness are required.
28
Its members constitute a substantial group of personnel with some language
knowledge, but whose competence in any linguist activity field is not sufficient to enable
them to preform high-or even medium-level linguist functions. There is, however, a
demonstrated need for these less-qualified language men, particularly in the technical
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The study concludes that “as of July 1953 the numbers of men in all four of the above
categories present in the ranks of the Army in Korea were grossly insufficient to meet the
operation needs of the Army” (ibid.). They found that there was a total lack of Class A
interpreters and an extremely limited number of class B interpreters in Korea during the
war. The majority of military interpreters working for the ROKA-U.S. alliance fell under
Class C or D. As a result of the shortage of high-level interpreters, “linguists were
frequently assigned to duties beyond their levels of training and consequently were
deficient in their performance of those higher levels” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 3).
The shortage of available linguistic assets meant that the more competent
interpreters were assigned in higher echelons of the military institute while the less adept
were sent to lower units (Hausrath 1957, 69):
We’re hindered by an insufficient number of good interpreters. Interpreters
are assigned from ROK headquarters as first lieutenants. The pay is very low and
they draw low caliber people. There are good interpreters at high echelons. We
could not operate without them.
There are four [interpreters] at the division. They tend not to be the best. The
best seem to be at headquarters; they get worse as you go down the line.
There were four principal spheres of KMAG operations: (a) headquarters (i.e.,
administrative and housekeeping), (b) combat and security units, (c) replacement training
centers and ROKA schools, and (d) technical service and support units. The language
problem existed to some degree in each one of these areas, but it was more serious in

services and in the enlisted ranks such as in signal work, some MP tasks, medical corps
(combat medics and for assistance in hospitals), and for routine operations in ordnance,
transportation, some advisory group assignments, QM activities, POW-handling
operations, labor supervision, TIE work in joint operations with non-American units, etc.
The characteristic of the Class D linguist is that they can translate ideas back and forth
between the two languages with the aid of a bilingual dictionary if needed but at a
relatively low level of skill.
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lower levels. Within KMAG Headquarters, Taegu, “the language problem here was not
ordinarily a serious barrier” (Hausrath 1957, 117).
Sure, there’s a language problem, but not so much at this level. My contacts
are principally with KMAG people, and I’d say I don’t need an interpreter more
than a few times a week, at most. [Lt Col. G3]
For the few occasions on which I come up against a Korean who doesn’t
understand English or doesn’t have a competent interpreter with him I can always
find one of our ROK interpreters handy. It might help if I could speak some
Korean, but if I did there’d be many other spots in this operation where I’d be
badly needed. The real language problem exists outside this headquarters. [Major,
G1]
With a good interpreter, an honest desire to be of assistance, and a patient
attitude, there is no particular problem caused by a language barrier. [Finance
Advisor]
Opinions of interpreters were much more negative in lower units, such as Service Schools
and Support Units (Hausrath 1957, 120):
I have 23 interpreters here who theoretically can be used. One I would rate
“fairly satisfactory” and a second one is “barely satisfactory.” The rest of the lot
are mediocre—you just have to draw pictures for them. [ROKA Inf School
Advisor]
The regiment has two interpreters: one is raw—he doesn’t speak much
English and he’s virtually useless. The other one is only slightly better. As you
can imagine I have some real problems getting information and thoughts across
and back. [ROKA Inf Regt Advisor]
While KMAGers expressed discontent about the linguistic abilities (or lack thereof) of
some UN Liaison Group officers, particularly in the lower echelons of the military, the
following table indicates that neither the interpreter’s lack of language skills nor deficient
knowledge of military terminology was the main complaint or concern of KMAG officers
during the war.
Table 2: KMAGers Response to Questions about Interpreters
Questions and responses

Percent of 204
respondents

a. Do you trust your interpreter from the standpoint of
security?
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69

Yes
No
No response
Total
b. Do you trust his accuracy in interpretation?
Yes
No
No response
Total
c. Do you trust his honesty?
Yes
No
No response
Total
d. What are your interpreter’s weak points?
English generally poor
Doesn’t understand military terms or situations
Afraid of ROKA officers
Other
No response
Total
e. Rate your interpreter’s ability
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
No response
Total

21
10
100
63
29
8
100
77
12
11
100
25
29
35
20
24
133
31
34
23
6
6
100
(Hausrath 1957: 121)

The table seems to indicate that despite the many challenges UN Liaison Group officers
faced, only 6 percent of KMAGers responded that they believed their interpreter’s
abilities to be poor. Furthermore, most responded positively with regard to the matter of
trust. Elsewhere, based on comments made in reference to the same questionnaire,
Hausrath makes the following comment:
[t]he most frequent complaint received from advisors was that their interpreters
were not trustworthy (i.e., on security grounds). The second most frequent
complaint was that they were poorly trained and consequently not competent to
perform their duties satisfactorily.
(Hausrath 1957: 122)
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Similar concerns regarding the trustworthiness of Korean civilian interpreters was voiced
by member of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK)
during the U.S. occupation. However, the later might have been caused by the fact that,
during the occupation, many Koreans viewed the U.S. as a pseudo-colonial force that had
unlawfully invaded their country, the situation during the Korean War was quite different
as the ROK and U.S. were allied against a mutual enemy. Considering the context under
which interpreting took place, what reason might the U.S. military have had to question
the loyalty of the UN Liaison Group officer? When asked “What are your interpreter’s
weak points?” why did KMAGers answer that officer-interpreters being “afraid of ROKA
officers” was more problematic than the linguistic difficulties of interlingual
communication such as “English generally poor” or “Doesn’t understand military terms
or situations”? This question will be answered in the following section.

3.4. Zones of Uncertainty within the UNC/ROK Alliance
Morris Janowitz and Roger Little (1965, 27) define the military establishment as
“a comprehensive and all-embracing hierarchy” and claim that “the career soldier is
assumed to be an ideal example of the professional operating under bureaucratic
authority.” Within the military bureaucracy, personnel are categorized and positioned
based on their rank, and, “uniforms and insignia, by ‘telegraphing’ the wearer’s status in
the hierarchy of authority and his job in the division of labor, facilitate communication,
coordination and impersonality” (Davis 1948, 145). Persons of higher rank are entitled to
command nearly absolute obedience from those of lower rank. While it is largely thanks
to the organization’s bureaucratic structure that militaries can coordinate the activities of
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large groups of people, the institution’s dependency on a rank-based chain of command
limits the organization’s ability to adapt to change as the top-down system of
communication leaves few channels for feedback. It was for this reason that Robert
Merton (1965, 53-62) criticized the ideal bureaucracy for its tendency to be rigid and
over time resistant to change.
The creation of the U.S.-ROK military alliance saw the convergence of two
hierarchical structures, the U.S. and South Korean militaries, each with their own systems
of operation and regulations. This multilingual army might therefore be defined as a
“zone of uncertainty” within social space in which social agents from disparate
backgrounds, in this case the U.S. and Korean militaries, who possessed different views
about what constituted legitimate activity were suddenly required to occupy a single
social space together. Because a defining characteristic of the military field is its
bureaucratic structure, military personnel are accustomed to inhabiting clearly designated
positions within the organization. Within the U.S.-ROK multilingual army confusion
emerged for the members of both groups because neither was sure as to how they should
occupy and operate in this newly formed social space. While trying to bring order to the
confusion, U.S. and ROK military personnel competed for the authority to reproduce and
distribute what each felt were legitimate values and regulative principles. Interpreted
events, in particular, were a crucial site for the convergence of the two military fields and
their respective habitus. During the Korean War, the three groups of interlocutors—U.S.
KMAGers, ROK commanding officers, and UN Liaison Group officer—given their
uncertainty about how to position themselves and operate in this space, sought to assert
their dominance over the form interlingual communication should take. While “zones of
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uncertainty” are often short-lived because some form of traditional hierarchy is ultimately
reestablished amongst the agents, the unique structure of the U.S.-ROK military alliance
prevented any one group from asserting their dominance over the interpreting habitus.
Thus, a sustained uncertainty was the defining characteristic of the interpreting habitus
during the Korean War. Hierarchy could not be established because uncertainty lingered
in regards to whether the ROK commanding officer or the U.S. KMAGer held authority
over the other, and thus the two military organizations competed to secure the loyalty of the
UN Liaison Group officer and establish dominance during interpreted events.

3.4.1. Conflict between ROK Officers and U.S. KMAGers
During the Korean War, the mission of the KMAG was to advise and assist the
commanders of South Korea military units. KMAG advisors did not hold the authority to
issue direct orders to the ROK military unit to which they were assigned. Rather,
KMAGers were expected to control training or operations by influence, suggestion, and
guidance. What they accomplished depended largely upon their powers of persuasion and
on the esteem in which they were held by their Korean counterparts. Had the U.S.
military desired the KMAGers to possess operational authority over the Korean military
unit, it could have sent American officers who were ranked higher the South Korean unit
commanders, thus positioning a U.S. officer atop the chain of command. The U.S.
military, however, chose not to pursue this approach and strictly limited the KMAGer to
an advisory role and required that they be “one or two ranks lower than their counterpart”
(Hausrath 1957, 51). The U.S. did not seek to place the ROK military under the
KMAGer’s direct control because the U.S. government hoped to avoid being overly
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invested in peninsular affairs. The U.S., at least ostensibly, had intervened in the war at
the urging of the United Nations Security Council, and thus assigning American officers
to command Korean field units ran the risk of aligning U.S. interests too closely with
South Korea’s, which would limit the U.S.’s ability to maneuver the diplomatic field in
Northeast Asia. The country’s direct involvement in the Korean War ran the risk of the
limited conflict developing into a direct conflict with China and/or the Soviet Union,
potentially sparking a third world war and the first international conflict involving two
states that possessed nuclear weapons. The deployment of KMAGers in an advisory role
was an alternative to such a move. The Soviet Union and China, likewise, took measures
to avoid a face-to-face confrontation with the United States. The Soviet Union did not
officially participate in the war, opting rather to provide diplomatic support, strategic and
tactical planning, and logistic support to North Korea and China. The Chinese, rather than
deploying the country’s official military, the People’s Liberation Army, created and
dispatched the People’s Volunteer Army, to avoid officially declaring war against the
United States and the United Nations.
The U.S. military hoped that the deployment of KMAGer as advisors to South
Korean units would allow it to exercise sufficient control over the ROK military to
maintain operational control over South Korean forces while maintaining that it had not
infringed upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. When asked the question “How
much difference in rank can there be between a KMAG advisor and his counterpart
without creating difficulties?” (Hausrath 1957, 52) it is noteworthy that over 70 percent
of KMAGers, after having engaged with Korean counterparts, claimed that being one or
two ranks lower than their advisees would not seriously impede working relations. In
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other words, they believed they could work on more-or-less equal terms even if they were
of slightly lower rank. On the other hand, only 11 percent believed advisors needed to be
of equal rank in order to perform their duties. This would imply that factors outside of
military rank offset the difference.
While the ROK Army unit commander may have held a higher rank than their
U.S. KMAG counterpart, the playing field was leveled out by the inverted hierarchical
relationship which existed between the U.S. and ROK militaries. It was due to the
lopsided power relation between the U.S. and ROK militaries that “at the time it was
widely believed that colonel-level officers had to be close to their KMAG advisor if they
were to be promoted to general” (Ji 2006, 168). In other words, a higher-ranking ROK
Army advisee could not blatantly disregard a lower-ranking U.S. KMAG adviser,
regardless of military rank. It was against this backdrop that one Chief of KMAG argued,
Advisors have ample authority. While they had no command over their ROK
counterpart or ROK Army units, they were directed to report to next higher
commanders, US or ROK, any dereliction or serious departure from advised
procedures. Eighth Army commanders were prepared to back up the advisory
function when needed, by issuing orders through command channels to insure
appropriate military performance. Advisors were cautioned, however, against
referring trivial matters, and were urged to work out satisfactory procedures
directly with their counterpart.
(Hausrath 1957, 20-21)
This statement suggests that although KMAGers did not have direct control over the
ROK units they were assigned to, their association with the U.S. military ensured they
possessed a level of authority that approximated the position of power accorded to the
ROK Army unit commander.
But while the U.S. military decision-makers argued KMAGers had the necessary
tools to successfully cooperate with their Korean counterparts on equal footing,
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uncertainty regarding their positioning within the organization meant that ROK
commanders and KMAG officers were constantly engaged in competition over authority
within the military unit. The animosity felt between the two sides was made most
palpable when one side unilaterally asserted authority over the chain of command, such
as during combat situations. For example, the following quote by a South Korean general
reveals that when tensions did arise, relations between the ROK unit commander and the
KMAGer could swiftly break down when either the ROK Army commander would
bypass the KMAGer in issuing orders or the KMAGer would place the ROK unit under
his command.
General Chung observed that during the retreat in the winter of 1950-51 a
number of KMAG officers were left behind and either were killed, fell into
the hands of the Communists, or made their way out without assistance from
their counterparts or the units to which they were attached. He said that this
had not been an accidental occurrence; whereas to some ROKA officers and
units their KMAG advisor was “their most prized possession” and was
therefore shepherded back to safety when the Communist attack came, others
were so poorly regarded by their ROK associates that no effort was made to
save them. General Chung continued with the comment that he was sure an
investigation would confirm his conviction that those officers who were in
rapport with their counterparts, interpreters, and subordinates were those who
had been brought out. The reverse was also verifiable, according to General
Chung.
(Hausrath 1957, 116)
Such attempts by the two sides to dominate the military field were made most evident
during interpreted events; both the ROK Army officer and the U.S. KMAGer sought to
dictate the norms of interlingual communication by subjecting the interpreter to the
particular command structures of their respective fields. The UN Liaison Group officer,
however, was able to resist pressure from both parties and assume a position of relative
empowerment during interpreted events because the U.S.-ROK rivalry prevented either
military institution from exerting unhindered pressure on the interpreter. The following
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sections will examine the dynamics between these military interpreters and U.S./ROK
officers.

3.4.2. Conflict between ROK Officers and UN Liaison Group Officers
Because UN Liaison Group officers were members of the ROK military, one
might expect that they would display unconditional loyalty to their national military, and
by extension their military superiors. The following statement by former military
interpreter Lee Yeong-hui (1988), however, demonstrates that this was not necessarily
the case and suggests that some UN Liaison Group officers and ROK Army officers
maintained a highly confrontational relationship during the war.
Although the name “UN Liaison Officer Group” was impressive enough, in
reality, we had nothing to do with the United Nations Command. We were
“interpreting officers” trainees, the most scorned upon group in the ROKA.
(Lee 1988, 214; my translation)
Throughout the Korean War, interpreter officers were put in an awkward position.
Our official title was “UN Liaison Officer (Group),” but we belonged to neither
the UN or the US. Because the US made up the majority of the so-called UN
forces, a large number of interpreter officers were assigned to US units, but they
were still under the authority of the ROKA. The main role played by
interpreters was interpreting between KMAGers sent to Korean units and ROKA
Commanders. When I was sent to my first post during the early stages of the
Korean War, it was still unclear if the Korean unit or the US KMAGer was
supposed to provide the interpreter with supplies. As officers of the ROKA,
interpreters were under the command of the ROKA senior officer, but because of
the ambiguity of our positioning and duties, interpreters were always treated as
the sons of concubines.
(Lee 1988, 216-17; my translation)
The cause for the discord between the two groups can be accredited to a number of
factors, the most prominent being the fact that military interpreters were ambiguously
positioned within the strictly hierarchical Korean military institution. As Huntington
suggests, the officer corps can be categorized into two groups,
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between officers who wish to become specialists and those who wish to prepare
themselves for top command positions. The former sacrifices the opportunity for
high command but develops a specialty which, in many cases, will be transferable
to civilian life upon retirement.
(Huntington 1963, 788)
Huntington also points out that “commissioned officers,” such as the ROK unit
commanders, are “generalists,” while “direct commission officers,” such as UN Liaison
Group officers, are “specialists.” While the generalist is committed to “the management
of violence as a career” (ibid., 785), specialization “takes place in areas not directly
related to combat” (ibid., 786). The following list of duties, obligations, and benefits
enjoyed by UN Liaison Group officer during the Korean War demonstrates that this
classification can be applied to the situation in the South Korean military:
Art. 11: Interpreter officers cannot assume any responsibility except interpreting
and translating.
Art. 14: Interpreter officers will have the same obligation as other branch officers
to observe all army regulations.
Art. 19: Interpreter officers will be excepted from draft call only during their
service in the army.
Art. 20: Officers of the interpreter branch will receive the same pay and allowance
as other branch officers.
(Hausrath 1957, 119)
The fact that their duties were limited to interpreting and translating meant that UN
Liaison Group officers were not engaged in the “management of violence,” which is
accomplished by ordering enlisted soldiers to engage in battle; as a result, they were
excluded entirely from the ROK military’s chain of command. A further consequence
was that in the eyes of the ROK unit commanders, these linguistic specialists, despite
their rank as first lieutenants, could not be perceived as their peers. And indeed, the
interpreters themselves did not see themselves as fully affiliated with their own military
institution. The following excerpt, taken from the memoir of former military interpreter
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Ji Myeong-gwan reveals that, even during the height of the Korean War, UN Liaison
Group officers saw themselves as non-professional military men.
Interpreting officers wore officer uniforms but could not be called true soldiers.
Unless under special circumstances, they were not provided neither gun nor
sword, all they did was accompany the U.S. KMAG Advisor and take charge of
interpreting. All they did in the battle tents was translate official documents
written in English or type their contents. I hope to tell you about the war in the
eyes of these amateur soldiers.
(Ji 2006, 85; my translation)
The reason interpreters were “the most scorned upon group in the ROKA” and “could not
be called true soldiers” can be understood using sociologist Erving Goffman’s concept of
“total institution,” as explained in his work Asylum. Goffman defines a total institution as
“a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals cut off
from the wider society for an appreciable period of time together lead an enclosed
formally administered round of life” (Goffman 1961, 11). Military barracks, incarceration
facilities, and asylums are often cited as examples of “total institution.” There are
typically two sets of groups within a total institution: staff and inmates. In the military,
commissioned officers might be seen as management staff while enlisted soldiers occupy
a position in many ways akin to that which is occupied by inmates. These two groups
inhabit two different social and cultural worlds, and there is considerable social distance
between the two, a schism that cannot easily be breached. A clear indication of this
divide is the fact that enlisted personnel cannot be promoted to the ranks of officer. In the
military, commissioned officers enforce restrictions on enlisted soldiers’ selfdetermination, autonomy, and freedom of action while excluding them from the decisions
taken concerning them. UN Liaison Group officers existed outside this strict
officer/soldier dichotomy. Though they were officers in the ROK Army and enjoyed
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many of the benefits that accompanied the position, their authority and duties were
limited to issues related to interlingual communication and did not extend to the
command and control of the military unit and its personnel. In other words, while other
officers in the South Korean military could be clearly categorized as members of the
management staff, the officer-interpreter was ambiguously positioned within the total
institution.
The commanding officers in the South Korean military sought to exert control
over the interpreting habitus by subordinating the interpreter to their command. This
effort took the shape of employing measures to reposition the interpreter firmly within
the hierarchical structure of the military institution. Rather than acknowledging UN
Liaison Group officers as first lieutenants in the officer corps, unit commanders often
treated them as enlisted soldiers. As a U.S. KMAG advisor pointed out,
the relationship between the ROK officer and the interpreter is also important.
The interpreters are often considered schoolboys and the officers expect the
interpreters to protect them, not to tell the truth of their boss, the advisor.
(Hausrath 1957, 77)
One of the central features of total institutions are the measures taken to manipulate the
personalities of residents so that their behavior fits the expectations of the larger group.
Ceremonial degradation, for instance, is carried out in an attempt to remake the self by
stripping away the individual's current identity and stamping a new one in its place. As
can be seen in Lee’s following evaluation, commissioned officers sought to discredit the
interpreter by refusing to acknowledge them as part of management, as well as
diminishing the value of the linguistic services they provided.
Although they assigned me the rank of “ROKA first lieutenant,” in reality, I was
only half a first lieutenant. I wore the insignia of first lieutenant on one of my
collars, but unlike the other branches of service, I did not have a badge to indicate
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my area of service. Interpreter officers were half-civilian, half-military personnel.
It was more than a year later that we were assigned badges, which were parrots
sitting atop rifles. The “parrot sitting on a rifle” was truly symbolic. It seems that
an ignorant group of combat officer in the Army HQ had out of spite come up
with the idea. It was perhaps an attempt to cunningly insult the group of frail
intellectuals in the military.
(Lee 1988, 215-16; my translation)
The strategy utilized by the ROK military can be interpreted as an overt attempt to
mortify the interpreter by labelling their linguistic services as little more than parroting
what was being said by commissioned officers. This is an extreme example of a dominant
institution seeking to assert control over the interpreting habitus by denying the
interpreter’s autonomy and agency. The ordering of interpreters to wear this military
badge can likewise be examined and explained using Goffman’s theoretical lens:
The individual finds that his protective response to an assault upon self is
collapsed into the situation; he cannot defend himself in the usual way by
establishing distance between the mortifying situation and himself.
(Goffman 1961, 36)
By forcing interpreters to adopt an official symbol which devalued their services, the
ROK Army attempted to strip the interpreter of any authority they possessed during
interpreted events. By stripping these specialized officers of their authority over their area
of specialty, the officers were attempting to demote these military interpreters to subofficer status.
UN Liaison Group officers, were, nevertheless, able to, at times, resist the
institutionalized pressure applied on them by the ROKA; they did not always conform to
the description of their job as limited to merely mimicking words. The following excerpts
show interpreters themselves played a critical role in fostering amicable U.S.-ROK
military relations. These citations also reveal the interpreters’ view of the job of
interpreting as one that required creative problem-solving skills.
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many Korean interpreters viewed their job as more than just work. The comment
was made…time and time again by interpreters that the difficulties of their
position were more than compensated for by the knowledge that they were
contributing to the betterment of Korean-American relations by overcoming the
language barrier.
(Hausrath 1957, 131)
As I have said earlier, translating from English to Korean and interpreting the
words spoken by an American into Korean is no different from creative writing. I
realized the difficulty of the task of translating and interpreting while carefully
interpreting the lectures given at the U.S. 9th Corps into Korean. It was then that I
realized how difficult interpreting is.
(Kim 2012, 2; my translation)
These statements show that, thus, despite attempts by the ROKA leadership to devalue
their services, interpreters recognized the value of their work and were able to resist this
institutionalized narrative.
The presence of the U.S. KMAG advisor created an additional buffer between the
interpreter and any pressure ROK commanders could apply on them. The fact that the
interpreter was often the only member of a ROKA unit capable of communicating with
the U.S. officer, with whom they worked in close quarters meant that there was always
the possibility they could use their position to their advantage by discrediting their
military superiors. Although interpreters were lower in rank than the unit commander, his
advisors, and the KMAGer, they took part in all activities in the unit outside of combat.
They participated in operation planning, the monitoring of unit supplies, and knew of
private purchases made by the commanding officer using military funds. As Lee writes,
regardless of how we felt about the war or the military, because we were Koreans,
we had to do our best to prevent the KMAGer from seeing or hearing about the
various delicate situations happening in the unit, which was always a source of
agony for us. The interpreting officer was placed in a position where he had to
“pretend not to have seen” what was going on. But we never received thanks from
the commander of his staff. We were the odd man out.
(Lee 1988, 218-19; my translation)
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As this excerpt suggests, despite the lack of clear boundaries regarding their roles,
interpreters were able to maintain a higher level of autonomy than either institution
would have preferred.
Perhaps most central to this issue was the fact that, often times, interpreters did
not acknowledge the superiority of commissioned officers in the ROKA. In the eyes of
UN Liaison Group interpreters, their military superiors lacked the symbolic or cultural
capital one would expect of an individual assigned to their position. The ROK military
had only been officially launched in 1948, after the USAMGIK handed over power to the
Korean Government. Many of the senior staff in the ROKA had limited military
experience when the war broke out and had since been rapidly promoted due to the lack
of available leadership in the face of a rapidly growing military. In fact, in many cases,
interpreters felt that they were superior to their commanders. The following passage has
been taken from the memoir of former UN Liaison Group officer Kim Il-pyong.
There were even ROKA officers and generals who hadn’t graduated from
middle school before joining the Japanese military as soldiers during the
“Greater East Asia War” (1941-45). Some of them had been drafted as soldiers
and transferred to the National Defense Guard after the country’s liberation.
These simple men were made officers and generals. Some were promoted
rapidly during the Korean War. Generals were awarded a new star every 3 to 6
months…some officers claimed that being a commissioned officer meant you
had the same level as a college graduate. Some of these officers were insolent
and incredibly ignorant.
(Kim 2012, 1; my translation)
During the Korean War there was a popular joke in Japan: if you were a private
in the Army during World War II (which the Japanese call the Greater East Asia
War), you would be made an officer if you went to Korea, and if you were a
sailor in the Navy you would be made the Navy Chief of Staff.
(Kim 2012, 3; my translation)
Perhaps it was because they felt inferior to us who had done well in school and
entered university after liberation and before the outbreak of the war, but when
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interacting with us ROKA officers tended to act pompously and talk
exaggeratedly, and always try to show off.
(Kim 2012, 3; my translation)
Former UN Liaison Group officer-interpreter Ji Myeong Gwan echoes Kim’s sentiment,
as he criticizes the fact that
The ROK military was hastily built up. Even people who had joined the
Japanese military during the Japanese colonial era as enlisted men became
generals.
(Ji 2006, 86; my translation)
Goffman mentions that within a total institution, management is able to assert their
dominance not only because they possess the power to do so but also because members
of the lower rungs of the organization feel a sense of moral inferiority to their superiors.
This element of respect for one’s superiors was missing in the ROKA officer/UN
Liaison Group officer relationship. Instead of accepting the pressure applied on them by
ROKA officers, the following excerpt suggests that these military interpreters may often
have been indignant that they did not receive the recognition they believed they were
owed.
We officer-interpreters generously lent our services to the establishment of the 2nd
Corps and served with distinction during the Korean War. Many of us were killed
in action during the war. However, in his memoire, General Paik Sun-yup does
not even mention the role of the officer-interpreter. There is no question that he
relied on the interpretations of the officer-interpreter and received plenty of aid
through their services but in his memoire “The Military and I” he puts on
“camouflage” to make it appear as if he could understand English and could
converse with KMAG advisors well. Can this be called respectable behavior from
a ROKA general? There is not a single mention of officer-interpreters in his
memoire.
(Kim 2012: 2; my translation)
It is noteworthy that General Paik Sun-yup, who was the first South Korean officer to be
promoted to the rank of four star general, was only 29 years old when the war broke out.
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The dissonance between the views of the ROKA commissioned officer and UN
Liaison Group officer over the positionality of the military interpreter was the cause of
continued friction between the two groups; “interpreter officers’ treated ROKA officers
with disdain, and ROKA officers treated interpreters with contempt” (Lee 1988: 217; my
translation).

3.4.3. Shifting Relations between KMAGers and UN Liaison Group Officers
During the Korean War, U.S. KMAG personnel were thoroughly reliant on the
services of UN Liaison Group officers when communicating with their South Korean
counterparts. Although these U.S. officers raised issue with the linguistic abilities of
these military interpreters, with particular frustration expressed over their lack of
knowledge regarding military terminology, ultimately, it was the “trustworthiness” of UN
Liaison Group officers that was the most significant concern of U.S. military personnel.
Questions regarding the honesty of these military interpreters stemmed from the fact that
UN Liaison Group officers were first lieutenants in the South Korean military. U.S.
military advisors concluded that they could not fully trust these interpreters because “the
primary loyalty of a Korean—civilian or military—is to the Republic of Korea rather
than to the U.S. Government” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 62). The fact that a first
lieutenant in the ROK military held a monopoly over the channels of interlingual
communication presented a problem for the U.S. officer because, when a conflict of
interests emerged between the two groups, the UN Liaison Group officer could easily
manipulate what was said by either interlocutor to benefit the South Korean military.
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When asked about the “seriousness of problems of distortion by interpreters,” 13
percent of KMAG respondents answered that it was “very serious,” 21 percent responded
that the issue was “serious,” and 50 percent stated it was “not too serious.” On the other
hand, only 12 percent thought the issue was “not serious at all.” In other words,
approximately 84 percent of KMAG staff believed UN Liaison Group officers used their
position of power, to varying extents, to manipulate what was said between U.S. and
ROK military personnel (Hausrath 1957, 71).
In response to requests that they provide further comment on the topic of
distortions made by UN Liaison Group officers, one KMAGer pointed out that the
officer-interpreter was often “torn between the devil and the deep” (Hausrath 1957, 70).
In other words, it was nearly impossible for interpreters to satisfy both U.S. and ROK
personnel because KMAGers demanded that the interpreter produce a target text that
closely mirrored the meaning and tone of the source text, while ROK officers expected
the interpreter to actively moderate exchanges between the two parties. The following is a
list of discontents expressed by KMAG staff with regards to the interpreting practices of
UN Liaison Group officers.
(1) Interpreters sometimes distorted or modified advice or colored or completely
held back information the advisor should have had to interpret strongly
worded advice or corrections accurately for fear of offending their superiors.
(2) Interpreters pull the same old stunt, they misinterpret in order to keep from
offending.
(3) all ROKs [interpreters] have a tendency to lie—to save face” or “cover for
their ROK superiors.
(Hausrath 1957, 70)
These excerpts show that KMAGers believed any discrepancies between the source text
and the target text were an indication that the South Korean military interpreters had
distorted the message to favor the interests of the ROK military. They assumed that
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interpreters “distorted” or “modified” what was said by the KMAG advisor to avoid
insulting their Korean superiors, because “the interpreters figure that when we [the
Americans] go, they’ve ‘had it’ if they alienate their ROK commander” (ibid., 70). As
one ROK Army interpreter stated, “The interpreter is always in the middle. If things don’t
go the way my commander wants, he blames me for not getting the right advice from [the
KMAG advisor]” (ibid., 126). The following chart shows that KMAGers believed the
majority of UN Liaison Group officers did not pass on information because they feared
recriminations by their commanding officer.
Table 3: KMAGers Response to Question about Withholding of Information
Questions and Responses

Percent of 204
respondents

Does your ROKA interpreter tell you things your counterpart does
not wish you to know?
Yes, always
Yes, frequently
Yes, from time to time
No
No response
Total

2
8
24
52
14
100
(Hausrath 1957, 126)

Such practices were thought to be a threat, given that their implied message that advice
issued by KMAG personnel was not being conveyed in its entirety, which could stymie
the U.S. military’s ability to maintain control over their Korean counterparts.
As an alternative to interpreter-mediated communication, “most advisors
considered speaking directly to their counterparts in English,” and if the other party
understood at least some English; this approach was considered “the most effective
means of communication and advisors used this method extensively” (Hausrath 1957,
67). In some extreme cases, KMAG advisors even demanded that their Korean
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counterparts learn English, which would enable them to communicate, while
circumventing the seemingly biased interpreter.
The Korean commander with whom I worked was 28 years old, a general. I tried
to teach him English and he proved an eager and apt pupil. Advisors look for
cooperative attitude on the part of the ROK officers and their willingness to learn
English is an indication of it. I had one ranking Korean officer removed from his
job because he was uncooperative and would not try to learn English.
(ibid., 68)
The U.S. military, however, was unable to implement this approach on a wide scale
because only a limited number of Korean officers were capable of communicating in
English. Furthermore, while the U.S. officer might have felt better able to express
themselves in English, there was no guarantee that the ROK officers with whom they
worked could understand what was being said to them, although, as the following excerpt
demonstrate, some KMAGers believed themselves capable of judging whether or not
ROK officers understood English based solely on their facial expressions:
I spoke directly to my counterpart and no serious situation resulted. If I tell them
something and they don’t get it, I know it. When I see that smile come on their
faces, I know they got it.
(Hausrath 1957, 68)
Counter to what this KMAG officer might have believed, in the absence of an interpreter,
U.S. military officers had no way of verifying if their counterparts understood what they
had said.
An alternative solution to surmounting the linguistic barrier between the U.S. and
ROK officers without involving an interpreter was to require fluency in Korean as a
qualification for KMAG advisory posts. It was believed this would allow KMAG
advisors to “communicate directly and easily with his counterpart and enhance his (and
the US Army’s) prestige and standing among Korean military men” (Hausrath 1957, 127-
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128). When asked “Should someone doing your present work be given instruction in the
Korean language before starting the job?” (ibid., 128) over 90 percent of KMAG
respondents conceded that knowledge of the Korean language would help or improve
their relations with their Korean counterparts. However, it was also noted that training
KMAGers to speak and understand Korean would be “expensive and time-consuming.”
Thus, although they recognized the value of learning Korean, only 55 percent of
KMAGers thought they should receive some form of language training. Furthermore,
only 10 percent responded positively to the prospect of undergoing intensive language
training.
This approach, despite its obvious merits, however, was never included as part of
KMAG training. Before the war, a new advisor received a short orientation, met the
KMAG chief, visited with the staff, attended a weekly staff meeting, and received an
advisor handbook and a procedure guide for his reading before being assigned to his post.
During the war, a new advisor received, at most, a brief KMAG orientation and/or a short
briefing by his immediate superior before going directly to his unit at the front. Chronic
shortages and frequent turnover of personnel, combined with the chaotic tempo of backand-forth combat operations and the expanding KMAG operational duties meant that
many unit advisors received little information on their missions or duties, much less the
conditions under which they worked. One advisor commented,
My mission was not clearly specified at the time of my assignment. I came as a
replacement and was given a two-hour briefing about the position of the outfit to
which I was assigned. I was given no instructions on how to work with the
ROKA. I was left on my own. I definitely had the feeling that my missions were
undefined and that I was on my own.
(Hausrath 1957, 37)
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Such a lack of clear instructions was largely due to the fact that there was a shortage of
KMAG personnel throughout the war in the face of urgent demands for advisors. While
the original plan was for all division, regimental, and battalion commanders in the
Republic of Korea Army to have an American officer at his side, aiding in the execution
of military duties, in practice, the U.S. Military Advisory Group “never attained such a
comprehensive coverage of the Korean Army. Moreover, though the advisory group
reached its full, authorized strength by the end of 1949, KMAG never was able to assign
advisors to all Korean battalions—infantry and otherwise—at any one time” (Sawyer
1988, 58). Much like UN Liaison Group officers, U.S. military advisors were often
thrown into a make-it-happen situation with little guidance and limited support.29 The
U.S. military did not have the time or resources to train members of the under staffed
advisory group to speak and understand Korean.
The last option available to the U.S. military in the fight to gain the loyalty of the
interpreter was to align the UN Liaison Group officer more closely with the interests of
the U.S. military than their position as South Korean officers would normally allow. The
most common suggestion made was to assign interpreters to the staff of the U.S. KMAG
advisor rather than to the ROK Army counterpart. Advisors who favored this shift in
affiliation believe the change would have the effect of,
protecting interpreters from possible reprisals or disciplinary action by their
ROKA superiors, and would also structure the situation so that the interpreter’s
A better organized system was erected in the summer of 1953 as KMAG conducted
regular orientations, provided advisors with an Advisor’s Procedure Guide that
emphasized the twin duties of advising their counterparts and of providing accurate and
timely reports to US commanders, and ensured each advisor received the “Ten
Commandments” for KMAG advisors. Given that the Korean Armistice Agreement was
signed in July 1953, however, these measured could hardly have improved the situation
during the war.
29
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primary duty clearly would be to further the advisory mission by seeing that the
advisor received complete and accurate information and by interpreting for him in
the same spirit.
(Hausrath 1957, 71)
As one KMAGer put it, “If interpreters are given some sort of immunity from domination
by their ROK superiors, they can do their job” (ibid.) The following chart demonstrates
that this approach was supported by the majority of KMAG staff members.
Table 4: Suggested Assignment of Interpreters
Suggested assignment
Should be assigned to the KMAG advisor’s staff
Should not be assigned to advisor’s staff
Doesn’t make any difference
No answer
Total

Percent of 255
respondents
58
22
16
4
100
(Hausrath 1957, 72)

Advisors also favored the attachment of interpreters to the KMAG staff because such
assignment would make the interpreter constantly available to the advisor.
Such an attempt was made in June 1953 in the 8th ROK Division when General
Song “ordered control of the ROKA interpreters in the division shifted from his own G1
to the KMAG G1 advisor in the division” (Hausrath 1957, 130). KMAG advisors
reported that UN Liaison Group officers reacted enthusiastically to the move and that this
change resulted in a “100 percent improvement in morals and effectiveness of the
interpreters.” One military interpreter informed the Senior KMAG advisor that he was
happy the change had been made; he noted that “the majority of the interpreters in ROKA
are better educated than most Koreans,” but they “are used like dogs” by South Korean
officers (Hausrath 1957, 131). The same interpreter explained that in addition to, and at
times instead of, the duties for which they had been trained, “ROKA interpreters were
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assigned duties as orderlies, strikers, etc. Under KMAG control their work was confined
to interpreting” (ibid.) After the UN Liaison Group officer had been transferred, one
KMAG officer expressed his satisfaction with the change and remarked that “the
interpreter should be assigned to the KMAG officer, and if satisfactory, always remain
with him” (ibid.) Such measures, however, were rarely employed during the war and
throughout the conflict the shortage of capable interpreters, the ambiguity of the
interpreter’s affiliation, and the indefinite hierarchical relations between the ROKA
advisee and the KMAG advisor created the conditions for a high level of uncertainty
during interpreted events.

3.4.4. Local Civilian Interpreters
Given the near impossibility of adequately training Korean officers to speak
English or American officers to speak Korean to a level of fluency that would allow for
meaningful exchange, coupled with the unfavorable position they occupied during
interpreted events, some KMAGers suggested that the U.S. hire “Korean civilian
interpreters (CMS), clothe them in U.S. uniforms and U.S. insignia, house them and feed
them with KMAG detachments” (Hausrath 1957, 130) as an alternative to employing UN
Liaison Group officers. The prospect of employing civilian interpreters was thought to be
the best solution to the language barrier because “the civilian is at least two steps
removed from subservience to and possible hostile action by a ROK counterpart officer”
(ibid., 131). It was believed that “although the man would certainly remain a Korean, the
experience of U.S. units that used Korean civilian interpreters was that a certain degree of
loyalty was accrued to the American employer” (ibid.). The employment of Korean
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civilian interpreters provides some insight into how the transfer of UN Liaison Group
officers from ROKA to KMAG staff might have transformed the interpreting habitus
during the war.
Records of a successful pairing between a U.S. military unit and a Korean
civilian interpreter can be found in “Mister Pak Takes Over,” an article penned by the
Korean War veteran, Captain Frederick Haight. Haight begins his story by highlighting
the fact that many members of his military unit were initially suspicious about the Korean
civilian interpreter Pak’s loyalty and doubtful about his abilities as an interpreter.
Members of the unit considered Pak to be “servile and unintelligent” because his
“English was not good” while disregarding the fact that he “spoke many Chinese
dialects” (Haight 1953, 63). As a result, the American intelligence unit “refuse[d] to
accept him as a full-fledged interpreter” (ibid., 64).
The relationship between the interpreter and the U.S. military staff members
underwent a wholesale transition after Pak successfully interrogated two Chinese
Communist prisoners who had defiantly refused to answer questions asked by American
interrogators. Through this event Pak gained the trust of the U.S. military staff in his
linguistic skills and political loyalty. The interrogation marked the beginning of a
camaraderie or “fictive kin” relationship between Pak and the members of the U.S.
military, made evident by the fact that the U.S. unit members thereafter referred to the
interpreter as Mister Pak.
Once a “fictive kin” relationship was established between the two parties, the
dynamics between the interpreter and the military agents during interpreting events
underwent a substantial change. While the personnel of the U.S. intelligence unit had
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previously forbade Pak for participating in meetings, they now not only relied on him to
interpret during meetings but also entrusted him with liaison duties and intelligence
analysis. The combination of interpreting and other roles was no doubt challenging for
the individual interpreter, even if, at the same time, it provided him with more capital
(e.g. status, authority, etc.), enhancing his position within the unit. The following event
shows Pak performing such a task, one which lay beyond the normative linguistic
obligations of an interpreter.
At the battalion command post Mr. Pak sat listening to a radio. We had tried
again and again to monitor the Communists’ network, but in issuing their orders
they used a dialect and military slang which baffled our interpreters. Suddenly,
Mr. Pak shouted for one of the regular interpreters. “Transmit what I say to the
Captain,” he snapped in Korea. “I cannot translate fast enough.”
From midnight until seven in the morning, he was virtually in command of the
battle of Nan Two. He translated the Chinese command’s orders to its units so
quickly that I could warn Able Company where and in what strength an attack
was coming. Hunched over the radio, a map spread in front of him, Mr. Pak
called every move. Our supporting artillery knew exactly where to place its fire;
Able was prepared for every Chinese assault.
Suddenly Mr. Pak had another idea: “Set a transmitter to the Chinese
frequency. I will give them orders.” The effect was almost immediately apparent.
Able Company called Battalion Observation Post. “What the hell’s come over
the Commies?” demanded an agitated voice. “They’re all snafu’d!” I explained
what Mr. Pak was doing. “Geeze,” said the voice from Able with deep sincerity.
“Well – thank him for us, will you?”
(Haight 1953, 65)
During this situation, Pak simultaneously played the role of linguistic mediator,
intelligence analyst, and military commander. Pak was entrusted with these
extralinguistic functions because his fluency in the enemy’s language allowed him to
understand, analyze, and respond to enemy tactics more quickly and accurately than
channels of command would allow. The immediacy of Pak’s response to new information
enabled him to shift the tides of this battle in favor of the UN troops.
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While the active role played by Pak during this event undoubtedly overstepped
the limits of what is often considered the normative role of the interpreter, U.S. military
personnel were appreciative of the service he provided. This was the case due to the
particularities of war. Before Pak demonstrated his loyalty he was viewed as a potential
enemy, either a North Korea spy or a Japanese sympathizer, but once it was ascertained
that Pak was not an enemy colluder, he was accepted as an ally of the United States and
entrusted with functions that far exceeded the boundaries of what is considered normative
practice in a professional interpretive setting. The abrupt shift in the level of trust allotted
to Pak can be explained by the extreme conditions of war; as Baker notes “there is no
place in war for fluid, shifting identities, for split or even strained identities, nor for
negotiated narratives of any kind” (Baker 2010, 200).
The U.S. military overwhelmingly favored the employment of civilian
interpreters, based on the view that as “a Korean civilian his loyalty was fundamentally to
his people rather than the ROKA, which meant that he probably would offer greater
loyalty to his KMAG employer than a ROKA interpreter-officer could be expected to”
(Hausrath 1957, 131). Utilization of such indigenous civilian linguists presented
numerous problems to the Army, not the least of which was the fact that of the 228
working for Eighth Army on June 30, 1953, 100 were eligible for induction into ROKA
at any time ROK decided to call them into its service.
The loss of these civilians would seriously cripple division, corps and Army POW
interrogation, as well as counterintelligence and communication reconnaissance
activities. The Department of the Army has been able to furnish only a small
fraction of Korean-speaking intelligence personnel. It will be impossible for
Eighth Army to fulfill AFFE post-hostilities intelligence requirements if CMS
personnel are lost through induction.
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 62)
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Furthermore, many of the men who were past the age of military service were already
serving as interpreters for commercial houses, where the wage scale was higher than that
of the U.S. military, and thus would not be easily lured into U.S. military employment
(Hausrath 1957, 124).
Nonetheless, the fact that U.S. military personnel preferred the employment of
civilian interpreters over trained UN Liaison Group officers demonstrates the falsity of
any illusions about the interpreter’s neutrality. While it has been revealed that interpreters
are not neutral conduits of meaning, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that
institutions of power, and by extension institutionalized norms of interpreting, do not
guarantee the impartiality of the interpreter, either. Ironically, during the Korean War, it
was precisely because the ROK and U.S. militaries were in competition against each
other, each attempting to place the interpreter under their control and establish dominance
over the interpreting habitus, the two cancelled out each other’s influence over the
interpreter, creating a layer of insulation, and room for maneuver, for the interpreter. In
other words, UN Liaison Group officer-interpreters were empowered because interpreting
events constituted a “zone of uncertainty,” and they could use their position and expertise
to contribute to their self-professed goal, which was for “the betterment of KoreanAmerican relations by overcoming the language barrier.”
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CHAPTER 4
THE KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS (1951-1953):
A FAITHFUL ECHO
The current chapter explains the conditions under which UNC military
interpreters served during the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-1953) and analyzes
the interpreting habitus that emerged within this diplomatic event, held during the
conclusionary phase of the Korean conflict. It will first introduce the circumstances that
implored both the UNC/ROK and the PRC/DPRK to seek to end the war at the
negotiation table rather than on the battlefield, followed by an examination of the makeup
of the negotiation teams and the topics that were discussed during the negotiations. After
analyzing the sociopolitical conditions under which the talks were held, the study will
discuss who was recruited to serve as an interpreter at Kaesong and Panmunjom, the sites
of the negotiations, how their position as military personnel limited their ability to
actively participate in the negotiation of meaning during interpreted events, and how the
presence of the PRC/DPRK’s multilingual negotiators and interpreters further
constrained interpreters as the communist delegation constantly monitored the
performance of UNC interpreters.

4.1. History of the Korean Armistice Negotiations
By the summer of 1951, it was apparent that neither the UNC/ROK alliance nor
the PRC /DPRK coalition would be able to readily achieve victory on the battlefield. The
U.S. government and its military officials concluded that it would take substantial
additional forces and resources to make a meaningful push northward but public opinion
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in the United States as well as other states that had committed forces to the UN cause,
however, “overwhelmingly called for their soldiers return home” (Rollinson 1997, 7).
Since the failure of its last major offensive in the spring of 1951, a communist victory
appeared increasingly unlikely, and both the Chinese and North Korean leadership were
burdened by the mounting cost of war. Thus, both sides sought to bring an end to the
fighting via truce talks at the negotiation table rather than prolonging military
engagement.
The ROK government, on the other hand, was adamantly opposed to the prospect
of ending the war without having attained the goal of a unified Korean peninsula.
President Syngman Rhee publicly rejected the idea of an armistice on multiple occasions
and called upon the people of the ROK to “reassert our determination to […] fight on to a
decisive end in case the UN accepts the truce and stops fighting” (Allen 1960, 160). He
repeatedly disparaged the idea of an armistice as communist appeasement, and brashly
claimed that “the Republic of Korea Army will fight on, if it means a suicide, and I will
lead them” (Clark 1954, 275). Despite his opposition to the armistice negotiations, Rhee
could not prevent such talks from happening as the ROK military had been placed under
the operational control of the commander of the UNC. Thus, discussions regarding a
ceasefire fell under the authority of the UNC. However, his threats to continue the war
even after a ceasefire was completed were made possible by the fact that although the
ROK military had been placed under the UNC’s command for the extent of the war, no
agreement on control in the post-truce period existed. As such, Rhee could pull ROK
troops out of the UNC after the armistice was signed and potentially carry on with the
fight after the ceasefire. The prospect of the ROKA making such a move as soon as the
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armistice was signed was highly problematic as it would likely force the UNC back into
the fighting. This difference in opinion caused severe friction to arise between the ROK
and the U.S. throughout the period of armistice negotiations which Rhee used to
negotiate a U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty, long-term economic assistance, and a
pledge by the U.S. that it would provide cooperation during the post-armistice political
conference.30 Only after these terms were met did Rhee give his assurances that he
would “not obstruct in any way the implementation of the terms of the armistice” despite
“his misgivings over the long-term results” (Clark 1954, 287-88).
On June 23, 1951, after holding preliminary discussions with U.S. State
Department representative George Kennan, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations
Jacob Malik publicly suggested in a UN radio broadcast that “as a first step discussions
should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for
the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel” (Acheson 1969, 532-533).31 A
few days later, on June 30, 1951, General Matthew B. Ridgeway, Commander-in-Chief
of the United Nations Command, made the following announcement:
I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing
for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate
guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.
Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be
prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at
which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could
take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Harbor.
(Vatcher 1958, 24)

The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea was
signed on October 1, 1953, two months after the signing of the Korean Armistice
Agreement. For full text see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp
31
UN radio was established at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on
February 13, 1946 to ensure that “the peoples of the world are fully informed of its aims
and activities/”
30
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In response to Ridgway’s comments, on July 1, 1951, the Chinese Communist Party’s
official newspaper, Remin Ribao, declared that the Chinese people had always wanted a
peaceful settlement in Korea, but “it was not until recently…[that]…severe blows to the
American army…[and]…the general demands for peace of the people of the world”
compelled the U.S. government to consider accepting the Soviet Union’s proposal for
peace (Stueck 1995, 216). The following day, Kim Il-sung, Supreme Commander of the
North Korean military, likewise made known that North Korea would participate in
discussions regarding an armistice deal. The communist side suggested that the meetings
convene at the city of Kaesong, which was located just below the 38th parallel, as an
alternative to the Danish hospital ship as Denmark was associated with the United
Nations. The Truman administration found Kaesong an acceptable location, as it was
located midway between the front lines of the two forces but was unoccupied by either
army. The U.S. leadership, anticipating that the talks would bring a speedy end to the war
and seeing no disadvantage in the proposed location accepted the proposal.
Talks between the negotiation teams of the UNC/ROK and DPRK/PRC began on
July 10, 1951. Both delegations were comprised of five principal delegates. On the UN
side, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy served as the UNC’s main negotiator from
the start of the negotiations until May 1952, after which he was replaced by Lieutenant
General William K. Harrison. Assisting him were Major General Lawrence C. Craigie,
Major General Henry I. Hodes, Rear Admiral Arliegh A. Burke, and ROK Army Major
General Paik Sun Yup, the single ROK representative at the negotiation table (Vatcher
1958, 30). At the head of the communist delegation was Lieutenant General Nam Il,
Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army, and the Vice Premier of North Korea. Assisting
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General Nam at the conference table were two representatives from North Korea: Major
General Lee Sang-cho and Major General Chang Pyeong-san. There were also two
delegates at the table from China: General Teng Hua and Major General Hsieh Fang
(Zhang 1995, 218-219).
The first issue that needed to be settled before talks could begin in earnest was the
matter of what topics were “on the table” for discussion during the negotiations. A major
point of disagreement between the two groups was the issue of where to establish a
military demarcation line. The communists believed that the UNC would accept the 38th
parallel as the line based on statements made by U.S. Secretary of State Acheson in early
March in which he stated that a settlement at or near the parallel “would accomplish the
military purposes in Korea” (Acheson 1969, 531) as well as comments by Ridgeway who
declared that “it would be a tremendous victory for the United Nations if the war ended
with our forces in control up to the 38th parallel” (Pearlman 2008, 163). UN Secretary
General Trygve Lie likewise announced on June 1, 1951 that a ceasefire along the
parallel “would fulfil the main purpose of the United Nations” (Foot 1990, 45). However,
for a combination of political and military motivations, which will be discussed further
on in this chapter, the Truman administration chose to reject the communist proposal
regarding the placement of the line of ceasefire. The U.S. was also unwilling to commit
to the withdrawal of its troops, partially due to the violent reaction of the ROK
government to such a move, and the difficulty that reengaging recently withdrawn U.S.
forces would entail should peninsular hostilities break out once more.
On July 16, 1950 the communist delegation agreed to eliminate the reference to
the 38th parallel as the demarcation line and on July 25, 1950 the two sides agreed to
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remove direct reference to the withdrawal of foreign troops, choosing to discuss it at a
later date. Sixteen days following the start of the talks, on July 26, 1951, the following
agenda was agreed to by both parties:
1. adoption of agenda;
2. fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a
demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea;
3. concrete arrangements for the realization of a ceasefire and an armistice in
Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising
organization for carrying out the terms of a ceasefire and armistice;
4. arrangements relating to prisoners of war;
5. recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both
sides.
(Bailey 1992, 76)
Once the agenda was set, the two sides were able to proceed with negotiations on the four
remaining agenda points.
The first item the delegations moved to discuss was the fixing of the location and
deciding on the nature of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone
(DMZ). In the following statement made at the opening of discussions, the KPA/PVA
reiterated their dedication to the idea of the 38th parallel being reinstated as the border
between the two sides:
We hold firmly that the 38th Parallel should be made the military demarcation
line between both sides and that both sides withdraw ten kilometers from the
38th Parallel in order to establish a demilitarized zone.
(Vatcher 1958, 46)
The UNC countered with a line running through Pyongyang and Wonsan, well north of
the current line of contact, which had formed more or less along the 38th parallel. To
support its argument for a line that was so favorable for the UNC, Joy presented the
notion of three zones of military significance: air, sea, and ground. He argued that since
the UNC maintained air superiority over the entirety of the Korean peninsula and held
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control over the seas that surrounded it, it should be awarded additional territory on the
ground. This argument for more territory was unconvincing, and Nam countered this
rather weak line of reasoning with the statement, “your battle lines on the ground are the
concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of your land, air and seas forces”
(Foot 1990, 47).
The UNC could not condone acceptance of the 38th parallel as the military
demarcation line due to an assortment of political and strategic reasons. While the
armistice talks were underway, the two sides were fighting along a line of contact
positioned slightly north of the 38th parallel except for a small section in the west. As
Paul Nitze, the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff wrote, a settlement
at the 38th parallel “would give the impression that the Chinese and the North Korean
communists had been able to achieve somewhat more than an even military result against
sixteen [United Nations member] nations” (Foot 1990, 45-46). This would strike a blow
against the legitimacy of the United Nations, as it would indicate that during the
organization’s first collective military effort it was only able to fight two newly
established states, the DPRK and the PRC, to a draw.
Furthermore, there was the issue of the indefensibility of the 38th parallel. This
line, which was drawn across the Korean peninsula in 1945 for the purpose of
demilitarizing Japanese forces, was not meant to function as a permanent border between
two belligerent countries. Most problematic was the fact that the 38th parallel was
entirely lacking in natural geographical barriers, such as oceans, rivers, or mountain
ranges, which usually run along national borders. A good indicator of the border’s
impracticality as a wall dividing the two armies was the fact that the UNC/ROK and the
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KPA/PVA were able to breach the line for a total of four times during the short span of
one year at war. The UNC regarded the new battle line north of the 38th parallel as far
more defensible than the former border created during the U.S./U.S.S.R. occupation.
With neither side willing to relent on this issue, and with the talks deadlocked, on
August 22, 1951, the Chinese-North Korean delegation declared a recess claiming that air
bombing conducted by the UNC had made the negotiation site unsafe. The UNC used the
break as an opportunity to move the talks to a more neutral location, as it was dissatisfied
by the fact that Kaesong was now located within territory controlled by the communist
forces. On October 22, 1951, the two sides agreed to relocate the venue of the talks to the
village of Panmunjom, located several miles to the east of Kaesong, which would
thereinafter serve as the site of negotiations.
Negotiations were reinitiated at the new site on October 25, 1951 and the two
sides continued to debate the location of the military demarcation line. The UNC argued
that the border should be drawn based on the line of ground contact at the time that the
armistice was signed. It favored this approach because, at the time, UN forces were on
the offensive, and Ridgway believed this fact, coupled with the UNC’s air and naval
superiority, would continue to provide the negotiation team with leverage during the
remainder of the talks. The KPA/PVA, on the other hand, insisted on an immediate
agreement regarding the location of the military demarcation line. Discussions dragged
on until November 27, 1951, when the two sides agreed that the line of contact at the
time of the signing of the armistice would form the demarcation line, which would
surrounded by a four-kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone (Hermes 1966, 114).
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Discussions between the two delegations regarding item 3—arrangements for a
ceasefire—began on November 27, 1951 with the two sides quickly agreeing to a
Military Armistice Commission with equal representation for both camps. On December
3, 1951, the KPA/PVA suggested that the armistice be supervised by nations “neutral to
the Korean War” and by March 1952, the two sides had more-or-less completed
discussion on this issue by agreeing to include Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and
Switzerland as the members of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)
(Hermes 1966, 173).
Formal talks regarding item number 5—recommendations to the governments of
the countries—began on February 7, 1952 and progressed quickly largely due to the fact
that both sides hoped to avoid precise phrasing on the matter. The negotiators were only
making recommendations to their governments about post-armistice political action, and
thus the contents of item 5 were not regarded as binding. Joy proposed that after the
signing of the armistice, the relevant country’s governments consider convening a
conference between the political representatives of both sides “to discuss appropriate
matters arising from but not resolved by the armistice agreement” (Posen 1986, 75). The
communist delegation advocated that a conference to discuss the signing of a peace treaty
be held ninety days after the conclusion of the armistice between a group of five
delegates from each side. It was their intention that the conference discuss the withdrawal
of foreign troops from the peninsula and other questions related to the peace in Korea.
The UNC negotiation team quickly agreed to these recommendations regarding the
holding a post-truce conference, on the condition that the Republic of Korea was one of
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the participants. This agenda point was agreed on February 18, 1952, only eleven days
after it was formally introduced into the negotiations.
The most problematic item discussed during the armistice talks was number 4,
prisoner of war (POW) repatriation. Heated discussions, and the substantial elongation of
the talks, were caused because the UNC delegation proposed the idea of non-enforceable
repatriation for Korean War POWs, which the KPA/PVA team immediately rejected. It
had, up to this point, been assumed by both sides that all POWs would be exchanged at
the conclusion of the armistice, as was customary. The UNC noted, however, that among
the prisoners held by the UN forces were many former residents of the ROK who had
been inducted into the KPA following the North Korean attack. The UNC argued that
these people should be allowed to return to their homes in the south. Furthermore, it was
also discovered that many of the Chinese soldiers were former members of the
Nationalist Chinese Army who did not support the communist government. The UN
delegation argued that these troops might prefer and should be allowed to go to Taiwan
rather than be forced to return to mainland China.
While the U.S. negotiators emphasized the value of individual human rights and
insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation, the communist delegation argued that
“the United Nations Command had no right to withhold repatriation of certain prisoners
merely because those prisoners expressed opposition to being repatriated” (Joy 1952,
146-147). The UNC responded that “it had the right and the duty to refuse to repatriate
those prisoners who could not be returned to the side of their origin without the use of
force” (ibid.).
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Both sides were adamant that they would not concede on this matter, and from
May to December 1952, no progress was made on the POW issue. Once committed
publicly to non-enforceable repatriation, the officials in Washington stubbornly insisted
upon “a clear-cut victory” (Foot 1990, 217). Truman thoroughly embraced the principle
of nonforcible repatriation because he wanted “a decisive victory…that embodied the
essence of the difference between the two sides in the Cold War” (ibid., 158). He insisted
that this was the best way for the United States “to maintain its hegemonic position in the
international system” (ibid., 151). The North Korea/Chinese side, on the other hand,
could not afford to allow many of their soldiers to refuse repatriation as both were still in
the early stages of constructing new regimes and the refusal by large numbers of
communist troops to return home would undermine the legitimacy of these newly instated
governments.
In March 1952, the communist delegation indicated that they were willing to
show some flexibility on the matter, but only if the majority of Chinese and North Korean
prisoners intended to return. In response, on April 19, 1952 the UNC conducted an initial
screening process to determine the repatriation desires of prisoners and reported that
among the over 170,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners, only 70,000 desired
repatriation. The KPA/PVA negotiators flatly stated that such low figures could not be
true and would not serve as the basis for further discussion on the matter (Hermes 1966,
144-149). Neither side was prepared to compromise on this issue and on October 8, 1952,
with no progress in sight, the UNC unilaterally declared a recess.
During the adjournment of talks, both sides believed that they could apply
pressure on their opponents by increasing military activity. In May 1952, General Mark
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W. Clark replaced Ridgway as Commander-in-Chief UN Command, and ordered the
largest air attacks of the war against the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and the
bombing of the hydroelectric dams on the Yalu River (Berstein 1983, 288-296). The
Chinese leadership, convinced that war would continue for some time, started to build up
its forces and by early 1953, Chinese troops in Korea reached 1.53 million, the highest in
the war (Zhang 1995, 225-227). Despite these efforts, neither the UNC’s aerial attacks,
nor the Chinese ground attacks were threatening enough to cause either side to
compromise on the issue. Thus, although the level of violence on the peninsula increased
substantially in 1952, these actions had no discernible effect on the negotiations and
served only to push up the number of casualties.
In early 1953, the political situation of both sides also began to shift. In the U.S.,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had strongly criticized Truman’s handling of the war and
armistice negotiations, came into office in January. Keenly aware that neither the
American people nor its UN allies would support a major offensive to reunify Korea,
Eisenhower made it known that, as long as there were no major compromises made on
the issue of voluntary repatriation, he would authorize the Armistice as it had been
negotiated at that point. By this time, the communist forces were also eager for the war to
end as both China and North Korea were eager to begin reconstructing their economies.
The biggest turning point, nonetheless, was the death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953.
The Soviet leader’s successors, facing unrest in the European satellites, encouraged the
Chinese and North Koreans to conclude the armistice (Weathersby 2012, 108-109). In
light of this situation, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a speech in which he
proposed that those prisoners not desiring repatriation be transferred to a neutral state and
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Nam Il agreed to this proposition “out of need to consolidate the Communist bloc after
Stalin’s death” (ibid., 183).
By July 27, 1953 all of the details had been worked out and preparations were
complete for the signing of the document. The final armistice was signed at 10 o’clock on
July 27, 1953 by U.S. Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr. representing the
United Nations Command (UNC) and North Korean General Nam Il representing the
Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA). Within
a few hours, General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,
Marshall Kim Il-sung, Supreme Commander Korean People’s Army, and Peng Dehuai,
Chinese People’s Volunteer, also signed the document for their military forces. The
representatives affixed their signatures to eighteen copies of the armistice, six in English,
six in Chinese, and six in Korean, thus ending the longest truce talks in history.32

4.2. UNC Military Interpreters at the Armistice Negotiations
The Korean Armistice Negotiations was the longest and one of the most complex
negotiated armistices in history, involving “159 plenary sessions and some 500 hundred
meetings at a subsidiary level” (Bailey 1992, 70), all of which required the mediatory
presence of interpreters who worked between the three official working languages:
Korean, English, and Chinese (Ekvall 1960, 20). As the working language of the UNC,

Both sides accumulated tremendous casualties during the war. Approximately two to
three million civilians were killed in North and South Korea. There were 33,629 U.S.
soldiers killed on the battlefield, plus 20,617 from other causes, and an estimated 400,000
South Korean military fatalities. One to two million communist troops are believed to have
perished. U.S. statistics show that 45 percent of its casualties occurred while the
negotiations were underway (Foot 1990, 208).
32
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which was represented by four U.S. military officers and one ROK officer, was English,
it officially only required the services of English-Korean interpreters and EnglishChinese interpreters (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 57). The UNC’s English-Korean and
English-Chinese interpreters rendered what was said by any of the representatives at the
negotiation table in English into Korean and Chinese. They did not interpret what was
said by the representatives of the PRC or DPRK in Chinese or Korean. That was the
responsibility of the communist interpreters.
The number of interpreters needed at Kaesong and later Panmunjom was,
naturally, much smaller when compared to the needs of the USAGMIK during the
occupation of southern Korean following the Japanese surrender or the UNC forces in the
battlefields during the Korean War. The U.S. military estimated that, in total, it would
require the assistance of approximately 140 military interpreters and translators at
Kaesong and Panmunjom (Ekvall 1960, 46). While the quantity of interpreters needed at
the armistice was far lower than the numbers needed during the occupation or the war,
the fact that these interpreters had to participate in a diplomatic conference setting meant
that they had to be highly proficient in the language pairs they were working with.
During both the U.S. occupation of southern Korea and the Korean War, the
United States military had steadfastly refused to recruit and train its own Korean
linguists, despite the negative effects it had on the institution’s ability to communicate
with the local populace, its allies, and enemies, choosing rather to rely on Korean civilian
interpreters during the occupation and the ROKA’s UN Liaison Group officers during the
war, as was discussed in the previous two chapters. The interpreters working at the
Korean Armistice Negotiation table, however, had to be U.S. military personnel, as the
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UNC’s negotiation team was being led by an American officer, and the entire operation
was under the management and control of the UNC in the face of opposition by the ROK
government. Thus, the U.S. military could not employ the services of UN Liaison Group
officers at the negotiation table because, as was discussed in chapter three, the loyalty of
these interpreters did not belong to the UNC but to the Republic of Korea Army.
Before the negotiations began, the U.S. military issued a call for “Grade A
linguists” to serve as interpreters at the armistice talks. These interpreters were required
to be on,
the “international political” (or negotiating) level. Personnel operating at this
highest level must be completely fluent in an Asiatic language and in English as
well. They should be capable of simultaneous translations (interpretation) to and
from English. In addition to linguistic fluency they must have a deep
understanding of the appropriate Asiatic culture, area, and psychology. This is a
“super” category, the personnel in which would be competent to handle
interpretation, advising, and even negotiating at high-level meetings such as those
which US military representatives have been engaged at Kaesong and Panmunjom
since 1951.
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 13)
Unfortunately, it was soon revealed that despite the fact that it had actively intervened in
Korean affairs since 1945, “the U.S. Army had no competent career-service language
personnel available to handle the 2-yr truce negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom”
(ibid., 8).33 Thus, the U.S. was forced to recall a number of its reserve officers to active
duty to serve as interpreters at the negotiation table.

During the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in post-war Japan
(1946-1948), which is examined by Kayoko Takeda (2010) in Interpreting the Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunal: A Sociopolitical Analysis, the U.S. military had likewise faced an urgent
need for high-level interpreters. The U.S. military was unable to supply interpreters from
within its ranks to serve as the primary interpreters, opting instead to employ Japanese
nationals with bilingual backgrounds with no formal training to serve as the interpreters at
the Tokyo trials. Nonetheless, because the U.S. military had recruited and trained Nisei
(second generation Japanese-Americans) interpreters and translators during World War II,
33
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The primary English-Korean interpreter to serve at the negotiation site was
Horace G. Underwood, a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve. Horace’s brother, Richard
F. Underwood, was a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army Reserve, who had been assigned as
an English-Korean interpreter for the initial liaison team of UN command officers who
flew into Kaesong to do the groundwork prior to the truce talks. Horace Underwood,
Richard’s older brother by ten years, had served in the military during World War II as a
U.S. Navy officer, and had since been teaching English at the Chosen Christian College
in South Korea when the Korean War broke out. Horace joined the armistice delegation
“at Richard’s urging” (Li, Millet and Yu 2001, 260) and became the Chief Official
Interpreter for the UNC at Panmunjom.
The top English-Chinese interpreter for the first two years of the negotiations was
First Lieutenant Kenneth Wu, who was later replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Ekvall. Like the Underwoods, neither of the English-Chinese interpreters was still active
in the military during the Korean War. Kenneth Wu was an ethnic Chinese born in Burma
who joined the U.S. Army in Kunming, China, in 1943 and was naturalized as an
American citizen in 1947. Before joining the negotiation team at Kaesong, he was the
chief of the Chinese POW interrogation team in Pusan. When the armistice talks began,
he was subsequently commissioned as second lieutenant, U.S. Army Reserve, to serve at
Kaesong and, in 1953, Wu was promoted to first lieutenant. As was the case with the

these Nisei linguists, who had worked for the U.S. Army as military intelligence staff
during World War II, were able to monitor the linguistic production of these interpreters.
The Nisei were charged with correcting interpreting errors and tasked with reading all the
prepared translations simultaneously as they were delivered by the different participants in
the courtroom. When linguistic disputes broke out between the Japanese interpreters and
the Nisei monitors they were resolved by two bilingual U.S. military officers.
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Underwood brothers, “he [was] not a career service-language officer” (Fishel and
Hausrath 1958, 14). Wu served as the senior Chinese language officer until he was
replaced in the spring of 1953 by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Ekvall, “a Reserve officer
who was recalled to active duty for the express purpose of handling interpretation chores
at the negotiations” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 16). Ekvall had served as staff officer and
translator with the military mission of General George Marshall in Beijing from 1946 to
1947.
Fernández Sánchez notes that, aside from Ekvall, all of the senior interpreters at
Kaesong and Panmunjom were “untrained interpreters” (Fernández Sánchez 2012, 118122). The task of interpreting during the armistice talks proved to be tremendously
strenuous, and the interpreters felt themselves linguistically ill equipped to meet the
challenges of serving as interlingual mediators in such a high-level diplomatic conference
setting. For instance, Richard Underwood recalled that he “did have very great problems
at the formal meetings because all of a sudden, we came up with all sorts of technical
language that I had no competence to interpreter, and it was a really, really, miserable
time” (Underwood 2010). Horace Underwood likewise experienced “initial difficulty in
meeting the requirements of his job satisfactorily” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 16), and
even Ekvall, who was already a seasoned military interpreter at the time, “found his
Chinese, fluent though it normally was, inadequate for the needs of the demanding task at
Panmunjom for several weeks after he arrived” (ibid.). The military’s employment of
untrained interpreters during military operations, however, has proven to be more the
norm than the exception in many cases. While there are instances in which a military
engages in warfare with a group of trained interpreters and translators, such as the Nisei
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interpreters and translators who played an active role during World War II, “wars have
been and—unfortunately—continue to be schools of interpreters” (Baigorri-Jalon 2010,
173).
Interpreters at the Korean Armistice Negotiations were required to participate in
both the plenary sessions and the staff meetings. During the negotiations the
representatives of both sides met in a tent set up on the 38th parallel where “a narrow
green baize table was placed in the center of the tent and down the center of that table ran
the 38th parallel” (Dean 1960, 9). The center line of the table had to be set up in
accordance with the actual boundary line of the two sides, so the placement of the
negotiation table was constantly adjusted in accordance with the changes of the actual
boundary line (Wang and Xu 2016, 191). Mirroring the circumstances on the battlefield,
the communist representatives sat on the northern side of the negotiation table while the
UNC delegation sat on the southern side. Such care was taken regarding the positioning
of the table because both sides regarded the negotiation sites as part and parcel of the real
theater of war.
Though Richard Underwood hints at the fact that the plenary sessions were more
challenging than the staff meetings, both proved to be challenging for the interpreters, for
different reasons. During the plenary sessions, the delegates of the two sides debated the
five items of the armistice agreement, with the interpreters seated at a small table just
behind the spokesman and the main conference table. This positioning allowed them to
reference word lists and dictionaries, which were required because the language
employed during the talks included a wide range of terminology, as pointed out by the
English-Chinese interpreter, Kenneth Wu.
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In the present armistice negotiations, the vocabulary involved is legion. Though
strictly a military conference the words used cover every province of semantics—
military science, political hocus-pocus, geographical jaw-breakers, political
jargon, philosophical abracadabra, and torrential tirades of penetrating oral
defamation couched in diplomatic sugarcoats. Here it is purposeful to point out
that the interpreter, wagging his tongue rather than the pen as does the translator,
has no time to seek refuge in a dictionary when he is ambushed by the lethal
assault of an unexpected and unknown word. In short, the ideal interpreter is the
one who can drive well on the thoroughfares of a two-lane lingual traffic, except
that he is to be able to jump tracks and switch directions on split-second impulses
far from being his own. He is to be able to juggle with words and put across the
most fantastic show of verbal magic.
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 15)
The interpreter was aided by an assistant who sat next to the interpreter to look up words,
check texts, and hand over documents with pertinent paragraphs marked for reading, in
cases where the principal suddenly quotes a passage. While having their own space
provided some advantages, sitting behind the main conference table also presented
interpreters with some challenges:
the interpreter loses something of the close rapport with his principal; there is a
diminution of the sense of immediacy; it is harder for the principal to consult with
his interpreter; there is greater chance of the interpreter’s not hearing correctly or
not hearing all of what his principal says; and, if he needs to cross-check on what
has been said or heard, he has to tip his hand and temporarily stop the meeting by
getting up and going to the conference table.
(Ekvall 1960, 62-63)
In addition to the plenary sessions, the interpreter’s presence was also required at
the staff meetings, during which the specifics of items which had been agreed to during
the plenary session was clarified and put into writing. During these talks, the interpreter
sat at the conference table, just to the left of the spokesman, and thus did not have
immediate access to an assistant, reference books, or any of the other props. All the
interpreters were allowed to have on the table were prepared texts that were given to
them and a pad of paper on which to make notes. During these meetings, interpreters no
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longer had reference material to lean on, but, according to Ekvall, this setting could be
preferable because “the stimulation of the front line permeates him and helps him dig
deep for the things he knows below the level of conscious awareness” (Ekvall 1960, 63).
Certain measures were taken by interpreters to ensure that they would be able to
best convey what was being said by the negotiators. The most commonly used tactic was
for interpreters to prepare a written translation of a statement before the meeting rather
than to interpret it on the spot.
Every statement had to be carefully and precisely formulated the evening before
and then translated into Chinese and Korean. Since the Chinese and English
languages are in no sense similar in structure, many hours had to be spent in
making sure that what we wanted to be said could be said correctly and precisely
in both the Chinese and Korean languages.
(Ekvall 1960, 9)
The downside of essentially reading prepared texts was that though they had a prim
finished preciseness about them, such interpretations tended to be “pompous, and often
oddly bombastic” (ibid., 67). Furthermore, excessive dependence on reading translations
of a statement made before the meeting was held could become an impediment to smooth
interlingual communication as “the interpreter tends to flounder somewhat wildly when
ad lib exchanges follow use of, or are inserted into, the prepared text” (ibid.).
When a statement could not be translated in advance, measures were taken to
provide the UNC interpreter some supplementary material which would help them
accurately interpret what was said by the negotiation team. For instance, often the
speaker at the conference table would write down what they were about to say on a piece
of paper, read from the paper, and then pass it to the interpreter. The notes scribbled by
the speaker provided the interpreter with a record of what has just been said. Though this
strategy was developed in Panmunjom to aid the interpreters, it was soon discovered that
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in addition to providing reference material for the linguistic mediators, it helped the
negotiators better organize their thoughts and get their points across in a more succinct
manner. Thus, interpreters urged that all members of the negotiation team employ this
tactic, and even asked that the senior negotiator consider, “making it mandatory in
preference to unlimited and uncontrolled adlibbing” (ibid., 68).
In addition to the Underwood brothers, Wu, and Ekvall, a team of linguists was
organized to provide interpreting and translation services during the negotiations. The
following chart indicates that there was a total of seventy-six UNC military linguists
working for the language division at Panmunjom in July 1953.
Table 5: Number of Interpreters and Translators at Panmunjom
Interpreters, Korean
Interpreters, Chinese
Translators, Korean
Translation, Chinese
Interpreter-translators, Korean
Interpreter-translators, Chinese

26
11
7
6
14
12

Total

76
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 57)

However, the following comments made by Ekvall suggests that Fishel and Hausrath’s
numbers were inflated and that the shortage of linguistic personnel at Panmunjom was
much more severe than official records indicate.
I found myself chief of a would-be language division whose table of organization
called for 140 linguists. Instead, we numbered twelve, including translators and
Chinese and Korean typists.
(Ekvall 1960, 46)
Given the importance of interlingual communication at the negotiation table, it is hardly
surprising that UNC linguist supervisors and intelligence division chiefs found their
number to be “assertedly insufficient” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 57).
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The disparity in the numbers presented in Fishel and Hausrath’s study and the
recollections of Ekvall in his memoire appear to have been caused by the fact that the
criteria for calculating the number of linguists differed. According to Ekvall,
The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, all suddenly pressured to produce
linguists, poured personnel into the language division. They were men who on
their records were rated as qualified linguists. We found most such ratings
fictitious. Using practical rule-of-thumb tests, we sent them back—at least four
out of every five—as fast as they came. The ones we did keep couldn’t interpret
as yet, but they showed promise. We set up training courses, rotated them as
monitors in the meetings and let them get their feet wet in various interpreting
assignments of an incidental nature.
(Ekvall 1960, 46)
In other words, the fourteen members of the language division appear to be the number of
permanent personnel Ekvall deemed as competent interpreters and translators. So while
Fishel and Hausrath’s records include all of the personnel assigned to the language
division, they fail to take into account whether all of its members could actually take on
the roles they were called on to perform. Whether it be seventy-six or fourteen, both
Fishel and Hausrath’s report and Ekvall’s autobiographical account indicate that there
was a vast shortage of linguistic mediators at the Korean Armistice Negotiations.
The lack of personnel translated to an increased burden for the interpreters
capable of performing their linguistic duties with any proficiency. Thus, the more
competent interpreters “often interpreted for eight or more hours a day” (ibid., 46),
despite the fact that it is widely recognized that the quality of interpreting decreases when
interpreters continuously interpret for long stretches of time (Moser-Mercer 2000). These
long working hours proved to be taxing for the interpreters, who often began to
“blackout” after about two hours without rest (Ekvall 1960, 48). Furthermore, because of
the limited number of interpreters available at the negotiations, it became necessary to
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stagger the schedule of those meetings so that “the interpreters, could go from one
meeting to the next” (ibid., 46).
While the lack of personnel added to the already heavy burden of the UNC
interpreters, as discussed in chapter two, interpreters can sometimes accrue significant
power and authority within interpreted events when they hold a monopoly over the
linguistic capital necessary for interlingual communication to take place. During the
occupation, this led to interpreting norms which allowed the interpreter to actively
intervene in interpreted events, during which they were not only allowed but often
encouraged to take on roles that extended beyond those of a simple linguistic mediator,
roles which included advisor, informer, and negotiator. The following section will
examine the interpreting norms that emerged during the armistice talks and determine
why, despite the shortage of capable interpreters, the military interpreters at Kaesong and
Panmunjom were unable to command more authority during the negotiation talks.

4.3. The Interpreter as a Faithful Echo
In his memoir “Faithful Echo,” Robert Ekvall (1960) provides the following
detailed account about a particular interpreting assignment that he found particularly
challenging and frustrating while serving as the UNC’s senior English-Chinese
interpreter at Panmunjom.
The temptation to add, if not a sentence, just a phrase or even a word, can be very
strong. The interpreter often feels as though he were the only one with hearing
ears, listening to a dialogue of the deaf where just one more word—the right one,
of course—would clear up all misunderstanding; he may even deceive himself
into believing that such addition is the best and highest form of interpretation. In
his inmost being he knows what his principal means: it is simply a matter of
clarification. Yet clarification may, in fact, be something not desired.
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And here I remember a staff meeting in Panmunjom in which I was most
unhappy from beginning to end. What I was given to interpret seemed to be, as I
worked through it stubborn sentence by sentence and refractory phrase by phrase,
the most amazing jumble of contradictions ever muttered. I thought I knew what
was intended. Again and again I was tempted to insert one or two explanatory
phrases which would make everything clear. But against all reason I held true to
the words of my principal and at the end wiped my sweating palms. The other
side responded with the request that the interpretation be repeated. This implied
that I was at fault, and I had to swallow the humiliation while at the same time
feeling, with a mounting, helpless sort of fury, that it wasn’t altogether my fault.
But no matter whose fault, I was the one pilloried and shamed. Then they asked
that the statement be repeated. It was no clearer than before, and I once more
sweated through its interpretation, after which those on the other side of the table
shook their heads in bewilderment. A long question-and-answer session followed
until everyone seemed tired out. At last, in a state of mutual bafflement, we
adjourned and I could take my shame outside.
Yet as we rode back to camp at Munsani, my principal remarked, “Ekvall, you
did a good job today.”
“But sir, they didn’t understand. Nobody understood and we ended more
confused that when we started.” I was smarting with the hurt of a job bungled and
yet still sensed bitterly, but silently, that it wasn’t altogether my fault.
“That’s it exactly. If they had understood I would have known you were
misinterpreting. They weren’t supposed to understand. I was purposely fuzzing it
up. Good work.”
(Ekvall 1960, 102-103)
The aggravation the interpreter felt during this meeting was due to a clash between his
professional desire as a linguistic mediator to enable accurate interlingual communication
and the established interpreting norms which prevented him from adding, omitting,
simplifying or embellishing what was said by the original speaker. Unlike the civilian
interpreters working for the USAMGIK, who were expected to serve as informants and
negotiators during interpreted events, and UN Liaison Group officers, who were expected
to manipulate an exchange between KMAGers and ROKA commanders to favor their
Korean military superiors, “absolute faithfulness, or fidelity, was the norm that was
strictly observed” (Wang and Xu 2016, 200) at the negotiation table. In Ekvall’s own
words “the interpreter must never add, even in the interest of clarification, anything of his
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own to what is being said; and conversely, he must never subtract, for neither subtraction
nor […] omission is permissible” (ibid., 102).
Inghilleri notes that interpreters in conflict situations “continually consider
disparate sets of rights and obligations and weigh one ethical obligation against another”
(Inghilleri 2012, 100). The event outlined above and comments made by Ekvall reveal
that when forced to choose between the ethical obligation to facilitate and mediate
language communication or to function as a neutral conduit, the UNC interpreters were
compelled to choose the later as their primary obligation, even when such practice came
at the expense of the comprehensibility.
Furthermore, this episode demonstrates that the UNC negotiators could not
monitor what was being said by the interpreter when their words were rendered into
Chinese, as they based their assessment of the interpretation’s faithfulness to the original
on the reaction of the Chinese negotiators. It also raises the question of why, given that
no one on the UNC side of the negotiation table could monitor whether or not the
interpreter was adhering to norms of interpreting that limited the interpreter to the
somewhat mechanical role of faithfully rendering of what was said in the source language
to its closest equivalent in the target language, the interpreter felt compelled to abide by
these norms.
A key characteristic that distinguishes the UNC interpreters who participated in
the truce talks from civilian interpreters working for the U.S. Military Government, who
viewed the U.S. as a foreign occupational force, or UN Liaison Group officers, whose
loyalties belonged to the ROK Army, was the fact that the interpreters at Kaesong and
Panmunjom, though not active, still saw themselves as U.S. military personnel. The fact
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that the UNC interpreters were members of the U.S. military had a clear influence on the
positionality of the interpreters within the military field as they were firmly embedded
within the military’s hierarchical chain of command. At Kaesong and Panmunjom, the
interpreters were unquestionably military men subordinate to the officers to whom they
were providing their linguistic services. As a result, these interpreters conducted
themselves in accordance with the norms of the military, and the power they exercised
during interpreted events was in large part defined by their rank rather than their
linguistic abilities.
As a result, interpreters at Kaesong and Panmunjom who were of low military
rank experienced considerable difficulties while serving at the negotiation table:
On [Horace Underwood]’s retirement from active duty in July 1953 he was
replaced as senior interpreter by an Army sergeant. The lack of senior status
proved a handicap for this sergeant, even as it had for other interpreters working
at Panmunjom. Because of the ticklish problems involved in phrasing documents
intended to be translated, the interpreters at these negotiations had been consulted
on all draft documents and had sat in on all staff meetings. Several of these
linguists commented that their lack of rank frequently was embarrassing to
them—not so much in dealing with the enemy across the table, but in dealing with
US negotiators!
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 16-17)
The difficulties the sergeant who replaced Horace Underwood faced would have been
particularly prominent as he was an enlisted soldier working with high-ranking officers.
This sentiment appears to have been widespread as one linguist suggested,
Perhaps we ought to be given field-officer rank for these negotiations so that we
could deal with our own negotiators on relatively equal terms. As it is, generals
and admirals often won’t ask or take advice from a sergeant or a lieutenant
regardless of his ability or his degree of experience.
(ibid., 17)
And another interpreter at Panmunjom observed that it was because of his military rank
that his superiors undervalued the worth of the cultural and linguistic expertise.
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The Army’s got to make up its mind what it wants from its language personnel. If
it wants top-grade people for meetings such as this it ought to be prepared to
“pay” for them. I mean simply that in my lowly rank I am constantly being
embarrassed by having to offer advice to some general or colonel who resents
hearing me talk because I’m just a ______. And frankly, if my future promotions
are as slow in coming as this last one was I’ll be damned if I’ll stay in the Army
much longer. I trained a long time to get to this point, and I don’t much like being
ordered around or scorned by some guy with a lot of rank who doesn’t know
anything about this work and looks down on me like some flunkey just because of
my rank.
(ibid.)
The laments of these interpreters stand in stark contrast with the situations seen during
the occupation and the war, during which the interpreters’ position was elevated due to
the access they maintained over the channels of interlingual communication.
In addition to the difficulties low-ranking military interpreters faced, interpreters
possessing high-rank were questioned on whether their job required such power within
the military establishment: “one disgruntled officer, irked at my rank which he felt was
too high for a mere interpreter, suggested that I be declared superfluous and sent away
from Panmunjom” (Ekvall 1960, 45). The presence of a high-ranking interpreter was seen
as a threat to the military institution because it implied that interpreters, whose functions
were viewed as supplementary, could in fact take on leadership roles and potentially
assume positions of power.
Ekvall provides details of several attempts made by members of the U.S. military
to remind interpreters that they occupied a subservient position within the military. This
was typically done by alleging that interpreters were not true soldiers as they lacked the
characteristic of a military man. For instance, U.S. personnel at the negotiation talks
claimed interpreters were “prima donnas” who were “too temperamental for any good
use” (ibid., 70). Here, interpreters are denigrated for possessing characteristics that ran
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counter to what was viewed as the central values of the military, namely, masculinity and
strategical thinking. Another denunciation directed at interpreters was the clichéd
assertion that the interpreter’s job was to parrot what is said by their “principal,” as
exemplified in the following comments made by one of Ekvall’s acquaintances at
Panmunjom: “He [the speaker] says ‘Squeak, squeak, squeak’, and you say ‘squawk,
squawk, squawk’. A hell of a job!” (ibid.). The treatment of interpreters at the armistice
talks mirrors the relationship seen between ROKA unit commanders and UN Liaison
Group officers during the Korean War. In both cases, the mistreatment of the military
interpreter by military staff might be interpreted as a conscious refusal to acknowledge
the value of the linguistic capital that the interpreter possesses, and thus rejecting any
authority the interpreter might hold in an interpreted event, while presenting military rank
as the sole source of symbolic capital within the military organization.
While the treatment of UN Liaison Group officers and U.S. military interpreters
paralleled each other, the interpreter’s reaction to this treatment differed substantially. In
the case of the UN Liaison Group officers, interpreters such as Kim Il Pyong (2012) and
Ji Myeong-gwan (2006) expressed their disdain for their military superiors and criticized
them for failing to recognize the value of the linguistic services they were providing. This
group of interpreters were able to challenge the authority of ROK officers and refuse to
be relegated to a position of subservience because they occupied an ambiguous position
within the military’s rank system. The UNC interpreters in Kaesong and Panmunjom, on
the other hand, were squarely positioned within the U.S. military’s chain of command
and any attempt to devalue the authority of their superiors would come at the cost of
diminishing their own worth and thus could not be attempted.
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Further adding to the constraints placed on interpreters to “parrot” what was said
by their military superiors was the fact that interpreters were constantly being monitored
to ensure they did not diverge from statements made by their principals. Ironically, while
the U.S. military staff serving as representatives of the UNC at the negotiation table could
not monitor the linguistic output of their interpreters, the majority of communist
negotiators knew not only their mother language but also one or two of the other
languages spoken at the talks. For instance, the head of the communist delegation, Nam
Il, “spoke fluent Russian—he had been a school teacher in the Soviet Union—and was
reputed to be equally fluent in Chinese” (ibid., 58). One of the Chinese staff officers and
Communist negotiators, Pu Shan, had received a doctoral degree at Harvard University
and worked as a professor at a U.S. college in the mid-west. He spoke much better
English than his interpreter. Nonetheless, he was barred from engaging with the UN’s
negotiation team directly in English, as it had been agreed that the negotiators would be
limited to speaking their own language, which would then be communicated to the other
side via an interpreter. Another member of the communist negotiation who could speak
perfect English was Huang Hua, the chief Chinese negotiator. Huang had previously
served as a Chinese-English interpreter for the Chinese Communist commissioner in
Beijing at the time of the Marshall mission. Nonetheless,
during six weeks of negotiating against Ambassador Dean he never uttered a
word—in greeting, argument or even incidental half pleasantry—in English, nor
did he correct his interpreter when the usual awkward mistakes were made.
(ibid., 56-57)
Although Huang did not flaunt his knowledge of English, his proficiency in the language
was a great asset to him, as he understood what was being said as it was being said, and
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could “think out his answer and counterattack” (ibid., 57) while the interpreter was
rendering the English message into Chinese.
Ekvall recalls that UNC interpreters were constantly reminded that the
representatives of the communist forces as well as the PVA/KPA’s Korean and Chinese
interpreters were constantly monitoring what they said. For instance, Pu Shan, who was a
forceful and polished orator in Chinese, was often aggravated that all of his eloquence
was lost on the American officers because the message had been rendered into English.
He thus developed a habit of staring at Ekvall, the only member of the UNC negotiation
team who could appreciate the merit of his words and elegant aphorisms, after making a
speech. At times, this became too much to bear and
He would twist and fidget until he could stand it no longer—he had long ceased
looking at me—and then would stop his interpreter with a fierce whisper: “No—
no, not that. Here read this.” He himself would write out the English interpretation
of what he had said and pass it to his interpreter to read.
(ibid., 54-55)
The other representative of the Chinese military, Huang Hua, likewise indirectly applied
pressure on the interpreter by making it evident that he was monitoring what the
interpreter said: “He listened to me, I knew, with amusement and a touch of malicious
curiosity to learn how I would put into his mother tongue what he had already understood
so well when it had been said in English” (Ekvall 1960, 48).
The fact that interpreters were constantly under surveillance was a source of
emotional distress because the norms of word-for-word interpreting were so fiercely
upheld at the negotiation table that divergence from the original could be interpreted as
an indication of disobedience towards the senior officer who had made the statement,
which, within a the context of a military at war, was a serious offense. This is best
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represented in the example of Sul Jeong Shik, the Korean-English interpreter of the
communist negotiation team. Underwood recalls that
He continually tried to “gild the lily” of [Chinese] Liaison Officer (Col. Chang)’s
remarks. For example: Col. Chang said quite calmly on one inspection trip “Here
are three of the Chinese People’s Volunteers [i.e. Chinese soldiers] killed by your
soldiers,” but Sul [the interpreter] said words to the effect, “Here you see, in pools
of their own blood these brave volunteers who left home and family to come to
this foreign land in sacrifice for the noble cause of our side in this war.”
After he did this several times I turned to Col. Chang (against all protocol, for
interpreters exist only to speak for their masters) and asked him if he indeed
meant what Sul said, or what he himself said. Chang glared at a third officer (who
had shown no evidence of speaking English) who gave him a quick nod, meaning
I was telling the truth. At that Col. Chang blew up at Sul and ordered him to go –
get out of my sight. My analysis of the situation is that Sul, who had been a
“mole” HS [high school] teacher in Seoul before the war, was simply trying to be
super patriotic to “prove” his loyalty to the North.
(Harris, 2010b)
The Korean War historian Allan Millet (2002, 260) writes that events such as those
discussed above were the cause of Sul’s demise:
“a turncoat Seoul highschool teacher” who worked as an interpreter for the
Communist delegation…He was executed at the end of the meeting because of his
poor performance. In other words, it seems that interpreters without any proper
training were only valuable according to their linguistic abilities, and, thus, they
were highly vulnerable.
Both Underwood and Millet ’s comments about Sul, however, paint a distorted picture of
this interpreter. First, while Millet claims that Sul was an unexperienced, untrained
interpreter who performed poorly at the negotiation table, this could hardly have been the
case. Sul had not only studied English Literature at Mount Union University, Ohio, and
Columbia University, New York, he was also an accomplished interpreter and translator
by the time the negotiations began. In fact, for several years during the U.S. military
occupation of Korea, he had worked as an interpreter for the Public Information Bureau
of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Sul’s name was
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even listed as an interpreter in the meeting minutes of the Joint U.S.-Korea Conference
(1946-47), which were discussed in detail in chapter two. The fact that he was chosen to
work as a mediator at this high-level meeting attests to the fact that Sul was recognized as
being a highly proficient interpreter whose skills were recognized by the USAMGIK.
When the Korean War broke out, Sul, whose writings show he was at heart a socialist,
joined the North Korean military but suffered a heart attack while in North Korea and
was operated on at a Hungarian field hospital. After his recovery, he was chosen to serve
as the KPA’s Korean-English interpreter at the armistice negotiations held at Kaesong
and Panmunjom.
Second, Millet claims that Sul was executed because of his poor performance as an
interpreter. Having established that Sul was already an accomplished interpreter by the
time the Korean Armistice Negotiation began, it is difficult to understand why he would
have been executed during the armistice talks, when his linguistic skills were more
valuable than ever. The truth of the matter was that Sul was not put on trial for being a
bad interpreter but on charges that he was an American spy (Cho 2012, 8). This was most
certainly not true, but these claims were made against him because the North Korean
communist party had begun a purge of cadre members who had defected from South
Korea. Sul’s career at the USAMGIK provided convenient grounds to justify his
elimination.
More important than the actual circumstances under which Sul was executed,
however, is the reasoning that led to Underwood and Millet’s assumption that he was
killed for being an incompetent interpreter. Their interpretation of these events provides
insight into the UNC interpreter’s self-perception and their perception of the norms of
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interpreting during the Korean Armistice Negotiations. In autobiographical material, an
informants’ over-emphasis of certain themes or their defensive stance on certain topic
tend to reveal their values and indicate their awareness of potential conflicts (Watson
1976, 107). Thus, the connection made by Underwood and Millet between Sul’s
interventionist interpreting tendencies or refusal to subserviently act as a linguistic
conduit, and his execution by the North Korean communist party suggests that UNC
interpreters themselves viewed fidelity to the source text to be an indicator of the
interpreter’s loyalty to the military establishment. Interpreting strategies such as addition,
clarification, subtraction, compression, omission, on the other hand, even when employed
to facilitate communication, were viewed as signs of open defiance. Because both the
negotiators and the interpreters saw the negotiation table as a battlefield, such
insubordination was legitimately thought to be punishable by death, which is why Millet
and Underwood arrived at the conclusion that Sul was executed for misinterpreting.
In sum, UNC’s military interpreters were officers and soldiers in the U.S. army,
working with their military superiors at the negotiation table. As members of the military,
the authority they commanded during interpreted events was decided not by the level of
linguistic and cultural expertise they possessed but by their military rank. As such, they
were obligated to abide by the military’s expectations regarding what constitutes
legitimate interpreting practice. The word-for-word interpreting norms of the military,
however, at times hampered interlingual/intercultural communication as it limited the
tools at the interpreter’s disposal which might be used to better convey the original
message to the PVA/KPA’s representatives. Despite the fact that the UNC lacked the
means to monitor the activities of its interpreters to confirm that they were acting as
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neutral conduits, the interpreters and representatives of the communist alliance provided
this function, since they kept close track of what the interpreter said and were more than
eager to point our discrepancies. Given that attempts to diverge from the original message
would be quickly discovered and the consequences of such an act were believed to be
severe, it is hardly surprising that UNC interpreters did not seek to challenge their
superior’s expectations regarding proper interpreting practices and abided by demands
that they function as a “faithful echo” to their principals.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Despite the historical significance of the Korean War as the first major
international clash to follow World War II, the first war in which member of the United
Nations participated in military action under the UN flag, and the first “hot war” of the
Cold War era, there have been very few studies conducted on the role interlingual
communication and interlingual mediators played in this violent conflict. The limited
number of studies that exist focus solely on the Korean Armistice Negotiations (19511953) but have thus far ignored the contributions made by interpreters during the U.S.
military occupation of southern Korea (1945-48) as well as the Korean War (1950-1953),
mostly likely due to the difficulty in locating historical records related to linguistic
mediation during those periods.
The data for this study draws from a wide variety of historical documents
collected from the Republic of Korea government’s online database, the Korean History
Database, and the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States of
America. A large body of newspaper and magazine articles published in both South
Korea and the United States were consulted as well. Special attention was also paid to
autobiographical material written by former interpreters as well as transfiction written
during the period under analysis. This study is likewise indebted to the families of former
interpreters, who shared insightful interviews, anecdotes, photographs, and military
records relevant to the topic at hand.
The archival material was analyzed and interpreted using Pierre Bourdieu’s
sociological notions of “field,” “capital,” “habitus,” and Moira Inghilleri’s
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conceptualization of interpreting activity as a “zone of uncertainty.” This theoretical
framework was used to analyze subtle shifts in the interpreting habitus that occurred as
the Korean conflict proceeded from preparation to engagement to conclusion. The
historical records, military documents and reports were used primarily to explore the
networks of power within which interpreting took place, while the information gathered
from interviews, autobiographical material, newspaper articles, and fictional works were
used to portray and analyze how interlocutors, including but not limited to the interpreter,
navigated and manipulated the structures of power that emerged during interpreted
events, thus lending further nuance to the study.

5.1. Summary of Key Findings
The current study views the U.S./U.S.S.R. occupation of the Korean peninsula,
the Korean War, and the Korean Armistice Negotiations as the preparatory, engagement,
and conclusionary phases of the Korean Conflict. Chapter two discussed the preparatory
phase, or the U.S. occupation of southern Korea. Chapter three delved into the
engagement phase, or the Korean War, and chapter four investigated the conclusionary
phase, or the Korean Armistice Negotiations. All three chapters followed a similar
structural format, as each introduced the socio-political circumstances of the military
field in which interpreted events were situated, the relationship between social agents
who engaged in interpreted events, and the distinct interpreting habitus that emerged
during each phase of the conflict. This structural configuration is in line with Bourdieu’s
recommendations for analyzing a field of power and its habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant
1992a, 104-105).
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Each of the three chapters began with a summary of the socio-political conditions
surrounding the Korean peninsula. Chapter two provided a review of the socio-historical
conditions and the decisions made by major players that led to the division of Korea
along the 38th parallel and its occupation by the militaries of Soviet Union in the north
and the United States in the south. Chapter three began with a brief account of the
outbreak of the Korean War and provides a detailed explanation of how and why the
United Nations and the People’s Republic of China became involved in the conflict,
despite the fact that the Republic of Korea was not a members of the United Nations
when war broke out on the peninsula. Lastly, chapter four clarified why the two sides
decided to bring the fighting to an end at the negotiation table rather than on the
battlefield, the process of negotiations, and the contents of the final agreement.
Next, each chapter moved on to examine the interagential structures of power
and relations within the military field during each period of the conflict. Chapter two
focused on three primary players: U.S. military personnel, the Korean public, and Korean
civilian interpreters working for the United States Army Military Government in Korea
(USAMGIK). During the period of military occupation, the southern half of Korea was
dominated by the USAMGIK, which maintained administrative control over the country
from 1945 to 1948. Despite arriving in Korea with the intention of establishing an
occupational government, the United States military did not possess any trained Korean
linguists within their ranks, as the country’s military brass had unfoundedly assumed that
Japanese Nisei interpreters could manage the task of mediating communications between
the Korean people and U.S. military personnel. This proved to be an erroneous
supposition, as fewer Koreans than initially thought could communicate through a
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Japanese mediator, and many of those who could refused to do so due to the country’s
recent experience of colonial oppression under Japanese rule. Consequently, the
USAMGIK was forced to employ Korean locals as Korean-English language brokers for
the Military Government. Because the study of the English language was strongly
discouraged during the last decade of Japanese rule, as Japan had engaged in open
warfare with the United States, there was a short supply of Koreans capable of
functioning as Korean-English linguistic go-betweens at the time. Despite the high
demand and low supply of English speakers, the USAMGIK chose to grossly underpay
interpreters, which might have led to some instances of corruption. The Korean public,
with whom the USAMGIK had to establish channels of communication, viewed the
foreign occupational force with great negativity because while the U.S. military claimed
to have arrived in Korea to aid in its establishment a functioning indigenous government,
it disbanded and oppressed the People’s Republic of Korea, which had been recognized
by the Japanese Governor-General and was widely popular and operational when the U.S.
troops arrived. The Korean public regarded interpreters working for the USAMGIK as
the second generation of foreign colluders, criticized the Military Government as an
“interpreter’s government” and claimed that USAMGIK interpreters were “malicious”
individual who were to blame for many of the problems Korean society faced at the time.
Chapter three reviewed the situation seen during the Korean War. Here, the study
focused on three agents: UN Liaison Group officers, U.S. Korean Military Assistance
Group officers and Republic of Korea Army officers. During the Korean War, the U.S.
military once again opted against recruiting or training its own linguistic staff, deciding
rather to rely on the services interpreters and translators provided by the Republic of
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Korea Army (ROKA). These military linguists were lieutenants in the South Korean
Army but worked under the misleading title—United Nations Liaison Group officers.
This was a highly coveted position because serving as an officer/interpreter guaranteed
better pay than enlisted soldiers, increased the person’s chances of survival, and gifted
the individual with the opportunity to study and practice English. Most UN Liaison
Group officers were individuals who had received higher education and considered
themselves members of the South Korea’s social elite. Once selected, interpreters were
required to receive three weeks of language and military training, but in reality, due to the
urgent need for interpreters in the fields and headquarters, training was often cut short.
Complaints regarding the linguistic capabilities of these interpreters can, in part, be
accredited to this lack of training, and the absence of agreed upon translation equivalents
for military terminology. A large number of UN Liaison Group officers were sent to
ROKA units to serve as linguistic mediators between U.S. KMAG officers and ROKA
unit commanders. KMAGers were U.S. officers sent to serve as advisors to the
commanders of ROKA units. KMAG advisors were lower in rank than their Korean
counterparts and did not hold official commanding power over the Korean units to which
they were assigned. Nonetheless, the ROKA advisees could not disregard their presence
because the UNC, which was headed by a U.S. general, maintained operational control
over the ROKA. Thus, the KMAG advisor and the ROKA advisee were constantly
contending for authority over the other. As the main channel through which the two could
cooperate and compete, interpreting was made the site of this struggle. Because UN
Liaison Group officers were members of the ROKA, and ROKA unit commanders were
their superiors, these interpreters were compelled to abide by their military superior’s
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orders. However, many members of the UN Liaison Group questioned the authority of
their unit commanders, as they viewed themselves to be socially and intellectually
superior to their senior officers, causing tensions to arise between the two groups. Near
the end of the war, the 8th ROKA Division reassigned their UN Liaison Group officers to
the KMAG staff. Because this move came only one month before the signing of the
armistice agreement, it is impossible to definitely confirm how such a move would have
affected the social dynamics between agents during interpreted events, though records
complied by U.S. military personnel indicate that both UN Liaison Group officers and
KMAGer responded positively to this move. The study infers how the relationship might
have developed over time based on the relationship seen between a U.S. military unit and
a Korean civilian interpreter. In this case, it was found that once a “fictive kin”
relationship was established between the two parties, members of the U.S. military relied
on the interpreter not only for linguistic mediation but additional services and functions
that lay outside of what is typically thought of as being the domain of the interpreter,
including intelligence gathering, analysis, and, when needed, operational control.
The subjects studied in chapter four, which focused on the Korean Armistice
Negotiations, were the UNC delegates to the armistice talks, the North Korean/Chinese
delegates, the communist interpreting staff, and the UNC interpreters. The Korean
Armistice Negotiations were held between the delegations of the UNC and the
representatives of the armies of North Korea and China. Consequentially, the languages
of all three participants—Korean, English, and Chinese—were recognized as the official
languages of the armistice talks. It was agreed that any comments made in one language
were to be interpreted into the remaining two languages. Both delegations were
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accompanied by interpreters who were tasked with rendering statements made by their
representatives into the other official languages. Because the United States military had
failed to train Korean linguists, despite its three year occupation of Korea and its
participation in an international war fought on Korean soil, it was discovered that there
were no linguists among active duty personnel who could reliably work as conference
interpreters at the armistice talks. As a result, the UNC had to rely on U.S. military
reserves, who had been raised as bilingual but had no formal training as interpreters, to
play this vital role. The number of interpreters and translators at the negotiation site was
constantly lower than the numbers recommended, forcing interpreters to work long hours
under highly challenging conditions. The delegation of the UNC was made up of four
officers from the U.S. military and one member of the ROKA while the KPA/PVA
delegation was headed by North Korean general who was supported by two North
Korean and two Chinese representatives. Both sides saw the negotiation table as an
extension of the battleground and treated the other as an enemy.
The following chart provides an overview of the findings of this study.
Table 6: Military Interpreters During the Three Stages of the Korean Conflict

Year
Military
Organization

Interpreter
Supply/Demand
Interpreter’s
Affiliation
Interpreter’s
Rank

U.S. Occupation

Korean War

1945-48
United States Army
Military Government
in Korea
(USAMGIK)
Low/High

1950-53
Korean Military
Assistance Group
(KMAG)
Low/High

Low/High

USAMGIK
Employee
Civil Servant, Grade
7 to 10

Republic of Korea
Army
First Lieutenant

United State Military
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Korean Armistice
Negotiations
1951-53
United Nations
Command (UNC)

Enlisted Soldiers and
Officers

Level of
Uncertainty
Interpreting
Norms

High



→

Low

Interventionist
Model



→

Conduit
Model

A common factor found throughout the Korean conflict was the high demand and low
supply of capable interpreters. These findings align with the following assessment made
by Fishel and Hausrath (1958) with regards to the linguistic challenges the U.S. military
faced in Korea during the Korean conflict:
The US Army has faced a serious language deficiency in Korea, not only since
the start of the Korean War in June 1950, but since the initial US occupation of
the peninsula in September 1945. Even as in 1945 when US forces landed in
Korea without trained Korean language personnel in their ranks, 5 years later in
the invasion of South Korea in 1950 found the US Military Advisory Group to the
Republic of Korea (KMAG), the Eighth US Army, and other US units in Korea
still without adequate supply of competent language specialists. The gravity of the
language situation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the US Army had no
competent career-service language personnel available to handle the 2-yr truce
negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom.
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 8)
Although the military field was characterized by a high demand and low supply of
interpreters throughout the three phases of the Korean conflict, the reasons for the
asymmetry between the two differed by period. During the U.S. occupation, the U.S.
military misjudged the efficacy of using its readily available Nisei interpreters in Korea.
This miscalculation was brought on by racist views of Asian countries and people, and an
insensitivity towards Korea’s colonial past and its identity as a sovereign nation.
Consequently, the USAMGIK was forced to rely on local civilian interpreters, whose
numbers were limited because the study of English in Korea had been restricted under the
Japanese colonial authorities.
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During the Korean War, the shortage of interpreters was in part caused by
America’s hubris following World War II. U.S. policymakers and military leaders
believed that the U.S.’s intervention would bring the war to a swift termination, and thus
the military decided against training its own Korean interpreters. Instead, the organization
relied on interpreters supplied by the ROKA. This belief demonstrates the fact that the
U.S. not only drastically underestimated its enemies but also undervalued the importance
of interlingual communication within the field of military combat.
The demand for interpreters at the Korean Armistice Negotiations distinguished
itself from the needs of the occupational government or the U.S. military during the war.
During the negotiations the U.S. military required the services of Grade A military
linguists, or “conference level” interpreters. Because the military had ignored the need to
train its own interpreters during both the occupation and the war, it had no active duty
personnel with the abilities to perform such a role. Due to the fact that the UNC
negotiation team was led by the U.S. amid opposition from the ROK government,
however, the U.S. could not rely on Korean interpreters. Because there were no active
duty language specialists capable of fulfilling this role, the U.S. was forced to recruit a
handful of bilingual personnel that were members of its Reserve Corps. Aside from
Colonel Ekvall, these individuals had not been trained and lacked experience as
interpreters, yet they were forced to learn on the job during this important event. While
the negotiations were ongoing, the U.S. military continued to recruit and send candidates
to the negotiation site to work as interpreters, translators, or typists, but most were sent
back because they lacked the linguistic skills to carry out theses roles.
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Also worthy of note are changes to the interpreters’ status, rank, and affiliation
over the three phases of warfare under examination as changes to their positioning within
the military field influenced their ability to dictate the terms under which interpreting
took place. During the occupation, the USAMGIK recruited local Koreans to serve as
interpreters at the Military Government. Their positions ranged from grade 7 to grade 10
government servants. As lower grade civil servants for an occupational government, who
were being paid artificially low wages for their linguistic services, it would seem natural
that these interpreters occupy a position of subservience within the institution of power.
The findings of this study, however, reveal that contrary to expectations, the civilian
status of these interpreters, which allowed them to exist outside the military hierarchy,
provided them with a high level of freedom when compared to military interpreters. As a
result, these interpreters functioned under less pressure to abide by the expectations of the
institution. Furthermore, because the U.S. military had arrived in Korea without having
made any preparations for the linguistic challenges it would face, the Military
Government lacked the capabilities to recruit and test, train, and monitor the activities of
its interpreters. In other words, this foreign institution was thoroughly reliant on the
services of interpreters over whom it could exercise no oversight. Rather, the officials in
the Military Government came to rely on interpreters to compensate for their lack of
cultural, political, and linguistic knowledge, and as a result the USAMGIK was often
referred to as the “interpreter’s government.” Under such conditions, the Military
Government was unable to present both the material and linguistic capital needed to
assume a position of power dominance during interpreted events, which prevented it from
asserting with confidence the validity of its views on how interpreters such function
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during interpreted events. Because of the lack of institutional control, there was a high
level of uncertainty regarding how interpreting should be conducted, which offered
interpreters the opportunity to actively intervene and in some cases dominate interpreted
events.
During the Korean War, UN Liaison Group officers, who served as mediators
between U.S. KMAG advisors and ROKA unit commanders. Despite the group’s name,
UN Liaison Group officers were first lieutenants in the ROK military, and as such, these
interpreters appeared to be firmly situated within the hierarchical structure of the ROK
military. However, because these officers were limited to performing tasks related to
translation and interpreting and were not involved in “the management of violence,” they
were excluded for the ROK military’s chain of command. Thus, these interpreters saw
themselves as “amateur soldiers” and commissioned officers saw them as “frail
intellectuals.” Furthermore, UN Liaison Group officers worked primarily with KMAG
officers, which added to the ambiguity of their positioning within the military field. They
were thus viewed as outsiders and a potential threat to the Korean military institution by
ROKA officers. While the Korean and U.S. militaries were allies, there was an ongoing
rivalry between KMAGers and ROKA commanders over who possessed more authority
because while the ROKA advisor held rank, the KMAGer was a member of the stronger
military force. The UN Liaison Group officer was pressured to function as a gatekeeper,
limiting the information the KMAGer had access to regarding the workings of the Korean
military unit to which they were assigned. However, just as officers in the Korean
military did not view these interpreters as regular members of the ROKA, the interpreters
themselves saw themselves as positioned outside the military structure. Their position as
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inbetweeners meant they could at time reject the premise that military rank equals
superiority, as memoires have revealed that they displayed disdain towards their military
leaders. Due to these complications, some U.S. military units preferred to hire civilian
interpreters, who were relatively free from pressures that Korean military personnel
exerted upon UN Liaison Group officers. In this case, if the interpreter demonstrated their
loyalty to the U.S. military, they were, in some cases, accepted as fictive kin and
entrusted with a wide range of duties.
The situation seen during the Korean Armistice Talks differs from circumstances
seen during the two previous phases of conflict significantly. The interpreters at the
negotiation table were U.S. military personnel, the majority of whom were officers,
conveying what the members of the UNC delegation, who were likewise U.S. military
officers but of higher rank, said to the communist delegation. While in the case of the
occupation and the war, the interpreters saw themselves as fully not situated within the
hierarchical structure of the military organization for which they worked, there was little
room left for such ambiguity at Kaesong and Panmunjom. As Wang and Xu (2016)
observed, these interpreters were first and foremost loyal to the militaries that they
served. The “role morality” of these interpreters was primarily defined by their status as
military personnel rather than their function, which was to serve as linguistic mediators.
Furthermore, while the U.S. military had outsourced responsibility over the recruitment,
training, and monitoring of interpreters during the occupation and the war because it
lacked the capabilities to carry out such functions, during the armistice talks, the U.S.
military was forced to locate, recruit, test, train, manage and monitor its interpreting staff.
An additional layer added to the constraints placed on interpreters to ensure that they
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were accurately communicating what was said by their principals was the presence of
“enemy” interpreters seated across the table, watching their every move and surveilling
their every word. The example of Sul Jeong Shik stands as a reminder that stepping
outside the bounds of verbatim interpreting could be equated to insubordination, which,
within the context of war, might very likely lead to server punishment. Thus, the level of
uncertainty regarding the identity of the interpreter, the positionality of the linguistic
mediator within interpreted events, and dominant views with regards to what constitutes
proper practice was low during the armistice talks, which limited the tools available to
the interpreter during interpreted events.
The findings of this study show that the interpreter’s status or rank within a
military organization is not the primary source of the authority they might possess during
interpreted events. It seems unlikely that military rank does not figure into the
empowerment of the interpreter during interpreted events at all, based on the fact that
lower ranking interpreters at the Korean Armistice Negotiations believed that their
superiors disregarded their linguistic and cultural expertise because of their lower status.
Nonetheless, it is readily evident that the civilian interpreters working for the USAMGIK
occupied a position of greater authority than UN Liaison Group officers during the war,
who, in turn, exercised greater freedom than the interpreters at the Korean Armistice
Negotiations.
Th results of this study also demonstrate that an institution’s ability to dictate the
terms of interpreting are decided by how actively it is involved in,
1) the selection of the interpreter, from a pool of competent candidates who
possess the requisite linguistic skills and are willing to align themselves with
the goals of the institution,
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2) the training of the interpreter, which helps students acquire relevant linguistic
skills and impresses on them normative practices,
3) the monitoring of interpreters, to verify that they adhere to prescribed
practices. The institution must be able to create incentives for interpreters to
comply with the requirements of the institution.
During the U.S. occupation, the USAMGIK was unable to effectively fulfill any of these
functions, which resulted in an interpreting habitus that allowed and, more importantly,
required that the interpreter take on an active role during interpreted events. During the
Korean War, the U.S. military was once again only marginally involved in the selection
and training of interpreters and entirely lacked the ability to monitor interpreting
practices. Furthermore, UN Liaison Group officers were members of the ROKA, and
under no obligation to defer to the wishes of KMAG officers. Instead, these interpreters
were liable, if grudgingly so, to manipulate an interlingual exchange to favor the ROKA.
The circumstances seen during the armistice negotiations were different, as interpreters
were selected from the military, received training at Kaesong and Panmunjom, and were
constantly being monitored by other interpreters, both friendly and enemy, to ensure that
they complied with interpreting norms which called for the interpreter to function as a
conduit of meaning.

5.2. Implications and Future Research
The findings of the present study, summarized above, have reinforced the view
that interpreting is a social practice. The data analyzed in this study suggests that the
interpreter’s position within the network of power that emerged during interpreted events
held during the Korean conflict affected their behavior as well as those of other social
agents situated in the military field. The interpreting habitus that took form in each period
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of the Korean conflict emerged based on the power dynamics between social agents, the
interpreter’s position within the institution of power, and the ability of the U.S. military
to select, train, and monitor interpreters. At different times and locations during the
conflict, radically different norms of interpreting, ranging from active intervention to
nonintervention took form. All of these findings point back to the notion that interpreting
does not occur in a vacuum, and that it is conditioned by the social, political and cultural
context of the setting in which the interpreted event takes place.
The author hopes that this study represents a contribution to the field of
Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS), mainly in the following two area. One is the
addition of new knowledge and information to the collective knowledge of this rapidly
growing discipline. This study drew from a wide variety of materials, including
previously classified military and governmental documents, provides a wealth of
information on various aspects of interpreting during both the U.S. military occupation of
southern Korea, the Korean War, and the Korean Armistice Negotiations, which had
previously been largely ignored.
The other contribution of the present study may be the broadening of
perspectives in TIS. Studies conducted within the discipline since the so-called “cultural
turn” have focused much attention on the social factors in which interpreting takes places
as well as the power dynamics seen between social agents. This study used Bourdieu’s
theoretical framework to examine the sociological nature of interpreting during the
Korean conflict. It directly addressed social and political issues to describe the field in
which interpreting took place, examined the social dynamics that arose within the
military field between social agents engaged in interpreting events, and analyzed the
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interpreting habitus that arose is zones of uncertainty. It is the author’s hope that this
research is seen contributing to the deepening and widening of sociological approaches to
Translation and Interpreting Studies.
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